FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 33 JULY 1955 No. 4

THE BAD AND THE GOOD IN US

By Paul H. Douglas

THERE is no doubt that during the last few years the United States has become increasingly unpopular abroad and that this is true in Asia as well as in Europe. There is a vague unhappiness and resentment in many parts of the world because of changes in former power relationships and because it is hard either to give or to receive favors gracefully. But part of our unpopularity has more specific origins.

In particular, three charges are being levelled against us. It is alleged that we are imperialistic; that we seek war and slight peaceful alternatives; and, finally, that we are bitterly racist and anti-Negro. Many Americans would consider these charges so evidently false that they would think it unnecessary to refute them. The fact remains that they obtain widespread acceptance. It may therefore be appropriate that a member of the opposition party, one who is not an admirer of the present national Administration, should try to set the record straight. I shall endeavor to do so without showing pique that we are "misunderstood" or "unappreciated" by many peoples for whom we have only respect and friendly feelings, and certainly without imagining that a happier economic situation than that of some nations gives the United States any moral or intellectual superiority over them or entitles Americans to preach at them.

II

First, let us consider the charge of imperialism. If it had been made a half or even a quarter of a century ago, there would have been a considerable degree of truth in it. For in the concluding years of the nineteenth century we also fell prey to the fever of imperialism and colonialism which was rampant in Western Europe and which had caused Britain, France and Germany to

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divide up Africa and to take control over so much of Asia. It was the period of Tory Imperialism and of Kipling's "White Man's Burden" and we as a nation were guilty along with the rest.

Out of the Spanish-American War, we took Puerto Rico and the Philippines and established a protectorate over Cuba by means of the Platt Amendment. In addition we annexed Hawaii and eastern Samoa. Admiral Mahan's teachings were being put into effect; and a book with a novel title, "The United States as a World Power," by Professor Coolidge of Harvard, paralleled the part played in England in the reign of Edward VII by Sir John Seeley's "Expansion of England." We began training our diplomats in the standards of the British Foreign Service.

Soon thereafter came the staged revolution in Panama and the attendant intervention by President Theodore Roosevelt which enabled us to complete the Panama Canal and to refuse to pay Colombia the price which she had demanded for this privilege. This shabby adventure, the complete facts of which are not yet known, did much to weaken our prestige and fasten the imperialistic label upon us. This judgment was intensified by our armed occupation of Haiti and Santo Domingo in 1914 and 1915 and of Nicaragua in 1927. And it was further strengthened by the declaration of our diplomats that the Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral policy under which we not only kept the European nations out of Latin America but also made our own will and decisions paramount over those of our neighbors to the south.

Imperialism therefore can with some reason be said to have been one of the dominant policies of this country during the 35 years from 1898 to 1933.

But there was always a strong current of opposition to this course and gradually the anti-imperialists won the day. The objections to the treaty which concluded the Spanish-American War were so powerful that it was barely ratified. Newspapers like the *New York World*, the *New York Evening Post*, the *Springfield Republican* and the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* voiced their protest and William Vaughn Moody in his "Ode in Time of Hesitation" expressed the feeling of betrayal which millions of humble Americans felt at the prostitution of their ideals by the party of imperialism. The American people had sought to free the Cubans in 1898—not to found a new imperialism. In the presidential election of 1900, William Jennings Bryan and the Democrats made imperialism their chief issue and while they

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were defeated by the "full dinner pail" argument of Mark Hanna, the opposition to colonialism was always strong and operated as a continuously restraining influence upon the State Department and upon those military, commercial and financial interests which favored a more aggressive policy toward the Latin-American peoples.

In justice to Herbert Hoover, it should be said that his genuinely pacific instincts inclined away from imperialism and that he tried to break away from the previous pattern. This was notably the case in Haiti. But it was with the election of Franklin Roosevelt and the coming to power of the Democratic Party in 1933 that a full reversal was effected. There was no more armed intervention. The Platt Amendment, giving us the right to intervene in Cuba, was repealed. The Tydings-McDuffie Act, providing for the practical freeing of the Philippines, was passed in 1936 and to the surprise of virtually all the Europeans was actually put into effect. In 1946 the Philippine Independence Act was also passed, completing this process under terms which in practice have proved to be comparatively generous. America thus led the way in the abandonment of colonialism and did so of her own free will and decision.

Puerto Rico was granted commonwealth status under which she obtained all the advantages of being a part of the American Union, including freedom of movement for her people and the free entry of sugar into our markets, but was released from any attendant burdens, such as the payment of income taxes. The Monroe Doctrine was transformed into a multilateral policy. Nor did our actions stop there. American sentiment was a factor in persuading the British to leave India and we put heavy pressure upon the Dutch to do the same in Indonesia. While we never pushed matters to the breaking point to get the French to act similarly in Indo-China, the weight of our influence was in that direction.

This record indicates that we have been the strongest force against colonialism among the Western Powers. Internally within the Asiatic countries, also, we have worked for land reform. This was perhaps the most lasting and beneficial feature of General MacArthur's reform measures in Japan. The Bell Commission urged it for the Philippines and President Magsaysay with our benevolent backing is seeking to carry it out. We have encouraged similar policies on Formosa as we did on the mainland of

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China prior to 1948 and we are working in the same direction in South Vietnam.

In these ways we would seem to have more than cleaned our skirts of imperialist tendencies; and even though the Republican Party is now back in power, my critical eye can find no indication that its responsible leaders have any desire to return to the ways of their predecessors. The American sympathy for the underdog and our strong belief in independence and self-rule have conquered the spirit of imperialism. This was weakened in any case by the knowledge that colonialism is both a financial burden and an emotional strain. If there is one major Power in the world that has abandoned colonialism and imperialism, it is the United States.

The real imperialistic countries today, as Sir John Kotelawala, the Prime Minister of Ceylon, stated so eloquently at Bandung, are of course Communist Russia and Red China. Russia has enslaved a string of satellites, including the Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania. These contain a total of approximately 100,000,000 people. In each of them, self-government has been eliminated and a brutal dictatorship established. Red China has taken over Tibet and North Korea, has its agents in Nepal and will be able to call the tune in North Vietnam. It is reaching out for the control of all Southeastern Asia—an area rich in food and natural resources and not overpopulated. Judging by the tactics which the Chinese Communists are using inside their own country, their oppression of the other Asiatic peoples, if and when they obtain dominance, would make the exploitation of the British, Dutch and French imperialists in days past seem as child's play. Nor would there be any real redistribution of the land to the peasants; this might be permitted for a few years, but Communist teaching and practice are very clear that as soon as possible the farm lands are to be organized in state collectives. The peasants would then lose even the degree of independence which they now have and a new and more terrible tyranny would set in under which they would become the work slaves of the state.

The pity of it all, however, is that since this political and economic oppression has not been directly experienced as yet in Southern and Southeast Asia it is not appreciated. As a Burmese statesman remarked to a friend of mine, it remains something purely

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theoretical. The oppression of the colonial administrators of the European Powers has been experienced directly and in the very recent past, however, and hence is keenly remembered and deeply resented. Thus the uncommitted third of the world tends to be much more angry at Western than at Communist imperialism, and since we are a Western Power and part of the white race we are included in the general dislike.

There are two particular ironies in this. Although we long since freed ourselves from imperialism, we tend to be blamed, as the most powerful Western nation, for all that has gone before. In India, for example, the Indians tend to exonerate the British who controlled that country for so long and to heap their condemnation instead upon us who certainly have never hurt them and and who have indeed from time to time given them a helping hand. The second irony is that while the so-called world of color for understandable reasons dislikes the whites, Soviet propaganda has apparently been successful in getting the majority of colored peoples to forget that Russians too are whites.

Some of this unfortunate drift in the public opinion of the neutral and uncommitted third of the world was perhaps inevitable. Some of it could, however, have been averted by a more vigorous policy of opposition to colonialism than our government has been willing to evince, by more considerate and friendly treatment of the Asiatic peoples by our diplomats, and by a bold program of truth-telling about the real facts.

III

The second complaint is that we are always rattling the saber and brandishing the atomic bomb and that we and not Russia have been the aggressors since the conclusion of World War II.

Now it is my opinion that the utterances of Secretary Dulles have at times been maladroit and I think that on crucial occasions he has used threatening language which he has not been prepared to back up. But it certainly is not true that we have in any sense been the aggressor during the last ten years. Our record is, in fact, quite the contrary. We were good allies to Russia during World War II, despite the suspicion and hostility with which our representatives were treated. We can be certain that if the rôles had been reversed, Russia would never have given us the 11 billion dollars' worth of war material and supplies which we lavished upon her. If anything we were overgenerous to the Rus-

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sians in the terms to which we agreed at Tehran and Yalta, although the degree of these concessions has been greatly exaggerated. Nor should the world forget that we practised unilateral disarmament following World War II. When the war ended, we had the mightiest force in the world and were supreme on the land, on the sea and in the air. Within 18 months, however, we had shrunk our armed forces from 12,500,000 to 1,500,000 men. On the other hand, while we were becoming militarily weak, Russia maintained a huge army of at least 3,500,000 men and was making great strides in the development of her air force and her submarine fleet. If we had been aggressive, we would never have behaved as we did; and if Russia had been peace-loving, she would never have done as she did.

It will be remembered that Secretary Byrnes offered Russia a 25-year and then a 40-year treaty under which Germany was to be kept disarmed and thus removed as a possible threat to Russia's western border. Both proposals were rejected by Russia.

Nor did our considerate attitude toward Soviet interests stop here. We contributed over seven-tenths of the relief furnished to the Ukraine, White Russia and Byelorussia after the war and in 1947 we offered to make the Marshall Plan apply to Eastern as well as to Western Europe and hence to Russia as well as to Britain and to France. Russia not only spurned this offer for herself but she also prohibited Poland and Czechoslovakia from accepting after these nations had indicated their initial agreement. Not content with this, the European Communist parties under Russian direction went on to carry out a program of opposition and sabotage against the application of the Marshall Plan in the West. Russia's policy was proof that she preferred hunger and misery in Western Europe to economic recovery because they would give her a better chance to take over these countries from within.

At about this time, moreover, when the United States had a monopoly of the atomic bomb, we offered, in the Baruch plan, to denature our existing stores of bombs, to enter into a world compact to manufacture no more and to use atomic energy for exclusively peaceful purposes. There was but one essential qualification which was attached to this offer, namely, that there should be a competent international system of inspection to see that the pledge was being observed. This is an essential feature of any disarmament agreement, as our experience after World

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War I with the Japanese mandated islands of the South Pacific demonstrated. Of course, we offered to submit ourselves to such inspection along with every other country. Russia refused to accept this necessary condition.

Similarly Russia has defeated every honest proposal for international disarmament. She killed the idea of an international police force. She refused to permit any international inspection. She has advocated disarmament only on those items in which we are strong, such as atomic bombs, but has been unwilling to cut her own huge ground armies.

American efforts to induce Russia to be coöperative continued well into 1947. Long before this, however, Russia had shown her evident determination to follow a program of aggression and of attempted world domination. While Great Britain and we lived up to our wartime pledge to withdraw our troops from Iran, Russia for a long time refused and finally agreed only under great pressure. The international conferences on the future of Italy, Hungary, Austria and Germany were stymied by cynical Soviet sabotage, as Governor Byrnes has well described in his book, "Speaking Frankly." Only recently did a treaty on Austria at last become possible.

In 1946, and again in 1947, Russia tried to get control of the Straits of the Dardanelles and to secure a strong foothold on the shores of the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean Seas. Turkey was bullied and an internal revolution was started in Greece. Only American help for the established constitutional régimes saved those countries. This help, it should be noted, was extremely careful not to trespass upon the sovereignty of the nations concerned or of their governments.

In 1948, Russia instituted the Berlin blockade, a wanton effort to starve West Berlin into submission. Instead of sending armed trucks to blast open the highway from the west to Berlin, as we would have been justified in doing, we instituted the airlift. This was successful, but only at great expense to ourselves.

Then in 1950 came the Communist invasion of South Korea. While this was nominally carried out by the North Koreans, it was quite plainly stimulated by the Russians who gave the invaders, first the Koreans and later the Chinese, supplies, equipment, artillery, airplanes and technicians.

Similarly, when we had the Communist forces on the run in June of 1951 and could probably have pushed on to the neck of

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the peninsula, the Russians made a cease-fire proposal to which we trustingly agreed. This turned out to be a hollow farce but we went through with it and finally agreed to an armistice which permitted the Communists to build airfields down to the 38th parallel and which placed no restrictions upon the Chinese taking up the offensive elsewhere. This they promptly proceeded to do by switching their support to Ho Chi Minh in Northern Vietnam. At Geneva, we acquiesced in a surrender which gave this area to the Communists and which opened up all of South Vietnam to their propaganda.

The present Administration has at times talked "tough," as when Mr. Dulles spoke of "massive retaliation" and when Vice-President Nixon talked of sending American troops to help the French defend Indo-China and Dien Bien Phu. But when the test has come, it has always backed away from the actual use of force. Indeed the Red Chinese claim that we are in fact a "Paper Tiger." How this argument can be reconciled with the other Communist claims that we are a bloodthirsty aggressor, I do not know. But Communist propaganda is never troubled by gross inconsistency.

Thus I do not think the Administration can legitimately be charged with being aggressive, let alone with being an aggressor. At times, in order to score a political advantage over us Democrats, the Administration will take an unsound position or stray from the truth, as when the President said that under President Truman we had shielded the Communists from Chiang Kai-shek and that he was issuing instructions to the 7th Fleet no longer to shield them. This so-called "unleashing of Chiang" led our government to help Chiang to fortify the Taechens, Quemoy and the Matsus as steppingstones to an ultimate invasion of the mainland. The consequences of this unsound encouragement have been injurious to our prestige in Asia; but the way in which the Administration has backed down when it was put to the test indicates that it is not fundamentally aggressive in its purpose.

IV

The third charge is that we are bitterly racist and anti-Negro. This indictment is grossly exaggerated in its details, but it touches nevertheless our worst national sin. The Communist agitators in the Orient strive to paint a terrible picture of the oppression practised upon the Negroes; they would have it believed that bloody

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lynchings are a daily occurrence in the United States and that the only question raised in our country is whether the Negroes are to be hung or burned at the stake.

It is true that 40 years ago our record in the matter of lynchings was disgraceful—the annual average for the six years 1910–15 being 63.6. It was still bad enough 30 years ago, when the yearly average was 41.3. In the last decade, however, lynching has virtually disappeared. The average for 1946–51 was only 2.4; and in the last three years there have been no lynchings at all.

But while the terrible reality has vanished, the din of Communist propaganda keeps resentments hot.

I am offering no apologies for our treatment of the Negroes, which along with the existence of slums in our great cities I regard as the worst blot upon our civilization. But censorious critics might perhaps remember that we have had the most gigantic problem of harmonizing racial differences ever presented in the history of the world and that year by year we have been improving our handling of it.

In sharp contrast with the European countries, which over the centuries have been able to achieve a largely unified population both racially and culturally, the United States is the most diversified nation in the world. Our great cities, notably New York and Chicago, are composed of racial mixtures hitherto unknown in history. European observers of American culture indeed predicted that this diversity would be our undoing and that, torn apart by bitter racial antagonisms, we would collapse at the first open test with the outside world. This prophecy proved false. We came through two world wars with greater rather than less unity and with racial tensions lessened rather than heightened. For example, anti-Semitism has markedly decreased during the last decade and the some six million American Jews are being properly received on terms of equality in American life to a degree that is probably unsurpassed elsewhere.

But the 15,000,000 Negroes and the some 2,000,000 Mexican-Americans of the southwest do suffer from real disabilities. No one can or should deny this. Nor should it be excused. These groups suffer from poverty, poor health, inadequate housing and school facilities. Over wide areas they are afraid either to vote or to take any real part in civil life. There is some discrimination against them in employment. But other nations might consider whether their own record is essentially better. The *tu quoque*

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argument is not effective in itself but use of it may be permissible here to show that what we face is a weakness in human character to which not Americans alone are subject and which we should all discuss with humility. If the prospect of a few added thousands of Jamaican workers was enough to excite the wrath of a large section of British labor, what would they feel and do if it were suggested that one-tenth of their population become, as ours is, Negro? And would British workers take with equanimity the yearly migration of hundreds of thousands of Negroes into their industrial centers, as happens with us? The fact seems to be that often when the attitudes of other countries towards the race question seem superior to ours, this has been primarily due to the fact that they have comparatively few of a widely different race amongst their numbers. The behavior of European soldiers, administrators, planters and businessmen in Africa and Asia lends no support to the thesis that they are more civilized in matters of race than we. This is indeed cold comfort, for unless all of us in the West effect a speedy and thoroughgoing improvement in our basic attitudes and behavior towards the black, brown and yellow peoples, this presently neutral third of the world is likely to join our enemies.

Nor would it be fair to pass over in complete silence the fact that our Indian friends, who often are to the fore in denouncing symptoms of American racism, belong to a people which engaged in the mutual slaughter of several millions of Mohammedans and Hindus during the separatist riots of 1947, and that India has maintained the cruel caste system under which tens of millions of human beings have been treated worse than animals. Socially conscious Indians disapprove of such practices and India is making a real effort to wipe them out. But to do so takes time and effort, just as it takes time and effort to end discriminatory practices in our country.

I shall not dwell on the inter-racial hatreds which flourish elsewhere in Asia. The rivalry and bitterness between Malayans and Chinese, between Chinese and Japanese, between Chinese and Koreans, between Japanese and Koreans, and so on, are evidence that most peoples, even those who themselves have suffered from the blight of discrimination, find difficulty in being friendly or even just to those who differ from them widely.

A real improvement has been taking place for some years in the United States. In the first place an almost complete integra-

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tion of the races has been effected within all branches of our armed services. Instead of separate Negro battalions and regiments, blacks and whites are now commingled in the same squads and platoons in both Army and Marine Corps. A similar integration exists in the Navy and the Air Force. It was originally feared that such an intimate mixture of the young and hot-blooded of such different races would breed discord and violence. This has not occurred. The change has been accepted with relative quiet and the testimony of competent field commanders is that the over-all combat effectiveness of the services has been increased.

Similarly we have made great progress in the field of political life. In the North and Middle West the political power of the Negroes has increased. They are an important factor in at least a dozen states north of the Mason and Dixon line. They play an increasingly important part in local government, with many aldermen and indeed the President of the Borough of Manhattan coming from their members. Numerous state legislators are Negroes as are three members of Congress. One of the most respected Judges on the federal bench is a Negro.

South of the Mason and Dixon line events have also been marching on. In the cities which border on the North, Negro voting is the rule rather than the exception. In cities like Atlanta and New Orleans it is increasing. Indeed in the former city, a respected Negro has recently been elected to the Board of Education for the city as a whole by the white vote. However, in the sections where the blacks are overwhelmingly predominant, as in the seaboard districts of South Carolina and Georgia and in the Delta counties of Mississippi, only the whites are in practice allowed to vote. In general there is little political participation by the blacks in the predominantly rural and farming sections. But we have come a vast distance from the almost total disenfranchisement of the Negroes of 30 years ago, and as a two-party system develops in the South, as it seems to be doing, rivalry between the parties will cause them increasingly to seek the Negro vote and hence will greatly speed up the process.

Great gains are also being made in the field of employment. The general shortage of labor from 1940 opened up many jobs to Negroes and they have been enjoying an unparalleled 15 years of prosperity. This has enabled them to improve their homes and their education. While the movement for a fair federal employment practices law has been defeated because of the power of

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Southern senators to filibuster such a measure through unlimited debate, there are a dozen states and a large number of cities with similar acts and ordinances. Discrimination, although not rare, is on the defensive throughout the North and the West. One of the most heartening events in recent years has been the way in which Ralph Bunche has won deserved honors. At least a score of American universities have conferred honorary degrees upon him and in so doing evidenced a desire to make atonement to his race for the slights and wrongs of the past.

The so-called restrictive real estate covenants have lost their binding force by decisions of the United States Supreme Court, with the result that the more well-to-do Negroes have been leaving their erstwhile ghettos and have been buying homes in outlying sections of the big Northern and Western cities. This is comparable to the way in which the Jews of Western Europe moved out of their ghettos and began to take their part in society as a result of the liberating influence of the French Revolution.

But the biggest forward step has of course come about as a result of the decision of the Supreme Court in outlawing segregation in the schools. The Court unanimously held that any such segregation was a violation of the provision in the 14th Amendment which guaranteed to each citizen the "equal protection of the laws."

In previous decisions the Court had ruled that the States must provide equal educational facilities. This opened the graduate and professional schools of a number of Southern States' universities to Negro students. No untoward events occurred and the experiment was generally pronounced a success. The decisions also led to an extensive school building by the Southern States to raise the level of the educational facilities available to Negroes so that the South might then better defend its doctrine of "separate but equal" facilities.

Then in 1954 the Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion struck down even this defense. The Court ruled that separate facilities were inherently unequal since they implanted in the race with lower social status the feeling that they were inferior and hence gave to most of them an inferiority complex which handicapped them in their later struggles in life. I personally regard this as the most important forward step since the Emancipation Proclamation and the subsequent 13th Amendment

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which formalized the abolition of slavery. The Supreme Court wisely ruled that it would reserve for later decision the ways and means by which the program of integration was to be effected and invited the States to submit plans of procedure. Arguments have been heard on these very matters.

The Court's decision has had a pronounced effect in the border States of Maryland, Delaware, Missouri and Kentucky and in those Northern cities where segregation was still practised. It has also led to the abandonment of segregation in a considerable number of Southern communities where the percentage of Negroes is not great. It has had virtually no effect thus far in the so-called Black Belt of the South. But while there may still be trouble in these regions there is little doubt but that segregation in the schools is on the way out.

In short, the forces of racism are fighting a rear-guard action in the United States. The whole drift of public opinion, as Congressman Powell testified at Bandung, is in the direction of a more perfect democracy in which men and women will be given greater opportunities, and then judged on their merits without regard to their race or religion. What many of us believed would take decades to effect has been done within a few years.

On the whole, then, I feel that the United States faces the world with relatively clean hands on the main issues on which it is often attacked. In striving to strengthen the forces of democracy in the world and to halt the spread of oppressive and totalitarian Communism we are merely putting into effect the principles to which the American dream has been dedicated and which we seek, not wholly without success, to establish within the texture of our own life and institutions.

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THE MIND OF ASIA

By M. R. Masani

A SOCIALIST intellectual coming from one of the uncommitted countries of Asia made an interesting observation during the Asian Conference on Cultural Freedom which met in Rangoon in February of this year. "In our efforts at expanding the bounds of cultural freedom in Asia," he said, "a difficulty which we come up against in many of our compatriots is what may be described as 'the colonial mind.' This is the obverse of 'the imperialist mind' and represents an intellectual hangover from a period of subjection to one or other kind of Western domination."

Now the decisive rôle that the intelligentsia plays in the underdeveloped countries of Asia is not always adequately appreciated in the United States or even in Europe. It may be worth while stressing, then, that the ruling class in these countries is neither the landed aristocracy nor the capitalists but the articulate urban educated class; this is the class which creates public opinion and makes and unmakes governments. Because the great mass of the people do not share in the making of "public opinion," particularly in regard to international affairs, the people who write and read the newspapers have a strategic importance out of all proportion to their numerical or economic strength.

What exactly is the "colonial mind" which is to be found at work in these circles? In a typical sense the Asian intellectual possessed of this outlook is a well-meaning, earnest soul. He has a Messianic zeal to reform the world. In the case of only a handful does this discontent with the *status quo* lead to acceptance of the Communist creed. The typical Asian intellectual is by no means a Communist. Indeed, inclined as he is to be liberal, gentle, devotional and somewhat easygoing, he is repelled by the intolerance of Communism, its brutal suppression of opposition, its extermination of religion, its ruthless efficiency.

But since many of us like to think that unpleasant socio-economic aspects of our countries are capable of being transformed overnight we look around for a panacea. Reports of the "success" of the Soviet Five Year Plans and of the "achievements" of the Soviet system evoke in us a ready response. Why, we ask ourselves, should not our own country take similar shortcuts to

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strength and prosperity? Studies which show that the real wage of the Soviet worker, whether in the factory or on the collective farm, may not, after all, be higher today than it was in 1913 are unknown to most of us and we tend to brush them aside as propaganda. In any event, it would be a mistake to think that most of us evaluate national achievement in terms of individual happiness or comfort. Our main measuring rod is that of national strength and power. The sons of Asians who thrilled in response to the victory of Japan over Tsarist Russia respond similarly to the military and diplomatic successes of Communist China over the Americans in Korea and the French in Indo-China.

Notwithstanding our acceptance—while it lasted—of the Malenkov look, "the look that failed," there is a vague sense of uneasiness somewhere at the back of our minds about the brutalities of the Communist system. "But then," comes the thought, "you can hardly make an omelette without breaking eggs. In any event, it can't happen here. Our spiritual tradition and way of life are different from those of the Russians who, after all, were always used to the Tsar and the knout. What we shall do is copy the Soviet plans without resorting to the blood baths and the terrors of the secret police."

No such caution, however, marks our attitude toward Communist China. "Ah," we say, "China is different!" The Chinese people, we have been told, are overwhelmingly behind the Communist Government. Land reform has been put into effect. Corruption has been rooted out. No more flies are to be seen. The trains run on time. For the first time in their history, the Chinese people have a clean and efficient government. *More* important, the Chinese people are united; *still* more important, the Chinese people have told the white man where he gets off. At the same time we are assured that the Chinese Communist leaders are peace-loving. Has not Chou En-lai affirmed in Delhi, in Rangoon and in Bandung his adherence to the Five Principles of coexistence? If the Chinese Communists fought in Korea, that was only because the Americans and their "reactionary" ally Syngman Rhee were threatening their frontier by marching, despite warnings, north of the 38th Parallel. If they threaten to fight in Formosa today, that is because, after all, Formosa belongs to China —or at least Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin agreed during World War II that it did. At this point, perhaps, it would be just as well to concede that many of us are not really possessed of a

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deep concern for peace. In so far as South Asia is concerned, it has not known a war within living memory. The horrors of war, like the beauties of peace, are therefore in the main an abstraction. But the issue of peace, like that of race, affords us an opportunity to feel morally superior to the Occidentals by contrasting our ideals with their practices.

The oppression of the colored peoples in South Africa is a recurrent theme which we are never allowed to forget. And indeed why should we? Thinking of color and the insufferable claims to white superiority and supremacy, how can we help but think of the suffering of the Negroes in the United States? Stories of discrimination in the Southern States make our blood boil, and the claims of the United States to be the leader of world democracy are automatically deflated.

Then there is always Senator McCarthy to attract one's attention. It is impossible to overestimate the contribution to anti-Americanism made by the Junior Senator from Wisconsin. Now that he no longer figures in the headlines, his place is rapidly being taken by the warmongering Mr. John Foster Dulles, who, if some of the journals we read are to be believed, is constantly on the point of dropping hydrogen bombs all over Asia. Talking of armaments, efforts at building collective security in Southeast Asia or in the Middle East are resented as bringing war nearer. They run counter to the Asian instinct for letting time do the job of easing tensions rather than going out halfway to meet the problem. Why not trust the Communist rulers to respond to friendship and the jettisoning of atomic weapons?

Urgings to trust the Communists bring up the topic of coexistence. The picture, as it is presented to us in Asia, is that of Russia and China responding to the plea for coexistence while the perverse Americans refuse to accept it. It is not recalled that Communist dogma rejects the very possibility of coexistence and that it is their bitter experience with Communist practice since 1945 that stops the spokesmen of the democracies from giving three cheers every time the word is mentioned. If occasionally it is mentioned, it is dismissed with a shrug of the shoulders, something about "a plague on both your houses."

In the view of most of us in Asia, the world is divided into two power blocs, with a few peace-loving nations in between. We see the efforts made by this Third Force as the major influence restraining the two armed giants from World War III. This "two-

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Power bloc" thesis is at the root of much of our thinking and it makes it possible for us to equate the total suppression of liberty in Russia and China with the continuing practice of colonialism by some of the Western Powers and of racial discrimination in Africa and the United States.

Having judged both sides to be equally guilty, we do not find it difficult to move on to an acceptance of the theory of equidistance preached by the Indian Socialist leader, Dr. Rammanohar Lohia, who urges "an attitude of mind that keeps away as sharply from the Atlantic camp as from the Soviet camp, from capitalism as well as Communism. To prefer one is to weaken our capacity to combat the other and to build our own way."

So we find the concept of state neutrality extended to the plane of intellectual neutralism and the concept of coexistence stretched to cover the world of ideas and culture. On the morning that preceded the opening of the Asian Conference on Cultural Freedom, the *New Times,* a Rangoon daily, asked in an editorial, after a reference to the Five Principles: "Why could not the cultures of democracy and Communism also coexist? Must one always seek to oust and replace the other?"

Underlying all this is the assumption that there is such a thing as a common mind or attitude among the intelligentsia of the countries of Asia. Now, this is a concept which has been challenged from more than one quarter. That there is little in common between the mind of the Indian peasant and the Japanese farmer or between the mental processes of a worker in a Lahore factory and those of his counterpart in Hong Kong or Manila may at once be conceded. Even at the level of the intelligentsia, there may be dangers in thinking in terms of a particular stereotype. A keen observer of the Rangoon Conference like Philip Deane commented that "the delegates from the various countries often meant different things when using the same words, and they did not have a common frame of reference, a background of common experience or even a common sense of history."

As the proceedings of the recent Asian-African Conference at Bandung revealed dramatically, European countries could hardly differ more amongst themselves than do those of Asia. There is very little in common between the Lebanese, Irani, Iraqi, Filippino, Pakistani, Ceylonese, Thai, Nationalist Chinese or Korean line of thought and the dominant point of view in Syria, Indonesia, Burma or India. It has now been demonstrated that no

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particular school of thought can claim to speak for Asia. Within each of the countries are to be found many nuances in feeling as well as thousands who dissent from the prevailing trend. A vocal minority may sometimes produce a misleading impression of homogeneity. Professor Takeyama Michio of Tokyo University writes: "Suppose we have 50 professors, perhaps 5 percent of them are sentimental. There are also 5 percent who write and publish their ideas. But the important point is that it is the very same 5 percent in both cases, so that the impression is created that 100 percent of the professors are sentimental. The facts, of course, are quite otherwise; but the other 95 percent are silent."

When all is said, however, there is enough in common in the historical experience, emotion and thought of a large and influential section of the intelligentsia of the region, particularly in the uncommitted countries, to make it worth while to attempt an analysis and understanding of the "colonial" state of mind.

II

Why is it that a body of men, many of whom have been exposed to the same education as their counterparts in Europe and America, should develop such a distinctive pattern of thought? What are the psychological and emotional motivations that go into the making of the stereotype, and what are the underlying compulsions of which these specific biases are only the signposts?

Consider first the environment in which the Asian intellectual of this kind finds himself. It is true that his country has recently achieved its national independence. The withdrawal of Western domination has, however, left the new ruling class facing tremendous economic, social and cultural problems. The general pattern is of a stagnant economy; agriculture with low productivity hampered still by the relics of landlordism; industry as yet without the strength to push through by itself the process of industrialization; on the one hand a shockingly low national dividend, on the other only too often a rapidly rising population. On the social side there is a predominantly illiterate population, steeped largely in ignorance and superstition, with low physical vitality and low social mobility.

National pride demands that one shall catch up, if not with the prosperity of the United States or Canada, at least with that of France or Italy. Yet the new ruling class finds itself ill-equipped to perform this task. Brought up mostly on a study of the hu-

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manities, it lacks both the managerial and technical skill required to put through that process of modernization, economic and social, which is obviously needed for the building up of a twentieth century nation state.

"Attainment of national independence," writes Professor G. D. Parikh of Bombay, "brought millions of Asians, overnight as it were, face to face with realities and demanded of them profound and far-reaching readjustments in their outlook and actions. Their disturbed balance under conditions of alien rule seems to have, however, impaired their capacity of 'facing the world on level terms.' No wonder, therefore, that on becoming independent and thus responsible for shaping his own future, the Asian often apparently fails to see the realities of the contemporary situation and the profound cultural and moral issues involved in it. Weak, defenseless and threatened, he pleads for tolerance and understanding of the sources of the threats. Poor, semistarved and suffering, he looks askance at those who are out to help."

Perhaps more alarming than the magnitude and complexity of the socio-economic problems of the region is the spiritual and cultural condition of the Asian intelligentsia. Often the inheritor of an ancient and noble cultural and spiritual tradition, the Asian intellectual is left, as a result of many centuries of erosion and stagnation, with a legacy which is largely fatalism, passivity and the acceptance of authority. In many cases, the inherited outlook is thus a feudal, caste or hierarchal one. There is a tendency to be a good slave or a good slave-driver. He also finds his recent historical background repellent and uninspiring. The combination of an old civilization in decay and the débris of foreign rule provides a poor foundation on which to build.

It is true that there are post and telegraph, railways, planes and many of the gadgets of modern civilization. But these were brought in by the Western ruling Power in the last century or so and the physical readjustment was carried out in a mechanical way which left the minds and souls of the bulk of the people untouched. "Our poetical internal combustion engines," laments a writer, "puff and pant and have to be pushed along." The basic adjustment within, which accompanied the various stages of the Industrial Revolution in the countries of Western Europe and North America, did not take place here. The same could be said of the forms and process of parliamentary democracy. The process of transplantation was most certainly there, but has there been

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any flowering? Takdir Alisjahbana, a leading Indonesian writer, put it as follows:

> Asia is living in thirty centuries at one and the same time. The stone-age runs parallel to the machine-age, feudalism and mysticism of the middle-ages mix with democracy and rationalism of the new era, and communalism is to be found side by side with the economic plan of today. It is the dualism of this situation which has made the position of the Asian intellectual so difficult. . . . If in addition we realize that the Asian intellectual is fully aware of the fact that the modern world is itself facing a crisis, that its values are menaced by a tide of secularism, skepticism and relativism, we know why he is vacillating between the two crises: the crisis of the Asian community and culture as a consequence of the impact of the West which has not yet ended, either in his surroundings or in his own soul; and the other greater crisis, the crisis of the modern people, embracing the whole of mankind.

It is perhaps necessary for a moment to consider the implications of Western education of men and women bred against the Asian background in order to understand why the educated middle class created by Western instruction, which successfully led the struggles for national independence, should find itself so ill-equipped to tackle the problems that follow on the transfer of power.

The answer is to be found partly in the fact that the psychology lying at the back of the Western system of education was at variance with the outlook on life of the peoples of the region. Developed at a time "when men were being rocked, so to say, in the cradle of Nature," the local philosophies of life tended to look on the aim of civilization as the achievement of harmony with Nature which, be it remembered, has been bountiful in this region and generous to man. The colder and less hospitable climate of Northern Europe and Northern America has just as naturally created a disposition to look on Nature as something to be conquered, harnessed and put to use. When these two philosophies met and clashed, both physical and psychological factors conspired to secure the victory of the imported way of thought. The process of machine production had already shaken the social structure to its roots. Western education carried the assault from the physical to the mental plane, making nonsense of religious ritual and social convention. A gulf now divides the educated urban minority and the rural mass which "not merely think different thoughts and speak different languages but regard each other with a strange incomprehension."

Among the results of this alienation, which has remained un-

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accompanied by a proper integration into the cosmopolitan intellectual fraternity, is the fact that, as Dr. Charles Malik has put it, "Asia suffers from chronic negatives." Another consequence is that split personality on which many observers have commented. We reject in principle that which we practise ourselves. We reject the "material values" of the West, but delight in availing ourselves in our personal lives of the facilities, the machines and the gadgets that the West has produced. We insist on our own personal right to express our views without the slightest hindrance, but delight in scoffing at talk of freedom in the midst of poverty. The separation of the intelligentsia from the common people leads to its becoming a mass in itself. Its rank-and-file simulate the hard response of the uninformed mass. Hence the absence of individual variations which are such a significant part of intellectual life in the countries of the West and the tendency for emotional reactions to take the place of hard national thought.

The absence of spiritual continuity and harmony creates a loss of faith and a cultural vacuum which is well described by Dr. Sampurnanand, the learned and scholarly Chief Minister of the State of the United Provinces in India:

> To my mind, the first component of the malaise from which the Indian intellectual suffers is utter uncertainty and instability. Political independence has been achieved in an age when the forces of Communism and democracy are drawn up against each other in preparation for a mighty war of extermination and, in between the two, there are any number of warring groups owing allegiance to an infinite variety of shades of pink faith. India is destined to be one of the important battle-grounds of these ideologies and the men who profess them. The education and bringing up of those who are the present leaders of society align the young Indian with the protagonists of democracy, but the call of Communism is no less insistent. He is treated every day to tales of the achievements of Communist countries. India frequently sends out good-will missions. These are composed generally either of colorless individuals or of persons whose mission in life is to decry India and praise her Communist neighbors. Little wonder he feels increasingly drawn towards Communism, but cannot, at the same time, divest himself wholly of his weakness for democracy.

And Dr. Sampurnanand continues:

> What makes our burden appear so heavy is that we are not spiritually equipped to bear it. There is no faith and no object of faith. Along with the breaking up of the social and economic fabric, old values are also losing their hold and new ones have not replaced them. Religion has become a mummery and old traditions, taking the memory back through a thousand years of the

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nation's history, embodying its hopes and aspirations, its ideals and its experiences, are being brushed aside with a contemptuous shrug. Spiritual vacuity has become almost a badge of intellectual superiority.

Faced with a distressing situation of social and economic backwardness marked by the absence of capital resources and trained manpower, inhibited by national pride from accepting aid from those more fortunately situated, we cast our eyes round for some method by which our country can pull itself up almost overnight by its boot straps and find itself facing the countries of the West on terms of equality and self-respect. We do not always know very much about what is in process of being accomplished in our own country but hear a great deal about what Russia and China are supposed to be accomplishing. It has been said by a shrewd observer that we are all often the victims "of the inefficiency of our own publicity and the transparently dishonest efficiency of the publicity of the Communist dominated economies." Is it to be wondered at that when we are told such things have been found possible in Soviet Russia and Communist China, we like to believe in the truth of these claims, and that, lacking a tradition of individual liberty and democracy, we do not cavil greatly if, in the process, a measure of economic planning and regimentation is found necessary which temporarily—so we hope—abridges individual freedom?

Besides, many of us have "a private version of Communism" which we equate with fine ideals such as those of liberty, equality and fraternity. "This private version," it has been aptly said, "gets linked with the Russian version through semantic confusion and we walk straight into the Communist trap." This also explains the sense of guilt felt in opposing Communism.

It is understandable that, deprived now of British or Dutch rule on which to blame all our misfortunes, we should look outside our country for a whipping boy to take the place of our old masters. Memories of past political subjection combine with resentment at continuing claims to white supremacy to make the United States, the current symbol of white supremacy, the obvious target of our righteous anger. By a queer twist, the Great Russian, who is also a white man, is excluded from this hated category! For one thing, Russia has been presented to us as a great Eurasian Power, and the unfortunate use of the terms "East" and "West" by the statesmen and columnists of England and America only helps to confirm this.

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Nationalism, political and economic, is the pattern that emerges. This, according to Professor Chiro Zengo of Tokyo University, is "a sign of lack of self-confidence in one's ability to maintain one's independence, and stands in contradiction to the general world tendency toward international coöperation." Mahatma Gandhi used to complain about the "slave mentality" of large numbers of his countrymen and to plead that if only they, like him, would *feel* free, they would *be* free. Unfortunately, that "slave mentality" has survived and is now to be found in the "colonial mind." It may be asked why, in that case, this nationalism does not react with the same vigor to the impact of Russia. Why this selective purity? The answer is that there is no sense of real internal strength and, with powerful Communist neighbors, discretion dictates a course of appeasement. Professor Takeyama Michio of Tokyo University frankly describes this process in so far as his own compatriots are concerned:

> Now that we have freedom of speech in Japan, anti-Americanism is all the rage. It is perfectly safe because after all America will not punish us. And besides, resisting authority is very fashionable and gives one a pleasant air of heroism. But to be anti-Communist is to risk hanging if the Communists should take power. Furthermore, it is condemned as "reactionary," a word which sends intellectuals scurrying for shelter. Thus anti-Americanism enjoys full freedom while anti-Communism does not. It is therefore not surprising that people take the "heroic" and conformist course which is of course absolutely safe, and then set out to convince themselves of its correctness.

III

Recently, there have been certain manifestations in America and Europe not only of impatience and irritation but also of a degree of exasperation, helplessness and defeatism with what have been described as "astigmatic ambiguities" and an "incredibly complex, knotted coil of attitudes." It is evidently felt by some that the Asian intellectual is a unique phenomenon, likeable as a human being, pleasant to know, but hopelessly baffling on the plane of thought and so neurotic in his ideological attitudes that the normal Westerner must abandon in despair the attempt to understand him.

In point of fact, there is very little that is original or mysteriously Oriental about the outlook of the Asian intellectual. Much of the rationalization in that outlook, if not its inspiration, is derived from the West itself. A whole generation of Asian intellectuals has been bred on the literature put out by the Left

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Book Club in the thirties and many of them have been greatly influenced by what Louis Fischer has aptly described as "Laskiology." The double standard of morality, a severe one for the democracies and a lenient one for Communism; the acceptance of the Soviet Myth; and the failure to understand the essential nature of Soviet imperialism—these are not Oriental inventions. They were all widely preached and practised in Europe in the thirties and in the United States during the Roosevelt era. Even today there are small but vocal groups of intellectuals in New York and London whose mental processes are exactly on all fours with these. And indeed, is it only small and unrepresentative groups in these countries who display such affinity? Does not much of the description attempted earlier in this article apply even today to considerable sections of the educated classes in France, Britain and the United States? "Many people in the West," write *The Economist,* not unfairly, "still seem to see less clearly than the Andhra electorate."

In response to the complaint that Indonesians, Burmese and Indians refuse to see the importance to their own security of defending South Vietnam or Formosa, it may be pointed out that it is not they alone who tend to regard measures of collective security in the face of totalitarian aggression as steps that increase the danger of war. Many Frenchmen and Englishmen and quite a few Americans share these prejudices, and when the complaint is made (as it was by a writer in *Foreign Affairs* of July 1954) that Asian "conceptions of neutrality sometimes transcend normal understanding," may it not be asked whether the mystery is not deeper when good Anglo-Saxons are found to indulge in the same intellectual convolutions?

The real difference between the intellectual climate in the West and in Asia is that in Asia a much larger and more influential section of the intelligentsia continues to hug the confusions and illusions that have been discarded by the greater number of thinking people on both sides of the Atlantic. An effort has here been made to explain why this is so. The same factors that have changed the climate of thought in Europe and America may be counted on to effect a similar change in Asia, though the complexities of the case may make this process a much slower one, with attendant dangers.

Even today, working against the tide of emotion and antagonism, the voice of reason is by no means silenced. At a meeting of

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Asian Socialists, it was U Kyaw Nyein, a Burmese Cabinet Minister, who rebutted Dr. Lohia's theory of "equidistance" and described Communist imperialism as being "even more degrading and even more dangerous [than old time imperialism] because it is more ruthless, more systematic and more blatantly justified in the name of world Communist revolution." And it was Sir John Kotelawala, the Prime Minister of Ceylon, who forcefully echoed this warning against "Soviet imperialism" at Bandung.

It was Asoka Mehta, an Indian Socialist M.P., who recently asked regarding Formosa: "Why should non-Communists be anxious to push people into Communist régimes?" and answered:

> As free people, should they [the inhabitants of Formosa] not be given an opportunity to decide their future? When such an opportunity was given to the POW's in Korea, we found that thousands of Koreans and Chinese chose democracy in preference to Communism. Friendship with China should be an important aspect of foreign policy, but it cannot be permitted to disrupt all our moorings to principles and lead us to accept a solution which we have not sponsored in solving even our own disputes with other Powers.

It was Mr. A. D. Gorwalla, a former member of the Indian Civil Service, a distinguished administrator and one of India's leading commentators, who wrote recently on the same subject:

> Assume that the Communist Party seizes power in India and consolidates its hold over the country. Suppose after putting up such resistance as was found possible, Pandit Nehru with a few faithful members of the Congress High Command and of his Government . . . accompanied by a hundred thousand troops was able to get away to the Andaman Islands. Suppose the British, who are responsible for the defense of Ceylon and who have a naval base at Trincomalee, then declared that they would not allow the new Communist Government of India to seize the Andamans and ordered their fleet to repulse any Communist forces that attempted an attack, at the same time aiding their old friends, Pandit Nehru and his companions, to hold out, would the condemners of American policy [vis-à-vis Formosa] then feel so very indignant?

IV

"We are all distressed by the misunderstanding existing between India and the United States. What in your opinion can be done to improve this situation?" asks an anxious letter from a good friend in the United States. What can people in America and the countries of Europe do to help?

The problem is surely not one of achieving agreement between the countries of Asia on the one side and those of Europe and America on the other regarding their immediate course of action

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in world affairs. What is essential is to make all these countries feel that they belong to the free world and are rooted in the community of free men in a manner and to a degree that can never be possible in regard to the countries behind the Iron Curtain.

To understand is to set up a relationship, Leonardo da Vinci observed a long time ago. A discussion between friends can only be on the basis of mutual respect and consideration. Flattery can have as little place in such a meeting of minds as abuse. What is called for is patience coupled with firmness in adhering to one's own convictions.

The conclusions to which this analysis has driven are twofold. First, that it is people within the region itself on whom the main burden of dealing with its complex problems must fall, and that the rôle of those in the West who seek to help must be secondary. Secondly, that the malaise is not only economic but also spiritual and cultural. It follows that a solution must be sought on the plane of thought, spirit and emotion as well as on the material plane. "Until the West can win the minds of Asia's millions, it will be impossible to defend their bodies," recently observed Mr. Denis Healey, British Labor M.P. He might have added, "or to feed them."

Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan, leading Indian Socialist, has questioned the assumption that underlies almost all discussion of economic planning in Asia, namely, that it is through a rise in the standard of life of the people that their happiness can primarily be secured. He feels that such an approach is unfair to the bulk of the peoples of the region, who would reject the idea of a surrender of spiritual and moral values for the sake of greater physical comfort. There can be no doubt that, in so far as the mass of the people are concerned, Jayaprakash's insight is sounder than that of most intellectuals who transfer to the masses of the peasantry, the real proletariat in Asia, their own preoccupation with the satisfaction of material needs. A valid corollary is that no mere improvement in economic standards carries with it any guarantee of the maintenance of the free way of life, a misconception which has been aptly described as "the bread and butter fallacy." Economic aid is to be valued as an act of human solidarity. As an antidote to Communism, it may not rank too high; and the one-way traffic it involves sets up adverse psychological reactions of its own. It must not be concluded from this that any attempt is being made to belittle the value of aid that comes in

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from the United States and the West. The point is that more emphasis needs to be placed on action on the intellectual, cultural and spiritual plane.

The field is wide and offers a large area of choice both in objectives and in procedures. Such action has the merit of refuting the insinuation that "the West has nothing to offer but technology." There is also the advantage that on the plane of cultural coöperation there is possible that mutuality or give and take which is unavailable on the economic level. On what basis shall this meeting of minds take place? It is obvious that there is little that the West can do of and by itself, but a great deal it can do to help people within the region to help their own countries. Mr. Chester Bowles certainly got hold of the right end of the stick when he recently warned a United States audience that when you do something *to* people "they resent it and throw it back in your face;" when you do things *for* them, they say: "Thank you, why don't you do more?;" but when you do things *with* people, you establish a "sound foundation."

There are many who feel—mistakenly, I believe—that economic aid by one part of the world to another should be canalized through the governments concerned. Even they, I expect, will concede that intellectual and cultural coöperation must be people-to-people and group-to-group, and that its regulation by the State would defeat its purpose. There are ever so many popular causes of a nonpolitical and nonpartisan type in which coöperation between nonofficial groups in the West and their counterparts here is desirable and helpful. It is necessary to stress this, since there would appear to be a tendency on the part of some Foundations and institutions needlessly to become subsidiaries to diplomatic activity.

Intellectual exchange and interchange between the East and the West is of the highest importance. Irked by the flow of "cultural delegations" between Soviet Russia and Communist China on the one side and India on the other, with the unbalanced picture they are apt to give of cultural "achievements" under Communism, someone was recently provoked to suggest the exchange of cultural delegations between India and America. This suggestion overlooks, however, the basic reason which underlies the phenomenon of "delegations," namely, the Iron Curtain and the desire of the Communist dictatorship to let it up in respect of a few hand-picked people—their own visitors abroad, chosen for

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their dependability, and their invitees, chosen for their naïveté. There is no need for "delegations" in the case of countries between and within which free men may travel freely. A more long-term view would involve the posting of teachers and students from one region in the other over considerable periods of time. Real comprehension involves a sincere effort to understand the forces that have developed what is called national culture. Nor should such exchange be limited to that between the region and outside. How little we in Asian countries know about the culture and intellectual life of our Asian neighbors and how easy is it for interested political propaganda to erect barriers between us! To help bring Asian to Asian is a process in which the West can participate.

Within each of the countries concerned there are numerous chores, big and small, that cry out for minds and hands to perform. Opportunity—as the Asian writer, musician, dancer, painter or sportsman sees it—is in dreadfully short supply. He sees his counterpart in the West achieve recognition and success in a measure that can never be his. The reasons for this are the barriers of language, often within the same country; the gulf of distance; and the poverty and consequent lack of patronage within the region itself. The Foundations and the intelligentsia of the West can lend a big hand in providing opportunities for presenting the best of the philosophy, literature and art of the countries of the region to the West. We have schools of classical music and dance languishing for want of support. There are documentary films that cannot be made for lack of funds. Sports organizations pine for the resources that would permit their teams to participate in international tournaments and rallies apart from those organized in Iron Curtain countries, travel facilities to which always are freely available. An association of writers in a certain language would like to start a journal. There is no one to encourage the translation and publication in English of the writings of the most eminent of those who write in other tongues. There is need for the establishment of courses for the study of comparative literature. With the fading out of the English language, the need is greater than ever for the translation of the Western classics into Asian languages. The Soviet Union recently gave an award to the script writer and producer of India's "best film of the year" and it has been assured of exhibition throughout the U.S.S.R. The United States Government cannot of course

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force Americans to see any foreign film it may choose to patronize for reasons of diplomacy, but is it not possible to have a confrontation of Eastern and Western films, music, dance or art through festivals organized at both ends?

The sphere of education offers many opportunities. It would be a mistake to think only in terms of universities and colleges. There are also scores of extensions and projections of the educational process which have yet to be developed. The employment of a critical methodology in the social sciences, in the criticism of art and literature and in philosophical dissertations has been highly developed in the West during the last half-century. In Asia, the development of such techniques can be helped by a sharing of skills and resources quite as effectively as can technical assistance and know-how in the field of agriculture or industry.

There is a noticeable trend towards a deep spiritual revival which takes different forms in different countries but which is too fundamentally alike to be purely coincidental. Perhaps the most outstanding of these phenomena is the revivification of Buddhism in Burma, with the support of Prime Minister Nu, and more recently in Ceylon, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia. Islam has of course been the foundation of Pakistan, but in "secular" Indonesia too the desire to base modern society and progress on a religious foundation has been steadily gathering strength. In India, people are once again beginning to turn to the deep influence of Mahatma Gandhi. Symbolic of this trend is the *Bhoodan Yagna* (land gift) campaign, led by Acharya Vinoba Bhave, Gandhi's chosen disciple, and that eminent convert from Marxism, Jayaprakash Narayan. The field of religion is a sensitive one where normally external intervention is to be deprecated. Any encouragement that may be forthcoming for these spiritual developments should be not for the churches of the various faiths but for specific projects of scholarship or social service, not for feeding monks but for efforts and services such as the constructive activities of the Ramakrishna Mission or the Buddhist orders.

Education in citizenship and training for democracy offer yet other fields for coöperation. The importance of propaganda is so well understood by the international Communist apparatus that it is used by them with the greatest persistence. In their own way, the Communists show an understanding of the truth that man does not live by bread alone. The effort put in by the democ-

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racies to meet this threat is altogether insignificant. Within the region, what is needed is an effort at presenting and popularizing the values of democracy, not on the level of propaganda but that of education. This has so far barely touched the fringe of the problem. The Asian Conference on Cultural Freedom was an effort of this kind. Such projects might bring with them an awareness of the problems, suggest positive solutions and lead to the activating of impulses that go towards the building of democracy.

The Communists disseminate their ideas through an army of indigenous personnel in each country. Since democracy does not and must not function through a fifth column, the problem of mobilizing local conviction and talent on the side of freedom achieves great importance. Commenting on this complex subject on the termination of the assignment in India of Ambassador Chester Bowles in April 1953, *Freedom First,* the organ of the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom, had this to say: "The lessons that the failure of Mr. Bowles' mission teaches would appear to be that those who represent the democracies in a peripheral country such as India should seize the initiative in the cold war of ideas which is being waged in such countries by the Soviet and Chinese dictatorships, that while attending to the needs of the governments the need to educate and enlighten public opinion should not be overlooked, and that economic aid unaccompanied by ideological coöperation and approximation is an undependable foundation on which to build democratic solidarity."

How to help in keeping alive the spark of freedom in the hearts of Asians and to fan it into greater vitality is the problem. There are, of course, obvious dangers of any coöperation on the ideological level. These can be limited if the parties with whom the coöperation takes place are existing organizations and institutions whose *bona fides* are established, whose activities are not influenced by the coming in of such external support and who share in the costs of the joint effort. Among such institutions can obviously be counted trade unions, universities and colleges, literary and philosophical societies, as well as established organizations and groups devoted to the spread of democratic values and the preservation of the free way of life.

Westerners who argue about these matters amongst themselves often stress the priority of physical strength over moral prestige, and vice versa. This is a false antithesis. In a part of the world

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where free territory in Tibet and Vietnam has been lost in recent years, power has a persuasiveness of its own. A British organ of opinion certainly saw the problem clearly when it stressed the need of bringing home to people in Asia the conviction that "the West is physically powerful enough to prevent a world Communist victory and sufficiently well intentioned to relieve the starving of the distressed."

Has the West adequately realized that, since freedom is indivisible, the defense and expansion of the bounds of freedom is a one-world proposition? If one who has written on Asia with great understanding and sympathy is to be believed, the West itself has still a great deal to learn. "There is not yet a one-world strategy for strengthening weak spots wherever they exist," writes Herrymon Maurer. "In large part the struggle between Communism and the free world is a struggle for peoples' convictions. The struggle cannot be successful unless the dynamism of Communism is countered by the dynamism of democracy, expressed in the spoken and written word, in economic aid and in the willingness to take risks."

In the end, all efforts at fostering certain values must fail unless those who espouse them demonstrably live up to them. "If we, with all our power, and removed by distance, waver, if we talk further about settlements and truces with the Communists," rightly observed the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Senate recently, "we cannot expect the small nations living in the shadow of the Communist octopus to stand up." On the other hand, those who stress that the answers Asians and Africans get to their questions about human dignity and individual rights are "going to make history" are equally right. A more unequivocal identification by Americans with the struggles to end racial discrimination and the relics of Western colonialism is what democrats in Asia would like to see. To Americans and others who are anxious to know how they can avoid letting down those who have faith in them in these distant parts, an outsider can perhaps only repeat the advice of the immortal bard:

This above all: to thine own self be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man.

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THE FUTURE OF OUR PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMACY

By George F. Kennan

THE idea that the United States of America ought to have a professional service for the performance of diplomatic and consular functions abroad had its origins in the final years of the last century. By 1914 it had already found recognition in the creation of separate career services for these two main branches of activity. Its fruition was reached in the mid-twenties with the passage of the Rogers Act, which combined the two existing services into a single "Foreign Service of the United States." High hopes prevailed at the outset for the future of the new combined service. No one doubted that a corner had been passed. The United States Government, it was assumed, would now proceed to develop in permanence a good professional arm to assist in the work of representation of this country abroad and to act as the main source of information and advice for American statesmen and envoys who were themselves not likely to be professionals. In the ensuing years a number of trustful young men, among them this writer, took the prescribed examinations and entered the new Foreign Service, confident that the country had made up its mind about the virtues of career diplomacy; that it wanted a real professional service; that the basic principles underlying the Rogers Act had been permanently accepted; and that one could rely on the uniformity and stability of the conditions in which, from then on, the competition for advancement and recognition would proceed.

These hopes and expectations, as experience was to prove, were largely unfounded. Those who nurtured them had failed to take account of the unsuitability of the American governmental system for the promulgation of any sustained administrative program (particularly one calling for the annual appropriation of sizeable sums of money) that was not supported at all times by the enthusiasm of some interested domestic pressure group. But beyond that it gradually became apparent that the rationale of the Rogers Act was poorly understood outside the small circle of its authors and the members of the Foreign Service itself. Neither the public at large, nor the press, nor the leaders of succeeding administrations, nor the majority of the members of succeeding

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Congresses, had any very clear idea of what was involved in the experiment or cared very much whether the Foreign Service, as envisaged in the Rogers Act, prospered or languished.

Since the development of a good professional service is a long-term operation, where the normal time-lag between decision and result in major matters is measured in decades rather than in years, this lack of comprehension and of sustained interest was gradually to prove fatal to the experiment. One by one, the principles on which it was intended that the new Service should operate were neglected, distorted or abandoned. I shall not attempt to recount the involved and painful stages by which this decline took place. The immediate causes were numerous and varied. The constantly recurring failure of senior government officials to understand why the Foreign Service should be treated any differently from the Civil Service as a whole; the endless jealousies aroused by what seemed to many the glamourous and privileged nature of the Foreign Service function; the tendency of other government departments, more powerfully supported in Congress than was the State Department, to set up competing foreign services; Mr. Roosevelt's dislike of the Service and unconcern for its future; the complete suspension of admissions for periods of years on end, a procedure which starved the Service at the bottom and sharply disbalanced its age structure; the failure to clarify the relationship of the Service to the war effort in 1941–1945; the proliferation of parallel and rival organizations during and after the war; the latter-day illusion that "management" is something wholly divorced from function, and the consequent burdening of the Service with a succession of administrative heads who had no experience or understanding of the diplomatic profession; the repeated and extensive "lateral" infusions of new personnel at intermediate levels; the growing tendency of able older officers to seek more promising fields for self-expression; and last but not least the operation of the postwar security programs, bringing humiliation, bewilderment and the deepest sort of discouragement to hundreds of officers—all these factors played a part. But all of them, it will be noted, were embraced in the major causes mentioned above: the unsuitability of the American governmental system for a prolonged administrative effort of this sort, and lack of comprehension for the nature and exigencies of the diplomatic function on the part of a great continental society not accustomed to regard prospering foreign relations as important.

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The result of all this was that by 1953 the old Foreign Service was weakened beyond real hope of recovery. The present Administration inherited not a going professional service but an administrative ruin, packed with people who had never undergone the normal entrance requirements, hemmed in and suffocated by competing services, demoralized by anonymous security agents in whose judgment and disinterestedness its members had little confidence, a helpless object of disparagement and defamation at the hands of outside critics. This was the tragic ending of an experiment launched, with high hopes and with none but the most innocent and worthy intent, three decades earlier. As of the year 1953, it was no exaggeration to say that the experiment of professional diplomacy, as undertaken by the United States in 1925, had failed.

Members and friends of the Foreign Service watched with deepest interest to see what the new Administration would do about the state of America's professional diplomacy. While what was left of the Foreign Service remained—as it always had been—genuinely nonpartisan in spirit, older officers could not but remember that the Rogers Act was the product of a Republican Administration and that most of the vicissitudes that had befallen the Service (though not all) had occurred during the subsequent period of Democratic ascendancy. There was, accordingly, a natural curiosity as to whether a new Republican Administration would not again show appreciation and concern for the principles on which the Service had originally been established, awareness of the reasons for its decline, and a desire to make a new start, this time perhaps on broader and more hopeful foundations, at the creation of a creditable and efficient diplomatic arm.

The first steps of the new Administration, consisting of a further tightening of the screw of the security controls (which most officers felt had already been tightened far beyond the requirements of any demonstrable national interest), were not encouraging. But there was still the hope that all this represented only the last phase of a governmental response to a wave of popular emotionalism—a final application of the lash, designed to disarm suspicion that the Administration would be "soft" in security matters and in this way to win Congressional confidence for a new program that would in itself be sound. And while the Service as a whole would long remain saddened and troubled by the mem-

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ory of what had been done to individual officers in the name of "security," there was readiness in most quarters to accept even this final salt in the wound if the result were to be the laying of a new foundation for healthy service. When, therefore, the Secretary of State announced in the early spring of 1954 that he had appointed a committee of distinguished persons, headed by Dr. Henry M. Wriston, President of Brown University, to examine into the state of the Foreign Service and to advise him as to what should be done about it, this action was greeted with deep and hopeful satisfaction by all those who had the interests of the Service at heart.

At this writing, if the press reports may be credited, a year has elapsed since the Wriston Committee took up its work, and several months since its findings were made available to the Secretary of State. The writer is not aware that the recommendations of the Committee have ever been published in any single and comprehensive form, nor does he recall seeing any published summary of the action taken subsequently by the Secretary of State with regard to the Foreign Service. Nevertheless enough has become known to the general public through press reports, governmental circulars and pamphlets to give some impression of the questions to which the Committee addressed itself, the general nature of the views at which it arrived, and the outlines of the action the Government is now taking, or proposing to take, in the light of these recommendations. Particularly helpful in this respect was the pamphlet of the Committee entitled "Toward a Stronger Foreign Service," although it is not fully clear at what stage this pamphlet was prepared or what relation it bore to the formal findings of the group.

II

The first and most conspicuous feature of the Wriston Committee's recommendations, and one that appears to have met with the entire approval of the Secretary of State, was the provision for amalgamation of the old Foreign Service with that portion of the personnel of the Department of State primarily concerned with the substantive problems of governmental policy. The desirability of such an amalgamation has been the subject of active and sometimes bitter debate in Foreign Service circles over the course of many years. In the circumstances of today it is hard to see how this measure, in itself, could be seriously challenged. Most For-

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eign Service officers have always understood that there were many people in the Department of State who belonged, subjectively speaking, in the ranks of the Foreign Service, in the sense that they were concerned with the substantive problems of foreign affairs and had come to regard their work as a calling and not just a job. The question is admittedly everywhere a difficult one, with a good deal to be said for any one of the main possible solutions. The present step merely brings American practice into accord with that of most other governments.

It is true that any attempt to marry services brought into existence on different standards of recruitment and advancement invariably involves inequities and hardships. If one were really concerned at this time to protect the career principle, as envisaged in the Rogers Act, it might have been wiser to effect this reform gradually, stepping up the rate of admissions into the Foreign Service and increasing little by little the percentage of officers serving in Washington as qualified Foreign Service officers became available. But since the present program is not really an effort to restore the old Foreign Service, but rather an attempt at the creation of a new one, the step may as well be taken at once.

There is, to be sure, one disadvantage connected with the present amalgamation which governmental leaders will ignore at the country's peril. That is the sheer size of the resulting administrative entity. When the writer entered the Foreign Service, it was made up of only some 700 officers. It is now to number something like 4,000.

The Wriston Committee, in the pamphlet mentioned above, took note with disapproval of the relatively small size of the old Foreign Service. Everything else in government, it concluded, had grown enormously; hence, it suggested, the Foreign Service should have grown too. To those who view governmental "bigness" as a disease rather than an advantage and who see in it a serious breakdown of the possibility for real inner-governmental communication as well as for administrative flexibility, this simple, keeping-up-with-the-Joneses reasoning of the Wriston Committee will not commend itself. There are even some antiquated spirits who would think it more important to have 25 really superior officers than to have 2,500 mediocre ones.

The elephantiasis of government is contagious; and there can be no question but that a governmental entity based primarily on quality rather than quantity would find itself uncomfortable,

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unappreciated and suspect in the governmental family today. Unless the general spirit underlying future governmental administration were to be one of emphasis on personal excellence and on the development of individual talent, the effort to preserve a small and compact Foreign Service, marked by that intimacy and mutual internal confidence peculiar to small and select organizations, would undoubtedly be a difficult task. Many older officers will feel that it would still have been a worth-while effort, from which the country would have been the gainer.

III

From the Wriston Committee's pamphlet one derives, perhaps erroneously, the impression that the administrative emphasis in the future handling of the Service is to be on the broadening of the variety of professional skills represented in the Service rather than on the all-around development of the individual officer. This seems to flow from the emphasis placed by the Committee on the need for specialists, as opposed to "generalists." One of the principal criticisms levied by the Committee against the administration of the old Service was the latter's effort to assure that men should become generally useful officers, to the neglect and detriment, as the Committee saw it, of the inclusion in the Service of adequate numbers of specialists in various fields of interest and endeavor.

As one who was among the first of the full-fledged area specialists produced by the old Service and who found a rich and satisfying field of activity in that capacity, the writer will perhaps not be suspected of any lack of appreciation for the virtue and possibilities of specialization. But he wonders whether in this respect the Wriston Committee has not confused two quite different things: specialized professional skill, on the one hand, and roundedness of education, judgment and personality on the other. Few older officers could fail to note, with a certain sinking of the heart, that whereas the Committee's pamphlet made frequent reference to the need of the Service for "skills," nowhere did it speak of the need for people as people. One sensed in this presentation not only a subtle rebellion against the Foreign Service officer as a type and as a mode of subjective identification, but also a certain military "table-of-organization" psychology—a belief that for any given task we need only so-and-so many of this "skill" and so-and-so many of that and we will have a suitable

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organization, the nature of the human personality behind each one of these "skills" being of secondary importance, so long as the subjects are professionally competent and "secure." This principle may be applicable for construction work, for industrial processes, and for many military functions. But it is not likely to be useful for the work of the Foreign Service, where what is important and decisive in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred is the totality of the man himself: his character, his judgment, his insight, his knowledge of the world, his integrity, his adaptability, his capacity for human sympathy and understanding. With these things, all specialties (and who would challenge the need for specialties?) will flower and bear fruit; without them, no specialty will really help.

It is true, as the Wriston Committee evidently concluded, that the *work* of the Foreign Service is not, properly speaking, a specialty in itself, or at least not an adequate one. What there is to be learned about the external amenities of international intercourse—the forms of correspondence, the correct channels for communication, international procedure, social customs, and the body of international law that enters into Foreign Service work —is admittedly not enough to make up a real professional discipline, in which the totality of a man's capabilities can be realized. It must be supplemented by substantive knowledge of the world in which we live and the processes by which human society functions. But if the Foreign Service be regarded as a *way of life,* rather than merely a job, then there is indeed a sense in which it is vitally important that every officer be a "generalist"—and that is in his quality as a person of character, intellect and good judgment. In the sheltered atmosphere of our domestic life, the real personality can take refuge behind the conventions and stereotypes with which every human community lubricates its various moving surfaces. In contact with the outside world, this is no longer possible. In the confrontation with the "differentness" of a foreign environment, personality is revealed, tried and tested as nowhere else. It makes little difference what the status may be in which an individual American official resides abroad—he is bound to be judged by many people, and his country will be judged by him. A nation, in particular, that controls about one-half of the world's wealth and talks of world leadership should be under no illusions as to the intensity and criticalness of this scrutiny. The outside world will be quick to tear off any masks

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with which its representatives try to conceal themselves. If what is revealed is a person of parts, endowed with imagination, dignity, warmth of feeling and knowledge not only of external reality but also of self (implying a measure of detachment Americans do not often acquire and do not easily forgive in other Americans), then the interests of the United States will be well served. But woe betide us if what emerges under this scrutiny is a petty or mediocre or pedestrian nature. In this case no laboriously acquired "skill" will redress the balance. The outside world is too well aware that a bear, taught to ride a bicycle, is still a bear.

IV

This issue of "skills" versus the man himself brings up the venerable and delicate question of the compatibility of a good professional diplomatic arm with the temper of a democratic society. There is no criticism of the Foreign Service older and more ubiquitous than the charge that it is exclusive and removed from the society it represents; that it leans to foreign ways and modes of thought; and that it is therefore unrepresentative and unsuitable as a vehicle for the promulgation of American foreign policy. It is this chronic distaste of democratic opinion for the image of the professional diplomatic agent that led Jules Cambon to observe that while democracies would always have diplomacy, it was a question whether they would ever have diplomatists.

The Foreign Service officer invariably finds difficulty in dealing with the charge that his profession is exclusive and unrepresentative; for it involves some subtle distinctions. If the charge is meant to imply that there is something lacking in the patriotism and loyalty of the professional diplomat toward his own country and government, then he can only deny it flatly, and not without indignation; for the United States Foreign Service has been happily and singularly free of anything of this sort. But when it merely implies a belief that "differentness" from the national norm in external aspects is in itself unacceptable in a foreign representative, the answer is more complicated.

The function of the Foreign Service officer abroad is not to serve as a museum exhibit of the external habits and demeanor of the average American, but to constitute an effective channel of communication with other governments and a perceptive observer of life in other countries. No sensitive and adaptable person can live for long years abroad and be obliged to cultivate, as

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a professional duty, communication and understanding with people of other nationalities, without acquiring outlooks, habits of mind, and occasionally even mannerisms, that will ever after distinguish him from the bulk of his fellow countrymen who have remained at home. If he did not react in this way he would not be useful to his country in the representative capacity. A great deal of his usefulness consists precisely in his ability to put himself in the position of the other man. To understand, in the international sense, is not only, as was once said, to forgive; it is also to identify one's self to a degree with that which is understood. This capacity for understanding and adaptation has absolutely no other effect on a man's patriotism or loyalty to his own government than to deepen the foundation for it. There is no firmer or wiser form of national feeling than that of the person who has seen his country's faults as others see them, and can yet find it in his heart to devote his life to the service of it. But this experience does leave its marks on people; and the ways in which these people are apt to express their love of country may be different indeed from those of the men whose conception of the values of his own society has never been enriched by any real standard of comparison.

It is understandable that the Wriston Committee was concerned for the reputation of the Foreign Service in the eyes of Congress, which has to be the sole source of the Service's financial sustenance, and that it attempted to cast its report in terms calculated to disarm the irrepressible Congressional suspicion that the Service of the future is to consist of people alienated from the ways and thought of their own society. But it is a question whether Congress should be spared the harsh necessity for facing up to the basic problem involved. The issue is a clear one, and there are really no two ways about it.

Democratic society must make up its mind, at long last, whether it wants its representatives abroad to be effective in its own cause or whether it wants them to be mirrors in which it can admire what it conceives to be its own virtues. It cannot have both. It can recognize that the talented and receptive officer will always be apt to take on some of the coloration of his world environment, and it can muster the generosity to be tolerant of this fact, confident that it will be better served by it in the end. Or it can insist that the country be represented by men untouched by any real contact with foreign realities and indistinguishable in their habits and manners and interests from most

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other Americans. In this latter case, the country will still have diplomacy but, as Cambon suggested, it will hardly have diplomatists; and it would be unwise for us to attempt to persuade ourselves, or the young men involved, that it could be otherwise.

V

This question as to whether the Foreign Service should be a highly selected group or a general cross section of the citizenry is reflected again in the problems of recruitment and entrance requirements. The Wriston Committee recommended that the examinations be shortened and administered in such a way as to make it possible for candidates to take them in many parts of the country. Beyond this, and as a long-term measure, it proposed "a fundamentally new method of recruitment to be known as the Foreign Service Scholarship Training Program." Under this scheme some 750 young people who had finished their sophomore year in college would be selected as candidates for the Foreign Service and would receive a Federal grant of $900 for each of their last two years, to enable them to complete their education at an accredited college of their choice. The Committee's pamphlet is not wholly clear as to the method of selection, but seems to indicate that this would be first on the basis of Congressional appointment and then of competitive examination under the Department of State. Since this system would require new legislation, it could not be put into effect at once. As late as March 1955 the Department of State was still in the process of developing the draft legislation to be submitted to the Congress.

In advance of the formulation and passage of this legislation, it is of course impossible to assess the new arrangements. But a number of questions present themselves at once.

In the first place, if the competitive examinations referred to in the Committee's report are to take place *before* the candidate begins his last two years of college work, the question arises: Does the candidate then have to take, two years later, the regular Foreign Service examinations given to candidates who have completed their college course? If so, does not the Government run the risk of losing its $1800 in the case of failure? And would this not provide an easy way out for the candidate who merely wanted to take advantage of government financing for his last two years of college? If not, would this not mean that the Government has no competitive examination check on the entering candidate

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after completion of his sophomore year in college—surely much too early a stage for any such determination?

It is true that these candidates were to complete their college course under the general guidance of the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State. But whether this could be regarded as an adequate substitute for the regular Foreign Service examinations, and how such candidates would be rated competitively as against those who had taken the examinations, is quite unclear. This question is rendered particularly acute by the fact that whereas the Foreign Service was estimated in the Committee's report to require a yearly intake at the bottom of about 500 officers, a total of 750 Congressional appointments to scholarships annually is envisaged. Even allowing for a 33 percent attrition in the ensuing examination, this would still leave enough to fill the annual quota. In these circumstances competition would obviously have to be severe between these people and those who had not been through the scholarship program but wished to take the Foreign Service examinations anyway on completion of their educational career.

A further question arises as to what colleges are to be accredited for this purpose. The number of institutions in this country equipped to give a college student the type of liberal education he requires for Foreign Service work, particularly in the last two undergraduate years, is limited. These institutions will hardly be found to be distributed throughout the country in anything resembling equal geographic distribution. Presumably, however, it was precisely in order to achieve something more closely resembling equal geographic distribution in recruitment for the Foreign Service that the Committee favored Congressional appointment to the majority of these scholarships. This problem may in part be solved by the transfer of candidates from institutions not equipped to give this training to ones that are so equipped.

Finally, there is the financial side of this scheme. The writer was not aware that lack of funds with which to complete the last two years of college was ever a serious impediment in the path of young people desiring to enter the Foreign Service. Far more serious were the delays surrounding the administration of the examinations and the subsequent admission to the Service—an evil which the Wriston Committee rightly recognized and opposed with all due vigor. The financing of the last two years of

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college is all the more questionable for the reason that those young people, in particular, who have been able to find the money for the first two years of college and have acquitted themselves creditably in their studies up to junior year do not normally have great difficulty in meeting the financial problem involved in the completion of their college course. Yet in the case of the Foreign Service, the educational requirements are such that no student who has not done well in his first two college years should be considered for the Foreign Service at all.

Beyond this, there will be many who will be troubled by the idea of governmental subsidy to individual college education in general. This is a question which of course carries far beyond the mere problem of preparation for the Foreign Service. Does this not bring us one step closer to the theory that the Government owes every young person a college education at public expense?

These questions are all ones that will have to be answered in some way or another in the forthcoming proposals for legislation. Meanwhile, general examinations are being held, once again, for recruitment into the Service; and the character of these examinations, in so far as it can be judged from the specimen produced for prospective candidates, strongly suggests a distinct lowering of educational standards for admission. The examination, in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee, has been shortened, and is now to be taken in a single day. Only a specialist could state authoritatively how it compares with the examinations formerly given to candidates for the Service. To this writer it seems most implausible that the present one could constitute any reliable test of intellectual excellence or degree of aptitude for Foreign Service work. The questions seem to be overwhelmingly of the "multiple choice" variety, involving very little test of the candidate's own creative intellectual capacity. Although the examination purports to test "whether the candidate can write correctly and effectively" and "whether he can organize his ideas properly," it appears to include no requirement for individual prose composition, and thus fails to touch one of the most common weaknesses of American college education today, namely, the failure to teach people to write the English language with any degree of precision, clarity or grace. The foreign language test, again, seems to be based only on vocabulary—surely an inadequate basis for testing ability in this field from the standpoint of usefulness in the Foreign Service.

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There is room for doubt whether an American undergraduate education, even at its best, is now sufficient preparation for entry into the Foreign Service—whether, that is, it ought not to be supplemented, as a regular requirement, with some form of post-graduate study. This question will become even more acute with the further decline in quality of undergraduate education that is to be expected from the anticipated vast increase in college attendance in coming years. In these circumstances, the arrangements now envisaged would probably be of doubtful adequacy even if they attempted to identify and recruit the cream of attainment and personal excellence in persons graduating from college. When, as would seem rather to be the case, they are designed only to make sure that the applicant has the minimum attainments of the average C-plus senior of the average college, then one can only have misgivings about the result.

The same applies to the oral examinations. Boards will sit, we are told, in various parts of the country, to spare the candidates the inconvenience of coming to Washington. For this reason, and because the whole Service will be so much larger, there will have to be many boards. The examination, says the Department of State, "will continue to be searching." But who will make up these boards? And by what principles will they operate? When the writer entered the Service, the examining board included such figures as Mr. Joseph C. Grew, Mr. Wilbur Carr and Mr. J. Butler Wright. They were a terrifying panel; but no candidate could doubt their great experience, their knowledge of the Foreign Service profession and the breadth of their judgment. Will we find such people today—to staff not just one board, but many? And will their criteria be the same? The most important qualities making for effectiveness in the diplomatic profession are, after all, ones engendered in the family and the home. They have little to do with money, but they have a great deal to do with what used to be called breeding. Nothing in the Wriston pamphlet gives the reader grounds to hope that future boards will find it natural to search for such qualities or will be encouraged to do so.

The question, in both cases, is again whether you want your Foreign Service to be (let us frankly use the abhorred word) an elite, in character and intellect and education, or whether you want its members to be as close as possible to the mean of other Americans of their age. I am sure that the founding fathers of our Republic would unhesitatingly have favored the former, as did

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all those who had to deal with Foreign Service affairs up to one or two decades ago. It was left for the present generation, given to confusing republican institutions with an egalitarian conformism, to embrace the theory that we should be represented by our average rather than our best.

VI

It is announced that in the future, as in the past, the obligations of military service are to take precedence over the duties of a Foreign Service officer. If an officer is called for military service, his Foreign Service work and career are to be interrupted for so long as the armed services are entitled to claim him. No work he might be doing in the Foreign Service is to be regarded as of such importance, from the standpoint of the national interest, as to take precedence over his military service. The reasoning behind the retention of this principle is not difficult to perceive. Distinctions with respect to military obligation are always invidious. As one who favors universal military service for all young men alike, the writer would be the last to challenge the principle that military obligation should be equal for all.

But as the system now operates, and as it is to operate in future, it has in it the makings of much wastage of training and experience from the standpoint of the Government. So far as peacetime is concerned, if a man is going to do military service at all, it would obviously be better that he do it and get it over with before he enters the Foreign Service, so that his subsequent Foreign Service career not be disrupted by this sort of an interruption. Much more serious are the implications of the present system for time of war. We had occasion from 1941 to 1945 to see how this principle operates. In time of war, the functions of the Foreign Service are so closely related to the war effort that they often become indistinguishable from those of a good portion of the armed services. During the past war many Foreign Service officers had the experience of working side by side with officers in uniform at common tasks. Yet there was usually a reason, as it happened, why some should be in uniform and some in mufti. When officers left the Foreign Service and went into uniform, either voluntarily or because they were called by their draft boards, it often merely meant that they were set to tasks in which they were less useful to the Government than they would have been had they remained in the Foreign Service, and that other,

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less qualified personnel had to be recruited to do their Foreign Service work. The State Department knew this, and encouraged men to plead with their draft boards to exempt them on the grounds of their greater usefulness to the country in the Foreign Service. Most Foreign Service officers knew it, too, and realized that their greater duty was to remain in the Service if they could. Yet the Department of State itself refused to take any responsibility in asking the draft boards for deferment. The men were thus left with a bitter personal choice: whether to ask for deferment as a matter of conscience, at the cost of being reproached as slackers and draft-dodgers, or to go unprotestingly to the armed services, knowing that the Government's interests as a whole would be worse served for the change. Since the old system is to be retained without change, all these problems are bound to arise again in the event of war.

It must not happen that the Foreign Service simply melts away and becomes largely unavailable for its duties precisely at the moment when, if the experience of the last war is any criterion, one might have greatest need for a trained and experienced corps of men for the performance of a multitude of duties in allied and neutral countries that do not come strictly within the military competence. Better than this, it would seem, would be a system whereby every young man did his military service automatically, before entering on his Foreign Service career, but remained thereafter wholly at the Government's disposal, to be employed in uniform or out of uniform, in the military ranks or in the offices of the Foreign Service, as the interests of the country might dictate.

VII

The failings of the new program noted thus far have been largely ones of commission. But the most fateful and serious deficiency is one of omission. It lies in that problem to which the Wriston Committee, for some reason, neglected to face up, and to which the Government as a whole has not faced up: the problem of security. Although the security system has been probably the greatest single factor in the collapse of Foreign Service morale, the Wriston program appears to have contained no recommendations for revising the system as such. And the implementation of the Wriston Committee recommendations by the Department of State also reflects no desire to revise or modify in any important

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way the unsound and dangerous state of affairs that has been allowed to grow up in this connection.

The scope of this discussion does not permit any detailed examination into the workings of the present security system; nor would the writer be prepared to say that he understands them all, shrouded as they are in the usual mixture of mystery and red tape. Only a specialist, able to give a great deal of his time to this subject, could hope to follow the shifting complexities of law, regulation and administrative policy by which the treatment of the individual officer is, at any given moment, determined.

It is plainly the business of government, as the employer of people entrusted with public duties of unusual delicacy and responsibility, to see to it that these latter are loyal to their country, have reasonable strength of character and are not afflicted with personal weaknesses that would incline them to lapses of self-control or render them likely objects for blackmail or malevolent exploitation by outsiders. These requirements are elementary. They are not peculiar to government. They are ones many other employers have to meet. Normally, they are handled as integral portions of regular personnel work, to be met with due prudence and common sense in the recruitment, supervision and advancement of personnel. They were so handled for many years in the old Department of State and Foreign Service.

The system did not work badly. During the quarter-century that the writer was actively associated with the Foreign Service, something in the neighborhood of three thousand officers must have been employed in it at one time or another; yet he can recall none that was ever discovered to have been disloyal to the country while serving in this capacity, and none that was ever blackmailed by a foreign government. If there were such cases, they were neither numerous nor important. Of indiscretions there were, of course, plenty; for mankind is given to indiscretion. But the older generation of diplomatists was taught that virtue did not lie in any perfectionist attempt to avoid this weakness altogether but rather in keeping it within the bounds of the tolerable —in the facility, that is, for being indiscrete only with a measure of discretion. Actually, even the most injudicious indiscretions of Foreign Service officers have rarely rivalled in egregiousness those regularly committed by the loftier of their superiors in government.

The totalitarians were the first to arrive at the idea that a man's

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"security" was a peripheral attribute of his personal makeup—something unconnected with his fitness for office generally, and something to be tested and established by a special race of men who needed to know nothing of the other aspects of his character and performance. In the aftermath of World War II, for reasons which would warrant some careful soul-searching on the part of the nation as a whole, the United States Government came to embrace this same philosophy with an enthusiasm approaching abandon, and to erect upon it, in the particular case of the State Department and Foreign Service, a new system of security controls that could scarcely have been more unsound in concept, more onerous in operation or more tragic in consequence. More than any other single factor, it was this innovation that was responsible for the discouragement and demoralization that have characterized the Foreign Service in recent years.

The new security system involved, as was indicated above, the establishment of a wholly new career service to check on the reliability of the old one. The members of the new service were not required to have had any personal experience or familiarity with the work of the old one. Although they were supposed to judge the political reliability of other men—often men considerably more mature and experienced than themselves—and although they were commissioned for this purpose to examine into and weigh the political views of these other men, there is no indication that it was thought necessary to give them anything resembling an adequate education in political affairs. Although they were charged with prying into the most delicate and intimate phases of people's lives, there appears to have been no requirement that they themselves be people of superior detachment and understanding in these matters. Whereas in the past such inquiries have generally, by the common consent of society, been left to men who might be presumed by virtue of age, training and previous experience to be able to conduct them with ripe judgment and detachment and to avoid bringing unnecessary damage or pain to the people involved—such men as priests, physicians, psychologists or judges at the bench—here they were turned over to brash young men whose qualifications appear to have been confined to the college or law school diploma and whose own superior virtue was documented by no other fact than that they were too young emotionally, and too virginal intellectually, to have known temptation.

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If we are to judge from what is known of past loyalty cases, no adequate arrangements exist for the evaluation of adverse information obtained in the course of this investigative work. Just how much sifting of evidence is theoretically supposed to be carried out before charges are formally preferred against an officer remains something of a mystery. In any case, the records of past loyalty proceedings are replete with instances where the Department of State obviously took cognizance of charges raised by people outside the Department and, without subjecting them to any independent critical scrutiny worthy of the name, flung them against the officer in formal proceedings, with the lighthearted injunction: Defend yourself if you can! This is an indefensible procedure, foolish even from the standpoint of the Government itself. It does not necessarily elicit the truth; for it is not always that the employee is able or inclined to refute malicious and vague charges, particularly when they emanate from persons whose identity is concealed from him. It is a procedure that leaves everyone, including the Government itself, at the mercy of the informer. If there is any penalty attached to the filing with the Government of false information, known by the filer to be false, about a governmental officer, many of us have yet to learn of it. It is obvious, and has been obvious for several years, that such a system is open to exploitation against us by the Communists themselves. That it has been retained so long, in the face of these circumstances, can be explained only by a belief on the part of Government that it makes no difference who gets dropped or who inspires the dropping (even though it be the Communist Party), so long as no one remains in government who *might* conceivably be insecure. Such a view, implying the assumption that our country is infinitely rich in talented, devoted and experienced public servants and that new ones can always be found where the others came from, is not the view of a provident or realistic employer.

Finally, there is the inexcusably painful and injurious method by which, in recent years, many officers who have fallen foul of the security system have been released from the Service. Most, if not all, of these men have been released for reasons having nothing to do with their loyalty. Many have been released, after long years of faithful and sometimes distinguished service, for reasons highly personal, which would have no relation to their usefulness in other walks of life. Some of us continue to doubt

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that in many of these cases the charges were ever adequately proven or, if proven, had any great relevance to the officer's fitness for further service. But even ignoring these doubts and supposing the charges reasonable ones and adequately proven, there could be no justification for releasing these men, as was actually done, in such a manner as to bring great anguish to them and their families and to damage their public reputations as well as their chances for future employment. We have yet to observe any penitence on the part of the Government for the injustice and suffering it has wrought in these cases.

This recital of the evils of the security system, as they have been apparent in recent years, is by no means exhaustive. But it will, perhaps, suffice to show why the failure of the Wriston Committee to deal with this problem has seemed to many officers the weakest feature of its work. What the Government now proposes to do about these evils, we cannot tell. It has indicated that measures will be taken, or are being taken, to mitigate one or another of them. If so, so much the better. But there has been as yet no evidence of any disposition on the part of official Washington to re-think the entire system and the philosophic basis on which it rests. There has been no evidence of any readiness to face the basic question as to whether a man's security is really something that can be measured and judged apart from his own personality and the totality of his performance as an officer—like the color of his hair or the condition of his arches—and whether it is really something suitably to be determined by anonymous individuals who know little about either political science or human nature. Until government is willing to face up to these questions, many who have the interests of the Foreign Service deeply at heart must be forgiven if they remain skeptical of the prospects for any complete restoration of Foreign Service morale.

VIII

A year and a half ago, just before the Wriston Committee undertook its work, the writer was asked by a student editor to comment for the benefit of his readers on the merits of the Foreign Service as a career for young men leaving college. He replied that as things stood at that sad moment, he could not encourage any young man to enter the Service at the bottom by examination and to start up the ladder in the normal manner. He pointed out that the Administration was about to undertake a study of the

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whole problem and voiced the hope that this study would lead to measures which would again make the Service a promising and satisfying career. He urged the student-readers to await the results of this study before making any final judgment.

Today, the study is complete; the results are in large part at hand. What is there now to be said about the prospects of the Foreign Service as a career?

Democracy, as Cambon observed, will always have diplomacy. There will always be a group of civilian officials of this Government charged with the representation of the country's interests abroad. However the service of these officials may be administered, the work and the life will remain in many ways stimulating and interesting, particularly for the officer who wishes to make it so. It will always carry with it the excitements, the rewards, the challenges, often the hardships, of foreign residence. However the Government may try to reduce these advantages through the anxious paternalism with which it now surrounds its officers, something of them will always remain for the officer who has enough intellectual curiosity to turn his back on the American colony cocktail parties and to learn something of the life around him.

Beyond that, the life of the Foreign Service officer will continue to be enriched by his association with other Americans in the same work. As in so many other American institutions, the deficiencies of administrative structure will in part be corrected by the virtues of the national temperament. Whatever the selection system, intelligent and talented people will, by the law of averages, find their way into the Service, to enrich others with their insights and to inspire others with the example of their own growth. Whatever the Government's views on specialists as opposed to generalists, there will always be magic moments when minds previously confined within the walls of a narrow special interest are suddenly awakened by the Foreign Service experience to a realization of the unity of all knowledge. However ill-designed the security system and whatever premiums it may place on timidity and a cramped suspiciousness of outlook, friendships and loyalties will develop; men will find satisfaction in the appreciation of their colleagues for work that goes unnoted or unappreciated at home; there will be times when men will be privileged to stand by each other in danger and adversity and thus to taste one of the richest forms of human experience. Every-

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where, even within the ranks of the security officers themselves, the golden mean of American characteristics will not fail to break through: men will learn by doing; experience will breed understanding and maturity; the instinct for common decency and fairness, instilled by a thousand earnest American mothers and on a thousand sand-lot baseball fields, will rise to assert itself and to do battle, wherever it can, with whatever is stupid or unjust in the system. Finally, and perhaps most important of all, the work of the Foreign Service will always have, in the eyes of those who perform it, that ultimate dignity that comes from the fact that it is the work of a great government, on whose performance rests the fate of a great people, indeed, in many respects, of the world at large—a dignity which means that whatever the Foreign Service officer may be occupied with in his official work, it will never be meaningless, never wholly trivial.

These things will go far to redeem the Foreign Service of the future, as they have redeemed that of the past. They will redeem it both as a subjective experience for those who live and work in it and as an instrument for the transaction of the Government's foreign business. And in many respects the changes introduced by the implementation of the new program will represent improvements over the state in which the Service has found itself in recent years.

Conditions will of course continue to exist which most older officers will be unable to view otherwise than as burdens on the development of an efficient and well-adjusted organization. In particular, no outsider can yet give to the young man entering the Service the assurance that the treatment he may receive at the hands of the security authorities will necessarily bear any relationship to the devotion and talent he may have given to his substantive work, and that it may not work tragic and undeserved hardship upon him. But in this, as in other respects, the future Foreign Service will be only in tune with an age committed to bigness, to over-organization, to de-personalization, to the collective rather than individual relationship. Skepticism of the value of individual excellence and reluctance to allow any of the weight of society to come to rest on the insights and intuition of the individual spirit will be the marks not of the Foreign Service alone but of the very environment in which it exists; and the young person seeking the road to self-fulfillment will not be likely to escape them by avoiding the Foreign Service career.

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THE SOVIET NAVY

By Hanson W. Baldwin

THE Soviet Navy has expanded more rapidly since World War II than any other branch of the Russian armed forces. About 200,000 to 300,000 men have been added to its strength, which now totals between 750,000 and 850,000 officers and men. Its submarine fleet is the largest in the world—in fact the largest in world naval history. The world's newest cruisers—of the *Sverdlovsk* class—are Russian. The U.S.S.R. operates 3,000 to 4,000 naval aircraft. The Red Navy's chief, Nikolai Kuznetsov, Admiral of the Fleet, protégé of Stalin, has survived purge and struggle for power to become perhaps the sixth or seventh-ranking military figure in the Soviet Union—which means that Kuznetsov is a political as well as a naval figure. Kuznetsov has called the Baltic, with some reason, Russia's "mare nostrum," and he, Stalin, Malenkov and Bulganin have all stressed the Soviet determination to become a leading sea Power.

Russia is, in fact, well on the way toward that goal. She maintains what Admiral Robert B. Carney, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, has called the second largest fleet in commission.[1] She has a submarine construction capacity estimated at about one a week, and a cruiser construction capability of about 1½ to 2½ ships a year.[2] She is purchasing merchant ships, fishing vessels and oil tankers (111,918 gross tons as of March 1955) from foreign builders and has a merchant marine that is now the tenth largest in the world (exclusive of satellite shipping).

Yet Russia's sea power has many anomalous features. Russian flagships are rarely seen on the high seas. Her newest cruisers are over-big for the Baltic yet are weakly gunned for blue water. Her Navy has no aircraft carriers, the capital ship of modern fleets. Her naval aircraft are all land-based. She possesses fleets of small craft, which never put to sea, for use on her numerous rivers and lakes. She has relatively few seagoing amphibious craft. The Russian Navy, like the Soviet nation, presents the West with "an enigma wrapped in mystery."

[1] This ranking requires qualification. The United States, by any standard the world's leading sea Power, and Britain maintain large reserve fleets of ships in "mothballs" in addition to ships in active commission. Soviet Russia has no such reserve. She probably operates more ships in active commission than Britain does but the total British fleet is much larger.

[2] A British Admiralty estimate gives Soviet Russia a capability of six cruisers annually.

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II

The Soviet Navy is, nevertheless, a political factor internally in Soviet Russia, and a power factor externally in the world struggle. More attention should therefore be paid to it. Much future history will be determined by the evolution of Russian maritime and naval thought. Will Moscow try to create a merchant marine for extensive export trade? Will the Soviet Navy develop into a high seas fleet, capable of projecting Russian power far beyond the continental "Heartland," over the 74 percent of the world that is water?

No sure answer can be found to these questions in a review of past Russian naval evolution.

Naval expansion and modernization is not peculiar to Communist Russia. Periodically in the days of the Tsars there were bursts of wartime activity, demands for warm-water ports, intensive naval construction, followed by long periods of inactivity and decline. Peter the Great, Catherine II and Alexander III stimulated Russian naval expansion. They enlisted foreign aid to build and direct their fleets, as the Communists today have recruited German submarine designers, naval architects and technicians. John Paul Jones, the hero of the infant American Navy, was summoned to Moscow by Catherine II to "fight the Turks in the Black Sea."

Yet save in Russia's warm seas the history of Russian naval expansion generally has ended in frustration. After the decline of Turkey and until the rise of Germany, Russia was able to command the Baltic and Black Seas. But the naval concepts of Maltzahn, Castex, Corbett and Mahan seem to have made singularly little impression on the Russian mentality, and most of the Russian attempts to produce a truly maritime force and a maritime strategy ended in defeat and sometimes in ignominy. There have been few defeats, for instance, as complete as Tsushima, which takes its place in history along with Cannae as symbolic of the battle of annihilation. The cruise of Admiral Rozhestvensky's fleet from the Baltic to its rendezvous with disaster off Japan revealed so many instances of confusion, ineptitude and land-lubberly qualities as to make the Russian Navy of that day almost a laughing stock among the seamen of the world.

The magnitude of the Russian naval disaster in the Russo-Japanese war can be dismissed as merely symbolic of the degeneration and decay of Russian institutions and Russian society in the

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last days of the Tsars. Yet so far the Communists have made a naval combat record which is not much more impressive. No Communist fleet has ever fought a naval battle; no living Soviet admiral has ever commanded a fleet in action at sea. The Soviet naval record in World War II was undistinguished except, paradoxically, on land. Soviet sailors and marines, organized for land fighting, joined in many of the most sanguinary battles around the Baltic and Black Seas, and seamen of the Baltic Fleet were among the most effective defenders of Leningrad. The Russian Navy participated in a considerable number of what Moscow has called "amphibious" operations in World War II. But all of them were short-range, inland-sea operations; most of them were what we in the West would call mass "river crossings." Even so, in the winter war against Finland a number of amphibious attempts failed, or were cancelled. In nearly every instance, those that succeeded were sea leapfrog operations over short or partially frozen stretches of water on the flank of the Army.

The Russians used mines and coastal artillery with considerable defensive effectiveness, particularly in the Baltic, but their old and obsolete heavy ships were immured in besieged bases most of the war, and the Communist torpedo craft—surface and sub-surface—scored but few successes. The Germans had no great difficulty with Russian submarines and the swastika was the dominant flag in the Baltic for most of the war.[3]

III

The past history of Russian futility at sea cannot be taken, of course, as an exact guide to present Soviet naval capabilities or to future Soviet intentions.

Russia's military and political conquests on land during and since World War II and the changing character of naval war have given a new potential to Russian maritime strength. Kuznetsov's boast of a Russian Baltic "mare nostrum" is not an idle one; the Baltic today is dominated by Soviet air-naval power, a domination contested unequally by the small though efficient air and sea fleets of Sweden. Russia has a new port on the Arctic—Finnish Petsamo—and in the Orient she has access, through her Chinese

[3] Control of the Baltic and Black Seas by the Germans waxed as their armies and air bases advanced into Russia and waned as they retreated. In these narrow seas this control was more dependent upon air superiority than surface superiority; nevertheless, German vessels used the seas for their own purposes for the greater part of the war, while denying such free use to the Russians.

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ally, to warm-water ice-free ports. And her control through her Balkan satellites over the Danube estuary and of most of the western shore of the Black Sea make her hold on that strategic landlocked ocean more total than ever before in modern history. Strong Soviet air power plus the electronic eye of radar have reenforced the Soviet grasp on these contiguous waters and coasts and have added a defensive strength to Soviet naval surface strength unparalleled in any prior era.

But the same geographic handicaps that have always hobbled the development of Russian maritime power are still evident today, though to a lesser degree.

Russia is a continental Power; she forms, as the geopoliticians put it, a major part of "the Eurasian Heartland." She has, in land and air concepts, the military advantage of the "interior position." Her air forces and land armies operate outward against the Eurasian "rimlands" over shorter distances—as if from the center of a circle—while the "rimland" Powers must move around the circumference of that circle. But this very fact weakens and divides Soviet sea power. Her surface and sub-surface fleets must move over tremendous distances around the "rimlands" of two continents past coasts held (except in the Arctic) by other Powers. Her ships still have no clear and easy access to the high seas and her fleets must be distant, scattered and divided, with no easy means of shifting vessels from sea to sea or of reënforcing one fleet with another.

Geography is the Russian Navy's undoing. The Baltic, sea route to Leningrad and to the political heart of Russia, is landlocked, and its narrow entrances, the Skagerrak and Cattegat, lie beneath Danish, Swedish and Norwegian guns. They are shoal and are easily mined, and would offer at best a hazardous gateway in time of war into the Atlantic, even if Denmark were conquered by Russian land armies.

The White Sea and the Arctic, where Russian ports give upon the north, are open save to nature, but most of the Soviet northern ports are frozen part of each year, and in winter the pressing icefields narrow the lane of freedom to the Atlantic to dangerous dimensions.

Between the Baltic and the White Sea, the Stalin-White Sea Canal provides for about five months each year a water link for ships no bigger than submarines and small destroyers. But it is a tenuous passage easily blocked by the manacles of winter frost,

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by sea mines or by bombing with conventional or atomic weapons.

Far to the south lies another water approach to a vital area of the "Heartland"—the industry of the Ukraine and the oil of the Caucasus. The Black Sea, landlocked like the Baltic, offers an even more difficult egress, for even if the Dardanelles were to fall to Communist armies the maze of islands in the Aegean and the close water of the Mediterranean would make a sortie by Russian surface ships or submarines a desperate adventure. But the Black Sea must be defended, and its defense poses a strategic problem separate and independent from the problems of the north. Small ships, it is true, can be transferred from Baltic and Arctic via the well-developed system of Soviet rivers and canals to the Black Sea and to the Caspian. But this process is limited and slow.

Soviet Siberia and the Far East present still a separate naval problem. For perhaps six to ten weeks in summer, sea communication along the Arctic coast between the Murmansk-White Sea area and the Bering Strait and the Pacific is possible, though difficult. Icebreakers and helicopters—the latter used to search out open leads in the ice packs—annually shepherd supply ships and merchant vessels to the Arctic settlements along this barren coast. Shoal water and the ever-present threat of the ice make this passage a precarious one but there is some evidence that the Russians have shifted submarines, destroyer-types and perhaps even a cruiser to Far Eastern waters by this passage.

Thus Soviet Russia has found no way by Marxist dialectics to overcome the geographic handicaps that hobbled Tsarist naval power. She must maintain four separate fleets—separated by vast distances and great obstacles and without any easy means of mutual reënforcement. Her present position can be likened to that of the United States in the days when it had a one-ocean Navy but needed a two-ocean fleet for the Atlantic and the Pacific. The American problem then was far simpler, however, than that of Soviet Russia now. The Panama Canal and even the route around the Horn or the Cape of Good Hope offered much surer connecting links for the transfer of ships from one ocean to another than any of the waterways available to Soviet Russia. And the American shipbuilding facilities were, and are, far greater than those of Soviet Russia.

Still another major geographic disadvantage confronts the

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Soviet "Big-Navy" advocates. Russian shipyards, generally speaking, are far removed from the main sources of Soviet industrial power.[4] Unlike those in Britain or the United States, Soviet shipyards do not in most cases have the immediate "back-up" of steel mills, fabricating plants, coal mines, iron ore deposits, petroleum sources and the sizeable industrial complex essential to support a major maritime Power. Steel plates and parts must be brought, sometimes thousands of miles by rail, road or inland waterway, to the shipbuilding ports. In war this process would be strategically vulnerable and in peace it necessarily delays construction.

IV

These geographic and industrial factors have influenced greatly the size, composition and organization of the Soviet Navy, which in each respect is in some ways unique.

The existing Soviet Navy is not a "balanced" fleet in the traditional concept of the term. Its heavy ships are of negligible importance. There are no aircraft carriers in commission or building, and contrary to many published reports it is probable that no battleships are under construction. Three obsolete battleships (one of them the former Italian *Giulio Cesare,* allotted to the Soviet Navy under the peace treaty) are assigned to the Baltic and Black Seas. They are of little importance except perhaps as static coastal defense weapons.

Soviet Russia has a sizeable cruiser and destroyer fleet consisting of about 24 cruisers, about half of them postwar, and 110 to 130 destroyer-types, most of them postwar. The new cruisers of the *Sverdlovsk* class, with an ostensible displacement of 12,800 tons, but believed to be about 5,000 tons larger, appear to be under-gunned (5.9 inch main battery) for their size, and they are equipped with old-style Italian optical rangefinders. However, they carry a heavy antiaircraft armament, torpedoes and mines; they are fast, have a long cruising radius, are rather well-armored and their bows are strengthened for ice navigation. They have a high freeboard, well-suited for the stormy seas of the North, and in the judgment of our naval authorities they are "first-class warships."

Some of the new Russian destroyer-types are also formidable

[4] Polish and East German shipyards have nevertheless added materially to Soviet shipbuilding capabilities.

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and compare well with modern Allied types. A few of the Soviet destroyers displace between 2,000 and 4,000 tons, and are armed with 5.1 inch guns, torpedo tubes, mines and radar. Most are short-range, high-speed types, but some appear to have cruising ranges far greater than that necessary for the landlocked inland seas.

Numerically, Russia's submarine fleet is the largest in the world; perhaps 350 to 370 submarines are in service. Many of these are old, and much of the Russian submarine construction program since the war has been devoted to replacement of obsolete and worn-out hulls. Most of the Soviet submarines are small, short-range or medium-range types constructed for inland-sea or coastal operations. Some of these, as they have been replaced by newer vessels, have been transferred to the Navies of Communist States. There is some evidence, for instance, that the Chinese Communists are now operating three to five 200–250 ton *Maliutki*-type submarines from a base at Tsingtao.

About 100 of the Soviet submarines are believed to be long-range, deep-sea types. This is twice as many as Germany's total submarine fleet when World War II started. Recently the Soviet Navy standardized two types of ocean-going submarines, both of them snorkel-equipped; one is of about 1,500 to 2,000 tons displacement, the other of 800 to 1,200 tons. These submarines are powered, for the most part, with the conventional installations of Diesels on the surface and electric-batteries when submerged. But some probably are utilizing a modification of the German Walther hydrogen-peroxide chemical turbine for submerged cruising. The Soviet torpedoes are described as good, and most of the Soviet submarines are equipped for minelaying or can be so equipped. Soviet Russia has not yet built a nuclear-powered submarine.

Partially because their shipyards are far from their main centers of industry, partially to achieve strategic decentralization, the Russians have taken a leaf from the German experience in World War II. Submarine assemblies are built inland (some of them at Gorki) and are transported in sections, sometimes by rail but chiefly by inland waterway, to the shipbuilding assembly yards on the Baltic and Black Seas, on the Arctic Ocean and in the Far East. By these methods a capability of mass production has been achieved.

Another impressive element of Soviet naval strength is in avia-

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tion. All Soviet naval aviation (except for a few seaplanes) is land-based, but it is an integral part of the Soviet Navy, and the aircraft are under the operational command of each fleet commander. There are an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 planes of the same general types as those used to support the Russian land army—Mig 15s and Mig 17s, the medium attack bomber IL-28, and reconnaissance and patrol types. The IL-28 and some of the patrol types can extend Soviet air-naval power at least 500 miles seaward from the Russian coasts.

In addition to these principal elements of Soviet naval strength, Russia has a vast small-ship fleet composed of types described by *La Revue Maritime* as "the dust of the sea." Escorts, patrol boats, trawlers, minelayers, minesweepers, motor torpedo boats, small landing craft, icebreakers, etc., are probably numbered in the thousands.[5]

These small craft, and especially the fishing trawlers, which can be easily adapted to minelaying, add immensely to what is perhaps the major Soviet naval capability—minelaying. Soviet submarines, cruisers and destroyers are all fitted for minelaying, and in this form of naval warfare, so suitable to the defense of their narrow shallow seas, the Russians have always excelled. With German help, Soviet Russia has mass-produced improved models of the German-designed magnetic, acoustic, pressure and contact mines used during World War II; and, as we discovered off the Korean coasts, these mines can profoundly influence the art of war at sea and provide a formidable defensive girdle for any coast.

Between 750,000 and 850,000 men serve the Soviet Navy in uniform. Some of them—perhaps 200,000—are the "hard core" of permanent professional officers, petty officers, pilots and leading seamen. The rest are conscripts, who normally serve five years. Perhaps 240,000 to 280,000 men serve afloat, aboard ships and boats of the Russian Navy. Another 75,000 to 85,000 fly and maintain and support naval aircraft. The very sizeable remainder—the majority of the Russian Navy's personnel—are stationed ashore, in support, administrative and maintenance positions, manning antiaircraft and coastal batteries and coastal defense zones (which are the responsibility of the Navy up to 50

[5] Satellite naval strengths are chiefly in small craft. Of these the Polish Navy is the most important; it mans a considerable number of minesweepers and motor torpedo boats, plus a few submarines and destroyer types. It has been virtually integrated into the Soviet Baltic Fleet.

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miles inland) and organized and trained as "naval infantry" or marines for amphibious operations and land fighting.

There is little evidence on which to judge the command ability and combat effectiveness of the sailors of the Red Fleet. But the tight political control that characterizes Soviet military organizations certainly extends to the Navy; political commissars as "Deputy Commanders" are prevalent, and "security" forces form a sizeable percentage of the total. Communist Party control is exercised at all levels. The Communists will never forget that the Red Revolution germinated among the sailors of the Tsarist fleet and that counter-revolution initiated by sailors represented the first real threat to Soviet power.

It is upon this large and unconventional force that Soviet Russia has spent perhaps $60 to $80 billions since 1945. About one-fifth of the annual Soviet defense budget goes to the Navy, and the British Admiralty believes that in about two years, more or less, the current construction program will build up the Soviet fleet to 30 cruisers, 150 destroyers, 500 submarines, 500 motor torpedo boats, 1,000 minesweepers, 4,000 naval aircraft and hundreds of other types.

V

The organization of the Soviet Navy is influenced both by Marxism and geography. Periodically, the Ministry of the Navy has been an independent department (as it was during World War II), only to be merged afterwards in the Ministry of Defense. Today, Marshal Zhukov, the head of the Ministry of Defense, includes the Navy under his over-all control, but Admiral Kuznetsov, the naval deputy and head of the Navy, has virtual administrative and operational autonomy within the framework of Party political control and over-all strategic concepts. An administrative and functional staff in Moscow is concerned with political indoctrination, naval education, personnel, supply, communications, naval medicine and justice. There are subordinate administrations for the naval infantry, naval aircraft and coastal defense and fortified areas. Operational forces are divided into four principal fleet commands—Northern, or Arctic; Baltic; Black; and Pacific, or Far Eastern—each with its own subordinate fleet air arm, and into at least nine "internal" or lake and river flotillas—the Caspian, Azov, Ladoga, Volga, Onego, Dnieper, Amur, Sungari and Danube.

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The Northern, or Arctic Fleet, which has its principal base at Polyarnoe, near Murmansk, numbers about three *Tchapayev*-class cruisers (smaller than the *Sverdlovsks,* with twelve 5.9 inch guns), 25 to 40 destroyer types and perhaps 40 to 70 submarines. This fleet is considerably smaller than the Baltic Fleet, but in a strategic sense it is perhaps the most important of the four Soviet fleets. It is supported by a fairly extensive naval and air base complex in the Kola Peninsula-White Sea area. The White Sea freezes in winter, thus limiting the value of Archangel (Molotovsk) as a port, but the Gulf Stream keeps the northern coast of the Kola Peninsula ice free and year-round naval operations can be conducted, with safety, though not with comfort, from Polyarnoe, Varenga, Murmansk and Pechenza (Petsamo).[6] A major industrial and mining area is under development to the east of the White Sea region in the Vorkuta-Pechora River area, and is of indirect support to the Kola complex. This region is connected by railroad (though inadequate) with the Leningrad area, and by the Stalin canal with the Baltic. Most important, the Kola Peninsula abuts on the undefended Arctic frontier of an exposed neighbor, Norway, and the sea route around the North Cape to the open Atlantic is usable throughout the year. In case of war, Russian naval, amphibious and land operations could secure northern Norway and safeguard the flank of this important access to the open Atlantic.

The Soviet Baltic Fleet, which really consists of two fleets, is by far the largest. The Fourth (or South Baltic) Fleet is based at Baltijsky (Pillau); the Eighth (or North Baltic) bases at Tallinn. Together these fleets include at least one of the old Russian battleships, perhaps eight to 14 cruisers of all types, 40 to 60 destroyer-types, 100 to 150 submarines and very sizeable numbers of motor torpedo boats and gunboats, patrol craft, minelayers and minesweepers—all supported by 800 or 900 naval aircraft. The Baltic Fleet benefits from three factors. It operates in a landlocked sea, the gateways to which can be easily closed and are controlled by weak Powers; there are scores of Russian air bases along its eastern and southern coasts which dominate the entire sea; and since the acquisition of bases and ports in the Baltic states, Poland and Eastern Germany the Russian Navy enjoys a plethora of harbors, repair and base facilities. These

[6] Sea traffic to the Murman coast is very limited, however, from December through February.

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include Kronstadt (outside Leningrad); Finnish Porkhala, Kaliningrad (Koenigsberg); Tallinn; Libau; Rostock, Stralsund; Dantzig; Memel; Sweinmuende; Gdynia and Osel. (Most, but not all of these, are blocked by ice during the winter.) A new and advanced base at German Ruegen, only 80 airline miles from Copenhagen, was started some years ago, but apparently construction there has been halted or greatly curtailed. This whole area is supported by the Leningrad industrial complex and the industry and shipbuilding facilities of Germany and East Poland.

Defensively, the Baltic is strong, but offensively it does not offer easy access to the open seas. Even if Russian land armies conquered the Jutland peninsula and Southern Norway, the narrow straits leading from the Baltic to the open seas could be easily mined by planes operating from England, and the passage into the open ocean would be hazardous.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet, based at Sevastopol, consists of one or two old battleships, four to six cruisers, and a sizeable number of destroyer types and submarines. Important ports and bases include Odessa, Nikolayev, Zhdanov, Novorossiysk, Poti and Batumi, all of them open to navigation the year around. The Black Sea Fleet benefits from its proximity to the principal Soviet oil source in the Caucasus and to the major industrial complex of the Ukraine. In size, it is large enough to contain any naval threat posed by Turkey, just as the Baltic Fleet is large enough to overpower the efficient little Swedish Navy. But, like the Baltic Fleet, it would find access to the Mediterranean difficult even if Soviet land armies conquered the Straits.

The Far Eastern Fleets are organized in two fleets and one flotilla. The Fifth Fleet, based at Vladivostok, consists of at least two cruisers, numerous destroyer types and perhaps 45 to 50 submarines. The Seventh Fleet, based at Sovetskaya Gavan, includes one or more cruisers, a small number of destroyers, and perhaps 10 to 20 submarines. The Kamchatka flotilla, based at Petropavlovsk (a sub-command of the Seventh Fleet), consists entirely of submarines—possibly 20 to 30. This fleet has greater strategic possibilities than any of the others for three reasons. Petropavlovsk, with its great bay and important airfield, is the only Russian naval base that gives squarely upon the open ocean. Soviet planes and ships based on Petropavlovsk and the Kurile Islands can reach great-circle air and shipping routes across the North Pacific in a very brief period. The Russians now control

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the Kurile Islands, which lie like a barrier across the deep-sea entrances to the Sea of Okhotsk; unlike the Baltic or the Black Sea, their ships based on Sovetskaya Gavan, Vladivostok, Magadan and Aleksandrovsk (with repair and construction facilities at Komsomolsk and Nikolaevsk) can sortie at will into the open Pacific. And, finally, Soviet Russia now has access to numerous "warm-water" ports in Eastern Asia, ranging from Rashin, the former Japanese naval base in Northern Korea, to Port Arthur, Tsingtao, Shanghai, Canton and as far south as Hainan Island.[7] The Far Eastern Fleet, moreover, can utilize the oil production of Sakhalin Island.

It nevertheless is under some major disadvantages. The greatest of these is its remoteness from the main centers of Soviet industrial strength in European Russia and in Central Siberia. The Maritime Provinces and Eastern Siberia have been considerably developed in successive five-year plans, and submarines can now be built—or at least assembled—in Eastern Siberian shipyards. But the extensive "back-up" essential to construct and repair ships and maintain and support major maritime operations is lacking. The Far Eastern Fleet is not self-sufficient and cannot be maintained for an indefinite period by the industries and resources available along the Siberian coast.[8] This isolation is particularly important in the case of open-sea bases at Petropavlovsk and in the Kuriles; these are remote from any important industry, they must be supplied chiefly by sea, and they are harried by wind, fog and ice. Moreover, the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk, and even Vladivostok itself, are icebound for many months; for three and a half months Vladivostok is kept open to navigation only by the use of icebreakers. And all of the "warm-water" ports to which Russia has access further south either lie in shoal water near the continental shelf, where submarine activities would be hazardous, or are fenced off from the open ocean by an island rampart extending from Japan to the Southern Philippines. These disadvantages are offset—though not completely—by Russian continental-based air power in considerable strength which could make American surface operations westward of these island ramparts hazardous, though not impossible.

[7] Submarines, presumably Soviet, have been reported in the coastal waters of Hainan Island.

[8] This judgment is open to challenge, and not all observers would agree. It is beyond challenge, however, that the Soviet Far East cannot maintain and support fleets in any way comparable in size, complexity or strength of the U. S. Seventh Fleet (assigned to the Western Pacific), which forms only a part of the U. S. Pacific naval power.

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VI

Such is the Soviet Navy—the navy of a country with the greatest seacoast in the world (most of it barren and worthless), a country with the greatest inland sea (the Caspian), a continental nation with reawakened maritime ambitions.

There is no doubt that a renaissance of Soviet sea power has started since World War II. It has been facilitated by the growth of Soviet industrial skills, the aid of German technicians and the expansion of Soviet industry and shipbuilding facilities incident to the five-year plans. It also has been aided by land conquests and political victories during and since World War II, in particular by the Communization of Poland, East Germany and the Danube delta, the acquisition of the Kurile Islands and Southern Sakhalin in the Pacific and the Communization of China. These have greatly broadened Moscow's naval horizon and have reduced—though not eliminated—the geographic handicaps under which Russian fleets of the past have labored. And the advent of air power has added great defensive strength and provided offensive capabilities to Soviet sea power.

The concepts that govern Soviet sea power seem still somewhat inchoate and contradictory. Some of the anomalies have already been noted, but there are others. There is little evidence, for instance, that Soviet naval air fleets have been trained to work in close coördination with Soviet submarines in attacks against shipping, the most difficult type of attack against which to defend a convoy. In the Baltic, in fact, Soviet naval aircraft apparently work with surface torpedo craft—particularly motor torpedo boats—in coördinated attacks, which are obviously pointed against the Swedish Navy. There is little evidence of the application of guided missiles to sea or naval air use. A Soviet submarine for launching guided missiles may be in existence, but there is no evidence of this. There are Soviet torpedo planes, but they appear to be "adapted" or modified types. Some of the Soviet cruisers, a few of the destroyer leaders, and many of the submarines are long-range types, but there do not appear to be any supply ships (similar to those which the Germans used in World War II) capable of replenishing the armed raiders in distant areas of the oceans. There is no evidence as yet of a really long-range or trans-oceanic amphibious capability. Most of the Soviet ships appear to be armed as "jacks-of-all-trades" with mines, torpedoes, antiaircraft and surface guns. There are few

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signs of the extreme specialization that has characterized naval development in the West, especially in the field of anti-submarine warfare. Helicopters for naval use are conspicuous by their absence. The part played by naval air logistics, meaning the use of planes for the transport of emergency naval supplies, is an unknown quantity in the strange equation of Soviet maritime power. The use of atomic weapons in conjunction with naval operations has been discussed in Soviet military magazines, but somewhat superficially; the design of the new Soviet ships does not appear to have been influenced to any considerable extent by the lessons of Bikini. And so on. . . .

What can be said, then, to be the governing philosophy behind the development of Soviet sea power?

First and foremost, it is a continental philosophy, a land concept, which now is complicated and influenced, however, by two other factors—the strategic concept of the naval *guerre de course,* and the desire for prestige.

Soviet naval thought is still to a major extent the prisoner of geography. To a nation which forms the bulk of the Eurasian Heartland, which through the centuries has seen the ebb and flow of conquest surge across its land frontiers, the ground army is still the principal element of military power.[9]

Soviet Russia has reached her present position of world eminence not by sea power or air power but by land conquests joined with ideological infiltration. And similarly the greatest dangers to Russian régimes have been on land, from Napoleon and Hitler, or through revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movements.

Thus "Mother Earth"—the land army—is the dominant factor in Soviet strategic concepts, and the way in which the Soviet Navy is organized makes frank acknowledgment of the fact.

[9] A leading British authority on the Russian Navy has stated in a letter to the author: "I do not believe that the Russian philosophy of sea power can be changed artificially over a comparatively short period of time, as the Soviet leaders are endeavoring to do at the moment. It is a formidable, though also fairly simple, problem to build fleets of warships and naval aircraft, but it is a very different thing to instill the sort of spirit which will prevent, should occasion arise, a repetition of the disasters of Port Arthur and Tsushima. The Russians are incorrigibly land-minded, with a notable exception of the limited race of northern seamen which operates the icebreakers in the Arctic. They have tried to create weapons of sea power at least three times in their history . . . [but] they have only succeeded in enforcing sea power where their opponent had been worn down by other means. . . . There can be no comparison, for the foreseeable future, with German U-boat efficiency."

Allied officers who commanded convoys to Murmansk during World War II have confirmed this Soviet "land-mindedness." Soviet escort vessels rarely accompanied Allied convoys more than 20 to 30 miles from port.

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Soviet marshals, not admirals, are the dominant figures in the Moscow military hierarchy, both politically and militarily. And the Soviet Fleet, with the greatest part of its personnel strength ashore in coastal defense zones and fortified areas, is the keeper of the sea flank of the army. As Stalin said during World War II, "the Red Fleet is the true helper of the Red Army."

"Command of the sea" is therefore a phrase which does not have much meaning to Soviet naval officers. And Mahan's concept that sea power is often the dominant factor in war is not accepted in Soviet military ideology. Rear Admiral Belli of the Soviet Navy has been quoted as follows: "War on the sea has historically never been an independent phenomenon, but always a part of a war as a whole. . . . From the experience of the Soviet and foreign armed forces . . . it is necessary to consider it completely confirmed that the combined action of land troops with air and sea forces is a foundation of the contemporary conduct of war."[10]

Combined operations, therefore, and particularly the extension of the flank of the army seawards, are envisaged as the primary mission of the Soviet Navy. Guns, torpedoes, bombs, surface ships, submarines and naval aircraft, naval infantry and all other means are used to protect the army's land flank against an amphibious turning movement by an enemy, and, on the offensive, to expedite and extend a land flanking operation against the enemy. Thus Admiral Isakov has written: "The main and most important task carried out by our Navy in all Soviet waters has been to protect the strategic flanks of the Red Army extending to the coasts against enemy landing parties and naval operations, and to direct its own blows against the enemy's flanks and rear."[11]

Translated into more precise geographic missions, these concepts mean that the first and primary task of the Soviet Navy is the mission of coastal defense.[12]

The control of the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Barents Sea (and its approaches to westward of the North Cape), the Sea of Okhotsk and the Gulf of Tartary are the primary task of the Soviet fleets and represent the extent to which the phrase "command of the sea" has meaning to the Russian admiralty. Nor

[10] Raymond L. Garthoff, "Soviet Military Doctrine." Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953, p. 362.

[11] *ibid.* p. 365.

[12] It is for this reason that the Soviet Navy's river and lake flotillas used in conjunction with land armies form so important a part of the Russian naval organization.

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would this "control," it is important to remember, be exercised by surface ships alone, or even primarily. Air power from contiguous land bases and the occupation of dominating positions by land power would provide major control elements to which the surface ships would be accessories.

Short-range Soviet amphibious capabilities thus acquire a new and important meaning within this essentially defensive strategic concept. If war came, Soviet naval infantry, in conjunction with the Red Army, could be expected to occupy Danish Bornholm island, to make landings on the Jutland peninsula, South Norway, perhaps Sweden, Western Finland and Northern Norway. In the Black Sea, one of the primary Soviet objectives (to be accomplished, however, largely by land power with the help of naval infantry) would be seizure of control of the Dardanelles. The short-range Soviet amphibious capability might also be used offensively-defensively across the Bering Strait to Alaska and from the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin to Japanese Hokkaido.

VII

The essentially defensive nature of the "sea-flank" concept is modified, however, by the two other factors now influencing Soviet naval development.

Prestige is playing an important rôle in the Soviet construction program—particularly, perhaps, because of the dismal record of Russian naval power in the past and its manifestly inferior position today. Soviet newspapers consistently stress Russia's position as a "great" naval Power, and Stalin, Molotov and other Soviet leaders have emphasized again and again that Russia must have a navy consistent in size and composition with her global power. A modern Soviet cruiser "showed" the Red flag at the Coronation Naval Review at Spithead and a Russian squadron has visited a Swedish port in recent years. It is even possible that the size of the *Sverdlovsk* class of cruisers was dictated, in part, by considerations of prestige.

Despite this emphasis on naval prestige, the Soviet Government applies it with caution in practice. The interception by the Chinese Nationalist Navy of a Polish tanker bound for Communist China produced fulminations in Moscow but nothing more. A natural reaction of any major sea Power might have been to escort other Communist-flag tankers bound for China by one of the long-range Soviet cruisers.

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The desire for prestige cannot entirely explain, however, the undoubted emphasis placed by the Soviets since the end of the last war upon the construction of a long-range cruiser and submarine fleet. It is very unlikely that the Russian cruisers and submarines are qualitatively comparable in over-all combat effectiveness to modern vessels of the United States Navy. Nevertheless, the Russians now have a capability, which is increasing, for conducting a *guerre de course,* or guerrilla war, against commerce at sea. This capability is as yet not as ominous as it has sometimes been painted. The geographic division of the Soviet Navy; the essentially defensive concepts that govern it; the lack of really good open-ocean warm-water ports—all these factors would militate against the conduct of a sustained and really effective submarine warfare campaign and against continuous cruiser raiding operations. The lack of supply ships, already noted, might be compensated for in Communist planning by assuming the availability of supplies in the hands of Communist sympathizers in many foreign nations. Nevertheless, air power, the atomic depth charge and new electronic and sonar developments would make a sustained raider campaign difficult, if direct attacks upon Allied convoys and surface shipping were its objective. This would also be true of a submarine campaign. Such attacks would yield initial successes, but once the Soviet submarines had advertised their presence by "kills" their lives could be made brief.

A more dangerous possible extension of the *guerre de course*—because more difficult to guard against—would be an extensive offensive minelaying campaign. This is well within present Russian capabilities; in fact, as noted above, the Soviet Navy excels at minelaying. Soviet submarines could well lay hundreds of mines without revealing their presence in shipping lanes along the continental shelf of the North American continent and off the coasts of Europe. The modern acoustic, magnetic and pressure mines are extremely difficult to sweep, and it cannot be forgotten that even in World War II British ports were closed periodically by German minelaying activities.

The missile-firing submarine—particularly when fitted with missiles with atomic capabilities—is also a potential strategic menace of no mean dimensions. It, too, might well be able to reach a launching position off our coasts without detection.

In addition to its defensive capability, then, the Soviet Navy

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possesses a limited capability for the conduct of a form of naval warfare traditionally practised by inferior sea Powers—the minelaying campaign, the attack by stealth, surprise and speed upon convoys and commerce, and raids or blows upon enemy coasts. This present capability may well increase. In fact, the Soviet construction program indicates that it will. But it will reach really dangerous proportions only if two or more of the following developments occur:

(1) If Soviet long-range planes with an operational radius of at least 1,000 miles and a capability for effective attack upon shipping learn to coördinate their operations with Soviet submarines.

(2) If Russia acquires new open-water naval, submarine and air bases on the coasts of Western Europe by land conquests (as Germany did in World War II).

(3) If the industrial facilities of Soviet Siberia are strengthened so greatly as to be capable of the self-sufficient support of a very much more powerful Far Eastern Fleet.

(4) If a breach in the Western Pacific island chain is achieved by Communist conquest or political action so as to provide Soviet Russia with a warm-water port fronting on the open Pacific.

The achilles heel of Soviet Russia's deep-sea power today is her naval base complex. Her most important and best bases are bottled up in narrow seas; the few that give access to the open ocean are subject to the vagaries of Arctic weather and are vulnerable to atomic or conventional bombing attack by land-based or ship-based aircraft.

Soviet Russia's naval might cannot be dismissed as a factor in her present global power. But it is not a major factor. Her submarine strength and in particular her minelaying capabilities deserve increasing respect. But it is still true today as it was in the days of the Tsars that if Russia is to challenge the United States or Great Britain for primacy upon the high seas she must, besides strengthening her maritime power with increased export trade, acquire warm-water ports fronting upon the open oceans of the world and expand her shipbuilding industry and the vast industrial complex to support it.

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THERMONUCLEAR REACTIONS

Can They Be Used for Man's Benefit?

By John S. Walker

THERE have been three historic developments during the short dozen years of our national atomic energy program. The A-bomb, of course, was one. We are just now attaining the second, the controlling of the A-bomb process by means of the fission reactor so as to yield power and peacetime products on a significant scale. The third was the success in making the H-bomb. Now we must consider a fourth step, which appears the next and best atomic bet—the mastering and controlling of thermonuclear, or fusion, reactions for man's benefit.

The process underlying this potential source of power and energy, however, must be distinguished from the fission chain reaction with which we have become familiar. Thermonuclear reactions produce energy through the combination of nuclei of appropriate light elements at the hydrogen end of the table of elements. If suitable light nuclei are weighed individually, and then fused together, the resulting weight of the fused nucleus is less than the original components. The difference in weight corresponds to an enormous conversion of matter into energy. However, accomplishing the fusion which releases this energy is most difficult, in part because nuclei are charged positively, and as the particles approach, their like positive charges repel each other. The nuclei must therefore be made to approach with the high energies necessary to overcome the repulsion, and for this purpose huge amounts of heat-energy are necessary. When fusion does occur, a great amount of energy is released, which can be utilized to help maintain the high energies of the material so as to contribute toward propagation of the reaction.

Heretofore the prospects for beneficent applications of atomic energy have been limited to the fission chain reaction. In the fission reaction, neutrons are used to bombard the nuclei of suitable heavy elements, such as uranium or plutonium. Because neutrons carry no electrical charge, they encounter no repulsion in approaching the nuclei. When fission occurs, energy is released, and the additional neutrons required for a self-sustaining chain reaction are also produced. A nuclear "reactor" therefore has two key functions. The first of these is to provide what scientists call

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a "neutron source." It is by means of neutron bombardment that radioisotopes useful in medicine, agriculture, industry and science can be created. So also entirely new materials can be made, just as uranium is transmuted into plutonium at Hanford. The second function of a reactor is to furnish a new and plentiful source of power. A nuclear reaction generates huge amounts of energy in the form of heat; for years we have looked forward to the time when this heat could be used economically to produce steam for the generation of electricity.

Fusion of the light elements, if controlled in a "thermonuclear reactor," would produce great quantities of neutrons and heat-energy, and the scale of production might be vastly beyond hopes which are confined to the fission reactor. The energy inherent in thermonuclear reactions is significantly greater than the fission chain reaction, just as an H-bomb is vastly more powerful than the A-bomb. Nor is there any theoretical limit to the amount of the fuel which might be "burned" in a thermonuclear reaction. The latter does not have a limiting "critical size," as does the fission chain reaction, beyond which the reaction would proceed out of control (*i.e.* explosively). Furthermore, thermonuclear materials appear more abundant and cheaper than the relatively expensive uranium and plutonium used in the fission chain reaction. Sir John Cockcroft, the eminent British expert, recently characterized the source of power which would be provided by light element fusion as "without limit."

An even more spectacular hope would be the *direct* production of power through controlled fusion reactions, a possibility raised a year ago by Senator Bourke Hickenlooper of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Despite considerable improvement in our generating plants, the conversion of heat to steam and steam to electricity remains exceedingly wasteful. Efficiencies are on the order of 25–35 percent, and conversion losses are on the order of 65–75 percent. The direct generation of electricity would constitute a revolutionary advance in man's conquest of energy, because the steam cycle would be entirely bypassed.

Such prospects, if they can be realized, would presage a new competitor for our future source of power. At their most optimistic, they dwarf existing hopes for material benefit from atomic energy. By this means power might become available for the most ambitious of projects, even processing the waters of the oceans for their contents. The worth of our present achievements

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in atomic energy might then, from such a vantage point, be measured not in terms of what they now produce, but by the yardstick of what they contribute to helping achieve control of thermonuclear reactions.

II

How much work, if any, is the Atomic Energy Commission doing in this field? There is little clue. At no time has the Atomic Energy Commission referred in any way to beneficent thermonuclear possibilities or to the absence of them. Reports published by industrial participation groups studying atomic power are also strikingly silent on this subject. The realities of organizing and obtaining appropriations for major Federal projects suggest that if a substantial thermonuclear power program were under way, there would be a budgetary or other reference to it in the public domain. (The hydrogen bomb program, for example, was announced at the inception of active development in 1950. Quite recently the Air Force has confirmed interest in the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile.) Nor was any attention apparently accorded thermonuclear reactor possibilities during consideration of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. While the record of inquiry into peacetime atomic uses was otherwise voluminous, only one reference to thermonuclear power appears in the hearings, and that reference was made by a public witness. The total silence emanating from the Commission and the relative silence of the law suggest that any such work is quite modest in scope.

There is some guidance, however, from other sources. As early as 1945 Dr. Hans Bethe, who had first explained the thermonuclear cycle of the sun's energy, told a Congressional Committee that light element reactions were of possible interest for the future development of atomic power, although the difficulties would undoubtedly be very great. His remark, made in passing, was unheard or unheeded. Seven years passed before the late Senator Brien McMahon, then Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, made the next square public reference to a hopeful prospect. In the last speech before his death, he held out the possibility of "important peacetime applications of hydrogen principles," and he noted also that this prospect might amount to a "basic change in the focus" of atomic energy control.

Later in 1952 the world's first full-scale hydrogen explosion, the "Mike" test at Eniwetok, in the Marshall Islands, fired the

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starter's gun of the thermonuclear age. As awesome reports of the bomb's power were carried on the first pages of our newspapers, Senator Bourke Hickenlooper of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy announced "hope, in time" for peaceful and constructive applications of hydrogen energy. The Senator's statement was hailed in the Federation of American Scientists Newsletter as more startling to scientists outside the Atomic Energy Commission than accounts of the bomb. It was in comment upon this statement that Dr. George Gamow, who had been interested in thermonuclear energies since the 1920's, referred to "theoretically possible" techniques for "slowed-down" atomic reactions with hydrogen bomb materials.

Other encouraging comments have occurred recently. Among these is the passing but unmistakable reference made in February 1954 by Sterling Cole, then Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to fateful consequences "for good as well as evil" from the fusion of nuclei. That April, Senator Hickenlooper reaffirmed his 1952 statement by noting "definite reason to hope that applications of new principles we are learning in the so-called fusion field can have great possibilities in the future for industrial and humanitarian uses." The Senator's reference to the possibility of generating power directly from thermonuclear reactions dates from a year ago, and Sir John Cockcroft's reference to thermonuclear power "without limit" was made last September.

Others have contended that such a development is impossible. Most of the contrary statements, however, occurred before and during the controversy over whether the hydrogen bomb should be built. Many who doubted the wisdom of proceeding with the hydrogen bomb expressed a one-dimensional moral view of thermonuclear work, arguing that it would be directed solely toward killing and destruction. The statements were made with surprising flatness; if it were true that thermonuclear reactions could have only destructive applications, the result would be unique in the history of science.

The technical difficulty of harnessing thermonuclear reactions represents a sounder basis for great pessimism. Every statement holding out hope has characterized any peacetime potential of the light elements as long range, or has in other ways underscored the magnitude of the scientific challenge. The difficulties of igniting a fusion reaction, and then of containing the extremely high temperatures which would be produced, are in all probabil-

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ity huge. Indeed, President Eisenhower in his April 7, 1954, press conference suggested that no direct application of the hydrogen bomb principle to peacetime power was known. The report of his statement is ambiguous; it probably is to be interpreted as saying merely that the H-bomb apparatus held no known promise for peacetime applications. Hopes for constructive uses, of course, might well not be limited to direct application (or any application) of the bomb principle. In any event, however, the President chose a comment which had a negative answer, and it was reported in the press as such.

III

Eventual success in harnessing the fusion reaction is not assured. Indeed, it could prove unattainable. Or, if attainable, fusion power might prove merely to be marginally competitive with other power sources. The statements on the subject suggest that technical prospects for controlling light element reactions approximate those for the hydrogen bomb in the mid-40's.

As against this, success would represent a "quantum jump" forward in nuclear technology. Nor can we easily gauge the difficulties before those difficulties have been subjected to prolonged attack. In the case of every major discovery since fire, the obstacles must have loomed dishearteningly large before solutions were found. How one assesses these difficulties may therefore reflect in large measure a deep-seated attitude toward discoveries in nuclear technology. Ultimately, in resolving supremely difficult questions of this nature, we perform an act of faith or, as has sometimes been the case, lack of faith.

Throughout the brief history of our atomic program, there have been the optimists and the pessimists. At the outset there was doubt about achieving the atom bomb; the Navy, to which development was first proposed in 1939, did not proceed to develop it because its representatives "weren't sure" of success. For more than a half decade after the Hiroshima bomb, it was taken for granted that both our bomb stockpile and our chances for atomic power would be severely limited by a scarcity of uranium ore. American pessimism concerning the early attainment of atomic power has contributed to the likelihood that the British will be the first to complete and operate a commercial-type atomic power plant. Only a few years ago doubts concerning the feasibility of the hydrogen bomb were widely expressed.

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Hindsight may show that we have consistently exaggerated the difficulties of exploiting atomic energy. Morally as well as militarily, our nation might have benefited had the mysteries of the atom proved more impenetrable. The greater the difficulties, the greater the advantage to the United States as a morally responsible and scientifically superior nation. But there are signs that the book of nature was not so written. We may be forced to conclude that the whole business across the board is easier of exploitation than we first thought. And, although we cannot be sure, harnessing thermonuclear reactions may also prove less refractory than now appears.

There are persuasive nontechnical reasons for emphasizing fusion development. By an apparent lack of interest in developing beneficent hydrogen applications, we increase our vulnerability to foreign charges that the United States is preoccupied with the destructive aspects of atomic energy. From Japan to the British Isles, these charges have been focused upon H-bomb work. We had no alternative but to build the H-bomb and have no alternative now but to continue its development. So far as observers can tell, however, we act as though no other use of fusion energy were of interest. In this respect, the 1949 debate over the hydrogen bomb has left behind a scar: the later comments holding out hope for constructive applications, such as the Congressional statements, have been given little public consideration and have never caught up with the representations of the 1949–1950 period. As long as the earlier statements continue unchallenged, we can be pictured as the developers of a thermonuclear force which can only wipe out cities and crater battlefields but which has no place in peace. The most unfortunate consequence of such an attitude would be to obscure from us, ourselves, the nature of thermonuclear work as a major avenue of science—perhaps *the* major avenue of nuclear science—to be traveled by inquisitive men, unhampered by moral prejudgments.

Would work toward a thermonuclear reactor interfere with the atomic fission power program? It seems hardly possible that prospects for thermonuclear power are so immediate that the fission program would be disrupted in the short term (although, conceivably, breakthroughs could occur at any time). The long-term concern would undoubtedly be that fission reactors be rendered obsolete before they could earn back capital investment in the tens of millions of dollars for each facility. If there be any

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such problem, it should be met only one way: as squarely as possible and as soon as possible. It should be understood (to the extent that it can be) while fission reactor commitments are made. Far from arguing against thermonuclear effort, any possibility of technical obsolescence of fission facilities constitutes a major reason for going forward. If we fear technical progress toward the enormously beneficial results promised by the harnessing of thermonuclear reactions, we do not deserve the scientific supremacy upon which we predicate our defense and survival. Nor will we have it for long.

Would success in controlling fusion reactions lead to an increase in the destructive potential of nuclear energy? If a means could be achieved to control the interaction of light elements of a scale producing useful neutrons or commercial power, it seems likely that the reaction might be made to proceed out of control with the effect of a nuclear weapon explosion. The abundance of thermonuclear materials plus the apparently open-ended size of the fusion reaction conjures up the possibility of a genuinely huge reaction and an enormous explosive and radioactive force. Apart from cataclysmic conjectures, any advance in a peacetime thermonuclear program might have a secondary military consequence, even if only that the neutrons produced might be diverted to the manufactures of war.

If, however, we forgo technical progress because constructive goals in the art may also entail a military use, we will be the first Great Power to do so—and probably the last. There is considerable probability (and scant comfort) that by the time thermonuclear reactions could be harnessed, their mastery would not prove a radical addition to the science of destruction. But if thermonuclear work could significantly affect our future military posture, it is the ineluctable logic of the atomic arms race that we understand it first and that we attain the answers first. Control of thermonuclear reactions may thus provide the most recent example of the duality of atomic energy—but one in which both the constructive and military stakes are exponentially increased.

IV

What kind of program, then, is practical today? The following steps could be taken immediately.

Initially, a policy in favor of bold development could be crystallized and announced. In the past our major atomic energy

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programs have been preceded by firm decision and top-level directives. No less may be fitting in this case. The President would be the most suitable spokesman to declare American interest in any aspect of thermonuclear development which may lead to the betterment of man or industry. Indeed, there may be need for the peacetime counterpart of the historic White House statement of January 31, 1950, which launched our real assault on the hydrogen bomb.

Secondly, this policy should be implemented by having work proceed as publicly as is prudent. Urging lower security classifications on the Atomic Energy Commission has been a popular pastime. But there may be unusual reasons why the Commission should adopt the most liberal policy consistent with security in declassifying any data which would help develop peacetime applications of the light elements.

Such work, after all, would look toward humanitarian objectives: creating vast new sources of power and electricity, manufacturing radioisotopes for medicine, agriculture and industry. It is perhaps true that an apparatus performing these constructive tasks might be diverted to military use. However, with past developments we seem to have recognized a distinction between weapons, as such, and items designed for peacetime purposes but which could be adapted to war. The internal combustion engine and electronics have vital combat applications; yet, for classification purposes they are treated (and correctly so) quite differently from such an item as the long-range ballistic missile. If our intentions are realized, controlled fusion reactions would resemble the former rather than the latter.

The resolution of classification problems must be left to those officials who have before them the full range of considerations and who bear the responsibility of maintaining the most scrupulous attention to national security. The judgments are difficult and the considerations competing. How much concealment do we gain, and how much achievement do we lose? Among the considerations are two on the affirmative side of what might be achieved by recognizing a large area of low-security sensitivity. First, we would make manifest here and abroad our interest in the constructive side of fusion energy. More importantly, however, release of information may furnish the only feasible way of making rapid progress toward understanding this subject. To develop the A-bomb, the H-bomb, and much of the fission-power

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program, large numbers of scientists were assembled behind walls of secrecy to make an intensive effort at government expense. A repetition today of the H-bomb effort in order to develop its peacetime counterpart is quite unlikely, although the technical problems are at least as great, and perhaps greater. The alternative way to enlist new minds and more people in harnessing the light elements for constructive applications is to make as much information as prudent available to non-A.E.C. scientists and personnel.

The other side of the problem is what may be lost by making information public. It is striking that every public reference to beneficent thermonuclear possibilities has characterized them as long-range. Radically new ideas (and perhaps many of them) appear needed. It is at this stage that the risk of losing time is perhaps the greatest. In all these respects information policies seem different from those for the controlled fission reaction (which had been demonstrated as feasible) and the A-bomb and the H-bomb (which are useful solely as weapons).

As a third stimulus, the Atomic Energy Commission might urge as many companies as possible to undertake study and development contracts as soon as their interest warranted. Some industries might be willing to carry part of the financial and developmental burden at the present time. Other firms may feel encouraged to study thermonuclear possibilities because such research might contribute to the soundness of their atomic energy business. Furthermore, the knowledge that there was an opportunity to participate would bring the know-how of American industry to a challenging effort. It might also ease the way for integrating an eventual thermonuclear power industry (if there is to be one) into our economy.

A further step should be taken which would cost the government (or industry) a modest amount of money, but which would add greatly to the effectiveness of the effort and the rate of development. A laboratory should be established to pursue all avenues which might lead to constructive thermonuclear uses. A new site should be chosen for the work, possibly in conjunction with a university, but distinct from nuclear weapons work. Such a laboratory, in addition to providing a focal point of all effort in this field, could symbolize our intentions to give thermonuclear development every chance for realization. Particularly now, when our scientists have been divided by controversies concerning the

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history of the hydrogen bomb program, there might be advantages in offering them the challenge of working to control fusion reactions.

We cannot seek security by military supremacy alone: we must demonstrate our constructive intentions and capabilities with comparable emphasis. Scarcely 16 years have passed since the fission of uranium was discovered, and a bare two and one-half years since the first full-scale hydrogen test. In all likelihood, progress in nuclear energy has just begun.

A correct guess as to the future of controlled thermonuclear reactions could be of overriding importance. We may now be able to contemplate what may prove the biggest step of all: harnessing thermonuclear reactions would be a conquest equal to or greater than any other in our national effort. Again we cannot assume success; but we can recognize that if we were to succeed, all our present work could prove to have been merely preparatory. We have, then, every moral and practical incentive to develop what appears our leading chance for the next big step forward in atomic energy. The initial cost may be little more than a decision to proceed boldly. Failure to do so could lose for the United States the accelerating race for scientific discovery and the contest for the allegiance of men of good will.

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REFLECTIONS ON THE YALTA PAPERS

By Raymond J. Sontag

THE Yalta papers could not have appeared under worse auspices. The decision to publish them was colored by partisan political motives. The leakage during the process of selection and editing of sensational passages throws a strange light on the supposedly tightened security regulations of the Department of State. The circumstances under which the documents as a whole were released to the press in the form of uncorrected galley proof were, to put it mildly, peculiar. Finally, it is doubtful whether all the important papers in the Pentagon files have been included.

The most unfortunate effect of the release of the documents to the press in proof form, months before publication of the finished volume, is that attention has been focused on the minutes of the conference itself. This is inevitable, because the minutes have by far the greatest interest as "revelations." Of the pre-conference documents, which fill almost half the volume, only a few have attracted attention. Yet it is only from these papers that a clear view of the world as seen by the American negotiators, and of the objectives of American policy, can be obtained.[1]

The foreign policy objectives of the United States in 1944–45, as set forth in the pre-conference papers, can still be studied with pride by Americans; and they should be placed by the rest of the world in contrast to Soviet policy as it has unfolded over the last decade. To see that contrast it is necessary to cite only a few examples. On Italy: "United States policy toward Italy is, briefly, to encourage the development of Italy into a democratic and constructive force in the future Europe and to assist Italy to become politically independent and economically self-supporting as quickly as possible." On Iran: "Our policy in this case is based on

[1] The pre-conference documents make untenable Mr. Byrnes' belief that Mr. Roosevelt "had made little preparation for the Yalta Conference," as well as the less directly stated suggestion that Mr. Roosevelt had no knowledge of the contents of the Briefing Book prepared for him by the Department of State (James F. Byrnes, "Speaking Frankly." New York: Harper, 1947, p. 23). The Briefing Book consisted of papers summarizing the status of the problems likely to be discussed at Yalta, and stating American policy, or making policy recommendations, on each problem. It is almost certainly true that Mr. Roosevelt did not read most of the papers. However, there is clear evidence that the main points of many of the papers were known to him, and that he was familiar with the policy statements or recommendations in most of the important papers. I have used the statements of policy as given in the Briefing Book only when it seems clear that the statement was, in fact, American official policy.

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the American Government's recognition of the sovereign right of an independent nation such as Iran, acting in a nondiscriminatory manner, to grant or withhold commercial concessions within its territory." On liberated countries: "In so far as the United States is concerned, the following two criteria could be applied to any proposed interim government: (1) that it should be dedicated to the preservation of civil liberties; (2) that it should favor social and economic reforms."[2]

These are not isolated instances. Through every statement of policy in the period preparatory to the conference there is evident the conviction that American interests would be best served by the independence and the economic revival of other nations, by the liberation of subject peoples, by the spread of social reform, and by the free coöperation of all countries in the United Nations. And throughout it is evident that the one central problem was believed to be to obtain Soviet support for the attainment of these objectives. That support obtained, the conviction was general that the world would enjoy peace.

Yalta was the supreme effort of the United States Government to obtain Soviet support for these objectives, an effort which ended in disastrous failure. The Yalta papers, for the first time, give the American people an opportunity to understand clearly why the effort was made and why it failed, and it is vitally important that we should achieve this clear understanding. The present writer had no part in the formation of policy during World War II, and at the time he viewed what was known of our policy toward the Soviet Union with foreboding. Examining the record a decade later, however, he is driven to the conclusion that in the circumstances of the time, and given the accepted military view of the probable duration of the war and of the distribution of power in the world after the war, no other policy was possible. One can go farther and say that if the policy of the American Government in 1944–45 had not been attempted, wholeheartedly and to the point where its failure was clear without a shadow of doubt, the firmness of will and the serenity of

[2] As only the galley proofs of the Yalta papers are available at this writing, and the precise title of the volume is uncertain, location of a paper within the volume can be given only by chapter and section within the chapter. The first quotation above is from a Briefing Book Paper on "United States Policy Toward Italy," printed in Chapter 2, section entitled "The Italian Cabinet Crisis;" the second is from a dispatch from Stettinius to Harriman, October 30, 1944, printed in Chapter 2, section entitled "Iran;" the third is from a Briefing Book Paper on "Liberated Countries," printed in Chapter 2, section entitled "Liberated Europe and Spheres of Influence."

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conscience with which the American people today face a world full of ominous portent would have been impossible to attain.

In the winter of 1944–45 the duration of the war was uncertain. For planning purposes, it was assumed that the European war would be over, at the earliest, by July 1, 1945.[3] At the time of the Yalta Conference, the Russian armies seemed to have a clear road ahead of them across the great European plain; the Western armies had not yet crossed the Rhine. In this situation, it was possible that the end of the war would find the Russians in possession of most of Germany, as they were already in possession of nearly all of what we now call the satellites.

Beyond the ending of the European war, there stretched the unknown duration of the Pacific war. For planning purposes, the end of the war against Japan was set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany.[4] While this date was tentative and set merely for logistical purposes, there is clear evidence that the Joint Chiefs saw a hard fight ahead, as indeed there was. The probability that one atomic bomb would be ready by July 1, 1945, and more by the end of the year, was known.[5] But there is no evidence that the military had yet assessed the probable effect of atomic weapons on the length of the war, either in Europe or Asia.

If the war developed in this way, the whole strength of the United States would be concentrated in Asia for some time after the ending of the war in Europe, and if, during this time, the Russians were in undisturbed occupation of most of Europe north of the Alps and east of the Rhine, how would they use this time? Ambassador Harriman reported that, "the overriding consideration in Soviet foreign policy is the preoccupation with 'security'. . . . The Soviet Union seeks a period of freedom from danger during which it can recover from the wounds of war and complete its industrial revolution. The Soviet conception of 'security' does not appear cognizant of the similar needs or rights of other countries and of Russia's obligation to accept the restraints as well as the benefits of an international security system."[6] This was ominous.

The situation in Asia was even more ominous. Within China, according to the Briefing Book Papers of the Department of

[3] February 9, 1945, Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, paragraph 18, printed in Chapter 8. [4] *Ibid.*

[5] December 30, 1944, Groves to Marshall. Printed in Chapter 2, section entitled "Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan."

[6] January 10, 1945, Harriman to Stettinius, printed in Chapter 4.

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State, "there is now Kuomintang China, Communist China, and puppet [*i.e.* Japanese dominated] China. Kuomintang China is being weakened by dissident elements and widespread popular discontent. Communist China is growing in material and popular strength. Puppet China is filled with pockets of Communist guerrilla resistance." A continuance of this situation would be "detrimental to our objective of a united, progressive China capable of contributing to security and prosperity in the Far East." There was an even more dangerous possibility. If the U.S.S.R. entered the Far Eastern war, one line of attack might be from Outer Mongolia; Soviet troops could strike east and take over all of north China and Manchuria. The Department believed that as yet there was little to substantiate the fear that Russia intended "to establish an independent or autonomous area in north China and Manchuria," but an open break between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists would tempt Russia to abandon her declared policy of nonintervention in the internal affairs of China. "It is our task to bring about British and Russian support of our objective of a united China which will coöperate with them as well as with us."[7]

Reading these documents, one sees clearly that the American policy-makers, civil or military, had no confidence in their ability, while the war continued, to *compel* the U.S.S.R. to accept the American plans for the organization of the Asiatic mainland. Moreover, our Government was eager to secure early Soviet military intervention in the war against Japan, and recognized the necessity to pay for it. The problem as seen in Washington was both to ensure early Soviet intervention and to bring the U.S.S.R. to recognize that "a strong and friendly China" was the best guarantee of Soviet security in Asia.[8]

Even after victory over Japan, in the view of American policy-makers, the power of the United States directly to shape the future would be very limited. The strategic situation expected after the war is most clearly outlined in a letter which Admiral Leahy wrote to Secretary Hull on May 16, 1944, giving the view

[7] Briefing Book Papers on "Political and Military Situation in China in the Event the U.S.S.R. Enters the War in the Far East," and "Unity of Anglo-American-Soviet Policy Toward China," printed in Chapter 2, section entitled "China."

[8] *Ibid.* It should be emphasized that the American objective was not simply to bring the U.S.S.R. into the war against Japan: "Russia's entry at as early a date as possible . . . is necessary to provide maximum assistance to our Pacific operations" (January 23, 1945, The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President, printed in Chapter 2, section entitled "Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan").

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of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a British proposal for the disposition of the Italian colonies.[9] While this letter was written many months before Yalta, it was accepted as the basis for policy by the Department of State in the Briefing Book for the conference, and, so far as can be determined from the available evidence, the views of the Joint Chiefs had not altered during the intervening months. The central theme of the letter was the "revolutionary changes in relative national military strengths" resulting from the war, and particularly the "phenomenal development" of Soviet strength, absolutely, and relative to the impaired strength of Britain. The situation which was expected to result from this shift now seems so remote that it is almost forgotten, but it must be recalled if American policy in 1945 is to be understood. Admiral Leahy wrote:

> It would seem clear that there cannot be a world war, or even a great war, which does not find one or more of the great military powers on each side. At the conclusion of the present war, there will be, for the foreseeable future, only three such powers—the United States, Britain and Russia. Since it would seem in the highest degree unlikely that Britain and Russia, or Russia alone, would be aligned against the United States, it is apparent that any future world conflict in the foreseeable future will find Britain and Russia in opposite camps. . . .
>
> In a conflict between these two powers the disparity in the military strengths that they could dispose upon that continent [*i.e.* Europe] would, under present conditions, be far too great to be overcome by our intervention on the side of Britain. Having due regard to the military factors involved—resources, manpower, geography and particularly our ability to project our strength across the ocean and exert it decisively upon the continent—we might be able to successfully defend Britain, but we could not, under existing conditions, defeat Russia. In other words, we would find ourselves engaged in a war which we could not win even though the United States would be in no danger of defeat and occupation.
>
> It is apparent that the United States should, now and in the future, exert its utmost efforts and utilize all its influence to prevent such a situation arising and to promote a spirit of mutual coöperation between Britain, Russia and ourselves. So long as Britain and Russia coöperate and collaborate in the interests of peace, there can be no great war in the foreseeable future.
>
> The greatest likelihood of eventual conflict between Britain and Russia would seem to grow out of either nation initiating attempts to build up its strength, by seeking to attach to herself parts of Europe to the disadvantage and possible danger of her potential adversary. Having regard to the inherent suspicions of the Russians, to present Russia with any agreement on such

[9] May 16, 1944, Leahy to Hull, printed in Chapter 2, section entitled "Liberated Europe and Spheres of Influence."

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matters as between the British and ourselves, prior to consultation with Russia, might well result in starting a train of events that would lead eventually in [to] the situation we most wish to avoid.

Seen in the light of Admiral Leahy's letter, much that is puzzling in the Yalta period becomes understandable: Mr. Roosevelt's elaborate efforts to avoid the appearance of intimacy with Britain, even to create the impression of friction between Britain and the United States; American opposition to the delimitation of Anglo-Soviet spheres of influence in Southeastern Europe; what seems now the shortsighted preoccupation of the Department of State with the possibility that the British and Soviet Zones in Germany might be administered along divergent lines. These and other aspects of American policy should be seen in relation to the conviction that, in the future, war between the U.S. and U.S.S.R was "in the highest degree unlikely," that Anglo-Russian enmity was the one likely cause of war, and that the United States must avoid appearing to line up with Britain on questions of direct interest to Russia "lest postwar disunity of the three great powers be thereby fostered with all the possibility of ultimate impact upon the military position of the United States which such a disaster would entail."[10]

It is probable that one can go farther. On many questions Mr. Roosevelt's position at Yalta seems to waver, even to involve contradiction. When Mr. Churchill insisted that France must participate not only in the occupation of Germany but also in the Control Commission, Mr. Roosevelt at the outset joined Marshal Stalin in opposing the British proposal, and made disparaging remarks about the French which, read now, cause justified resentment. At the end of the conference, however, Mr. Roosevelt moved to the British position. Surely, in such cases the position of a statesman should be judged, not by isolated remarks on a single occasion, but by his long-term policy, and the policy of his responsible advisers. Mr. Roosevelt had shown himself a friend of France, and historians of the future are likely to describe American policy toward France, before and after Yalta, in the words the Secretary of State addressed to the President:

It is in the interests of the United States to assist France to regain her former position in world affairs in order that she may increase her contribution in the war effort and play an appropriate part in the maintenance of peace. . . . In the long run this Government will undoubtedly gain more by

[10] *Ibid.*

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making concessions to French prestige and by treating France on the basis of her potential power and influence, than we will by treating her on the basis of her actual strength at this time.[11]

Similarly, the real state of Anglo-American relations in 1945 cannot be determined on the basis of a few quips made by Mr. Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin; much more can be learned from the few words with which General Marshall justified his refusal to insist on precise formulation of American right of access to Bremen: "The broad policy had been decided and the good will was there."[12]

What requires explanation is the fact that, at the end of the Yalta Conference, the American delegation was convinced (so far as can be determined from evidence set down at the time, and not from undocumented afterthought) that Soviet support had in fact been won. In the last days a note of relief, even of rejoicing, breaks through the cold summaries of the proceedings.

To understand this rejoicing it is necessary to stress, not the concessions made by the Americans and the British, but the attitude and the promises of the Russians. On Poland, the Americans and the British stood firm until Stalin said that free elections could be held in about one month; then agreement was quickly achieved. On Germany, what seemed important at the time was that the Soviet Union agreed to a single administration for all the zones, thus apparently eliminating the possibility of disastrous friction between the occupying Powers. On the Far East, the concessions to Russia in Manchuria, Sakhalin and the Kuriles seemed justified not only because they insured Soviet military intervention in the war against Japan; these concessions also set limits to Soviet expansion in an area where there was no effective force to oppose Soviet expansion; finally, these concessions brought a Soviet promise to support the government of Chiang Kai-shek. When Molotov agreed to accept the American proposal that in the United Nations the veto should not be used in questions involving the peaceful adjustment of disputes, Mr. Roosevelt "felt that this was a great step forward" and Mr. Churchill echoed the President's words, adding that the decision "would bring joy and relief to the peoples of the world."[13]

Over and above concrete concessions, there were Marshal

[11] January 4, 1954, Stettinius to Roosevelt, printed in Chapter 2, section entitled "The Rôle of France."

[12] February 6, 1945, Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, printed in Chapter 8.

[13] February 7, 1945, Fourth Plenary Meeting, Bohlen Minutes, printed in Chapter 8.

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Stalin's repeated protestations of his determination to "create for the future generation such an organization as would secure peace for at least fifty years,"[14] and, in contrast to earlier exchanges between the Allied Governments, his disarming friendliness and apparent eagerness to continue the wartime coöperation into the years of peace which lay ahead. Even Mr. Churchill, whose detestation of Communism went back to 1917, was persuaded to hope that "we were all standing on the crest of a hill with the glories of future possibilities stretching before us," while Mr. Roosevelt felt that the atmosphere "was as that of a family, and it was in those words that he liked to characterize the relations that existed between our three countries."[15]

Seldom in history has deception been so successful and so decisive as that perpetrated at Yalta by the Soviet leaders at the expense of Britain and the United States. Immediately after the conference closed, evidence began to accumulate that the Soviet promises were worthless. If the Americans alone had been deceived, one would be driven to conclude that they were deceived only because they were blind to the nature of their antagonists. Blind they certainly were. Nowhere in this volume is there anything which suggests that American statesmen were conscious that they were dealing, not with Russian national leaders, but with Communist revolutionaries determined to outwit and eventually destroy their allies, allies not from choice but because of the mad decision of Hitler to attack the Soviet Union.

Even those who urged a firmer policy in dealings with the U.S.S.R. did not make it clear that Russia was now, not a national state pursuing national interests, but the center of a revolutionary movement dedicated to the creation of a Communist world ruled from Moscow. General John R. Deane believed that for the United States always to be "at the same time the givers and the supplicants" was "neither dignified nor healthy for U.S. prestige." But he also believed "we have few conflicting interests, and there is little reason why we should not be friendly now and in the foreseeable future."[16] Ambassador Harriman shared General Deane's views on the need for tougher bargaining with the U.S.S.R., but he also felt strongly "that the sooner the Soviet Union can develop a decent life for its people the more tolerant

[14] February 6, 1945, Third Plenary Meeting, Bohlen Minutes, printed in Chapter 8.
[15] February 8, 1945, Tripartite Dinner Meeting, Bohlen Minutes, printed in Chapter 8.
[16] December 2, 1944, Deane to Marshall, printed in Chapter 4.

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they will become. . . . I am satisfied that the great urge of Stalin and his associates is to provide a better physical life for the Russian people, although they will retain a substantial military establishment."[17] Such statements did little to undermine the belief, dominant in Washington, that Russian and American interests were identical, and that the only problem was to bring the Soviet leaders to a recognition of this fact.

But it was not just the Americans who were deceived at Yalta. Churchill also was deceived, and that was indeed a triumph for Soviet duplicity, for Churchill's denunciations of "the foul baboonery of Bolshevism" are among the most magnificent examples of sustained invective in the English language. Here we touch the real root of Soviet success at Yalta: British and American consciousness of the consequences of failure to reach agreement with the Soviet Union. Churchill stated the case with his customary precision when he presented the Yalta agreements to the Commons: "I decline absolutely to embark here on a discussion about Russian good faith. It is quite evident that these matters touch the whole future of the world. Sombre indeed would be the fortunes of mankind if some awful schism arose between the Western democracies and the Russian Soviet Union."

That awful schism did arise. This volume makes abundantly clear that in 1944 and 1945 the American Government made an honest, a desperate, effort to secure Soviet friendship. At Yalta, the professions and promises of Stalin and Molotov convinced the American negotiators that Soviet friendship had been won, that Soviet good faith was assured. Almost immediately after Yalta the conviction was shaken, and slowly, much too slowly, it was destroyed by Soviet aggression. But if that honest and desperate effort had not been made at the outset it is hard to believe that we could now accept unflinchingly the tragically unfolding consequences of the schism between East and West.

The schism is not of our making. So much consolation we can derive from our failure at Yalta. Farther we need not go, and should not go.

[17] January 6, 1945, Harriman to Stettinius, printed in Chapter 2, section entitled "Proposed United States Loan to the Soviet Union."

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SLAVERY, MONARCHY AND MODERN BRAZIL

By Gilberto Freyre

BRAZIL differs from all the other countries of Latin America. The difference results mainly from the impact of slavery, which was conducive to the development of a patriarchal, aristocratic organization of society, marked by romantic excesses of individualism and a strong addiction to rhetoric. This force was moderated, however, by the influence of monarchy, a classic influence to which no other American nation was subjected. Let us see in detail how this combination of factors operated to form present-day Brazil.

It is now 20 years since I published in Portuguese an essay setting forth my theory that it was slavery—slavery of a patriarchal type—that more than any other social institution or social process had left a mark on Brazilian social development and on the character and culture of the Brazilian people. In 1941, a similar book appeared in the United States—W. J. Cash's "The Mind of the South."[1] This penetrating analysis of the influence of slavery on Southerners in the United States confirmed my analysis on a number of points as to the general psychological effects of an institution like slave labor upon descendants both of masters and of slaves. Though sociological effects have been somewhat different in the two areas due to a number of historical and ecological factors, the psychological effects have been almost the same. One of the factors of sociological differentiation has been the presence in Brazil of an institution that was at once complementary to patriarchal slavery and corrective of it: patriarchal monarchy of a type more classic than romantic.

Romanticism was one of the general psychological effects of the plantation and slavery system, and with it went the fondness for rhetoric already mentioned, which was common to Brazilians and to Anglo-Americans of the two areas of the New World where slavery flourished most vigorously. In the South of the United States, as Cash points out, rhetoric became "not only a passion" but "a primary standard of judgment, the *sine qua non* of leadership." So in Brazil. There, too, the love of oratory was associated with "the love of politics." In Brazil, the campaign for the aboli-

[1] "The Mind of the South," by Wilber Joseph Cash. New York: Knopf, 1941.

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tion of slavery suffered particularly from an excess of rhetoric. It also was one of the causes of the fall of the Brazilian monarchy —a system of government that, being rather classic than romantic, was a strong corrective to romantic excesses associated with republicanism in South America and in the South of the United States—excesses of individualism, paternalism and familism.

The monarchy in Brazil was also a healthy influence in favor of national unity and national culture and even in favor of objectivity in international, particularly continental, relations. It was helped in this by an observance of proper diplomatic form and formal methods of diplomatic intercourse uncommon among republican Americans, both Latin and Anglo-American. Since it was a sort of super-paternalism, enjoying the prestige given to the royal family for the sake of its national rôle, the Brazilian monarchy stood above regional paternalism and above rivalries between powerful antagonistic families. It served also as the basis for an international policy in which traditional methods and styles of diplomacy gave Brazil a clear superiority over young romantic republics. The presence in Rio de Janeiro of a royal family, surrounded by statesmen and diplomats with a European training, explains why in dealing not only with *caudillo* republics like Paraguay but also with the United States, Brazilian diplomacy was often superior both in objectivity and classic form to excessively romantic and anarchic republican diplomacy. Professor Lawrence F. Hill[2] gives interesting examples of the discrepancy between the two types of diplomacy; and I think he would agree with me in describing the republican one as romantic and the monarchical one as classic.

Familism, an effect of the slavery system, was common to Brazil and the South of the United States as well as other American areas like Cuba and Peru. In the isolation of plantation life, the home, the family, the small domestic world in and around the patriarchal "big house" became the "center of everything." In this atmosphere there developed what Cash calls "an unusually intense affection and respect for the women of the family—for the wife and mother upon whose activities the comfort and well-being of everybody greatly depended." In my 1934 essay as well as subsequently I attempted to analyze this situation. I suggested that the Roman Catholic devotion for the Virgin Mary

[2] "Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Brazil." Durham: Duke University Press, 1932.

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glorified as Queen—Regina—seems not to have become as intense in any other Roman Catholic area of the world as in Brazil. This was a result, it seems to me, of that extreme idealization of aristocratic women (and even of Negro women, in the shape of old mammies) as vital or basic sentimental parts of the plantation family complex developed in slavery days. In this particularly intense devotion to the Virgin Mary we detect a sublimation or idealization of the cult of women that has found other means of expression in the United States, including an identification of the cult of the purity of women with the cult of race purity. This identification is not to be found in Brazil, where the cult of women has been associated more with family pride than race pride.

In the days of slavery, patriarchal male power was not absolute in Brazil, since the prevailing intense respect for women under romantic and mystical forms was projected into practical and everyday life. Men were the real lords in the Brazilian slavery system—the white men that is, who were the owners of white women as well as of plantations and slaves. But their power was psychologically limited by the romantic or mystical respect which they had for women. This included not only their mothers, their wives and their daughters but also the Virgin Mary, who to many of them was much more of a mystical power—it should be repeated—than God or Jesus Christ; and she was not a universal goddess but a particular or domestic manifestation of the divine power that took care of a particular family or home.

In a recent book,[3] Sheila Patterson attempts to compare the slavery complex in South Africa with that in the old South of the United States and in Brazil. And she makes a very intelligent distinction when she says that in the slavery days in Brazil there prevailed a cult of the "purity of the home" instead of a cult of the "purity of the race" as in the United States and South Africa. She goes farther and suggests that in Brazil the slavery system derived from what she calls "a Portuguese prototype," different from the Anglo-Saxon or the Dutch. I was delighted to find in this English book conclusions very similar to what I had suggested in my 1934 essay. I based my analysis of the Brazilian slavery system on the assumption that it was different from the Anglo-American, the Dutch and even the French and the Spanish systems of modern slavery. It was an extension of the Portuguese system, just as the Portuguese system in turn was an extension

[3] "Colour and Culture in South Africa." London: Routledge and Paul, 1953.

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of the Moorish or Arab or Mohammedan system of domestic rather than industrial slavery. I have since found new and stronger evidence to support this view during a long voyage that took me first through Mohammedan countries like Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt, then to India, and later to Negro Africa. I visited not only parts of Africa that are deeply affected by Mohammedan culture but also those where its impact is almost unknown.

Everywhere I was impressed by the fact that there is a sociological kinship between the Portuguese and the Mohammedan systems of slavery and it is this that seems to me to account for certain characteristics of the Brazilian system which are not found in other regions of America where slavery also prevailed. The fact that slavery was less cruel in Brazil than in English America and even in French or Spanish America seems to be a well-documented fact. Why was it so? Not, certainly, because the Portuguese are a more Christian people than the English, Dutch, French or Spanish peoples (by more Christian, meaning here ethically better in morals and behavior). The truth seems to be the reverse: the more suave form of slavery developed by the Portuguese in Brazil seems to have been a result of their contact with slave-owning Mohammedans who are known to have been particularly humane towards their slaves and to have had a domestic conception of slavery entirely different from that of industrial slavery. We know that the Portuguese, though intensely Christian and champions of Christianity against Islam, imitated the Arabs, the Moors, the Mohammedans in a number of techniques and customs and assimilated from them a number of their cultural values. The Mohammedan conception of slavery as a domestic system (linked to a form of family organization that included economic activity without being entirely dominated by an economic purpose) was one of the Moorish values that the Portuguese applied in the course of their colonization of Brazil. When in 1938 I spoke of what I had in mind to my old teacher in Columbia University, the late Professor Franz Boas, he told me that this would probably be the basis for a new and better understanding of the Brazilian situation, arguing that the Mohammedan Arabs and Moors had for centuries been superior to the European Christians in their methods of assimilating African groups and cultures to their civilization. And a British anthropologist of the same generation, Professor Fox Pitt-Rivers, says in one of his books on what he calls the clash of cultures: "Orien-

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tal slavery is something quite different, nobler and less degrading than it was in Europe and the United States."

This was the type of slavery that the Portuguese adopted in the East and in Brazil: a mild form of slavery which, as part of a social whole, included polygamy in order to increase the population. Some say that it was in order to increase the number of laborers, but one should remember that since the fifteenth century the Portuguese used slavery for the eugenic selection of good human elements. Once these had been Christianized and domesticated in the sense that they had become a part of domestic, patriarchal, family systems, they were liberated and given an opportunity to be the social equals of the white Europeans. As early as the fifteenth century, African youths were given opportunities in Portugal, through a eugenic selection that did not mean racial exclusiveness, of becoming priests, then a high position in Portuguese society. This opportunity for a rise in the social scale was increased in cases where the youths were not Africans who had been brought very young from Africa as slaves but the sons of Portuguese men by African slave girls. Here, again, the Portuguese, perhaps because of their lack of manpower for their tremendous task of expanding in the tropical regions of Asia, Africa and America, followed the Mohammedan or Arab example. According to the Mohammedans, the offspring of Arab men and slave women had only to adopt their father's faith, rituals and customs to be considered their father's equal in social status.

The Portuguese did not go as far in following Mohammedan precedent when they developed in Brazil a slave system on a larger scale than the one they had developed in India. Nevertheless, as soon as they were established in Brazil they began adding to their plantation system a disguised imitation of polygamy, allowing for the legal adoption by a Christian father (when he wrote his will) of "natural" and illegitimate sons not only from Indian girls but also from African slave girls. That is, "natural" and illegitimate children could be chosen by him to be the social equals, or almost the social equals, of his legitimate children, to be educated in his "big house" by the same priest or chaplain who educated his legitimate children. Here I should point out that legal marriages of Portuguese planters with Indian girls who had become Christian were not rare in colonial Brazil. Some of these girls were Indian princesses, like the North American Pocahontas, and being the descendant of an Indian princess and a

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Portuguese nobleman has remained a matter of special pride for many Brazilians. The first Cardinal, not only of Brazil but of Latin America, was a descendant of a sixteenth century Albuquerque who, besides marrying a Portuguese girl of good origin who was sent out of Brazil by the Queen of Portugal for the purpose, adopted and legalized the children he had already had by an Indian princess. I have read many wills of aristocratic planters in the colonial period, and I know from them how much suavely disguised polygamy contributed to the increase of the Brazilian population along lines that would have met with the approval of eugenic specialists; for the fathers were often first-class men, not only sociologically but also—judging by their achievements and the quality of their descendants—biologically.

Slavery of this type was not only useful in many ways to Brazilian social development: it proved valuable in an immense country like Brazil in promoting national political unity and social discipline, for it was a system common to different provinces and sub-regions. In the "big houses," children grew up surrounded by relatives—grandmother and grandfather, an unmarried aunt, perhaps, a cousin, even a close friend of the family —so that from birth they saw, as the anthropologist Margaret Mead has pointed out regarding children in the old Anglo-American patriarchal families, "many ranges of ages and human experience, right in or near their own home."

On the other hand, patriarchalism in Brazil was in some ways harmful to the national development and to the Brazilian character in general. It has made Brazilians too dependent upon paternalism and paternalistic government. It has made it difficult for manual labor to be considered a decent occupation for free men. It gave too much value to such careers as the priesthood even when one did not have the vocation for so noble a career, to the military and to academic honors, with a neglect or disdain for industrial, technical and commercial activities—a defect only today being outgrown by Brazilians. It contributed to make some Brazilians sadistic in their exercise of power. It created a tendency also, as in the South of the United States, to associate politics with rhetoric, since rhetoric is the easiest way for leaders to impress emotional people.

But some of the excesses of slavery in Brazil were corrected by another powerful institution which the Portuguese brought to Brazil and which the Brazilians were wise enough to maintain

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even when they separated politically from Portugal. This—the monarchical system of government—deserves as much attention as slavery from students of the Brazilian development.

The various "big houses" of sugar-cane and later of coffee autocrats had a tendency to separate Brazil into patriarchal blocs that sometimes were violently antagonistic, each protected by a particular Virgin Mary or saint, to such an extent that the field slaves of one plantation often engaged in fights when they met the slaves of another. Monarchy was by nature too national to take sides with local or provincial autocrats or to take sides with saints that protected only particular patriarchal families. It acted also in defense of law, of justice, of morality against paternalistic abuses of power. Since the autocrats of the "big houses" wanted to show their prestige by participating in political life and being recognized by the Crown with titles—barons and viscounts wanted to be marquises, and, if possible, dukes—it was in their interest to behave in such a way as to please the Emperor and his counsellors. Fortunately for Brazil, the four ruling monarchs from the time Rio became the seat, first of the Portuguese monarchy, later of a Brazilian monarchy, had a high sense of their national and royal responsibilities: King John VI, Emperor Pedro I, Pedro II, Princess Isabel. They were greatly respected by the Brazilian people, and this respect was to a large extent a result of the general Brazilian attitude towards paternalistic authority; only the King, the Emperor, the Princess were understood by all or nearly all to be more powerful than the local autocrats. On the other hand, the monarchical authority felt for a long time that it had to depend upon the loyal coöperation of these local autocrats. The interdependence between the two was complete, so much so that when the Crown favored the abolition of slavery and played an important part in the movement in that direction, the Empire immediately lost its vitality and was able to survive slavery for only one year. Slavery disappeared in Brazil in 1888, and in 1889 a republic was established.

At first it was a fraternalistic republic, but that did not last long. Soon it imitated the monarchy which it had replaced and became paternalistic. It did so by acting as if presidents were strong men who had to protect their country almost as if they were kings.

The ironical thing about the simultaneous disappearance of the two institutions of slavery and monarchy was that former

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slaves found themselves men and women who had neither an Emperor nor an autocrat of a "big house" to protect them, and who in consequence became the victims of a deep feeling of insecurity. Some of them became nostalgic for the Emperor and the "big house." It took years for political leaders to understand the real psychological and sociological situation of these former slaves, disguised as free laborers and deprived of the patriarchal social assistance that had been given to them in their old age or when they were sick by the "big house" or, when that failed to do them justice, by the Emperor or the Empress or the imperial Princes. The Emperor was called or considered by most of them their "big Father," the Empress their "Mother," in a sense similar to that in which the Virgin Mary as "Queen" (Regina) was also their Mother.

This explains—to come to modern Brazil—the great popularity of Getulio Vargas when as President for some time with dictatorial power he decided to enact social legislation that gave a large part of the Brazilian labor population protection against old age, disease and exploitation by commercial or industrial firms. It also explains why Vargas became known as the "Father of the Poor" and won a popularity among the common people even surpassing that gained by Emperor Pedro II in 48 years of good, honest and paternalistic government.

Perhaps one may conclude from this that, in Brazil, the monarchical tradition, correcting some of the excesses of the paternalistic tradition which had been developed by a strongly patriarchal plantation system, has expressed itself down to the present day not simply negatively but in positive values. This seems to be the conclusion of everyone who compares Brazilian administration and government with other parts of the general social organization of the country.

Years ago Woodrow Wilson wrote, in an essay which became classic, that in making administrative adjustments the United States was "at a signal disadvantage as compared with the transatlantic nations." Why so? To a certain extent because much of what was more efficient in their administrative system than in the United States had been developed by "kingly initiative." Kingly and, one might add, paternalistic, as in Prussia and to a lesser extent England, where there was a sort of foretaste of what happened in the political history of the United States: a history, as Wilson pointed out, not of administrative development but of

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legislative supervision, not of progress in governmental organization but of advance in law-making and political criticism.

The political history of the republican Americas—North, South and Central—has been influenced to a very great extent by the Anglo-Saxon and the revolutionary French example of democratic law-making and sometimes over-liberal political criticism. As a result, governmental organization there of the efficiently paternalistic, kingly type which has been responsible for many European advances in measures for the protection of the common people against privileged groups has been of an abnormal sort—an effort through frequent revolutions and frequent dictatorial republican governments. It is a frequency that Brazil, with her tradition of paternalism and monarchism, has not known. This seems to explain why having added to the tradition of paternalism and monarchism a slow and peaceful limitation of parliamentary lawmaking, as in Great Britain, and of legally free political criticism, as in the United States, she stands today as a very complex case. Being very American, very liberal, very democratic in some of the most expressive traits of her social and political organization, she is, on the other hand, very classically European—more than Argentina, Uruguay or Canada—in being sensitive to a paternalistic-monarchical tradition that is her peculiar inheritance in America. This tradition, instead of giving Brazilians only a predisposition to remain archaic against so-called Progress with a capital P, has acted as a constant stimulant, especially in critical days, to the legalistic, peaceful, civilian solution of problems that other Latin American republics—even Argentina and Chile—have faced only through open and sometimes brutal military dictatorships (even though republican in form and sometimes in substance).

Ever since the establishment of the republic the Brazilian Army has considered that one of its great responsibilities as a national force was to take the place of the Crown as an influence above parties in Brazilian national life. During the monarchical period, it was a corrective influence which in critical days prevented abuses of power by any individual or group—political, economic, ideological or religious. This seems to explain why military leaders as *caudillos* or dictators have been abnormal in Brazilian life. When Vargas became a semi-dictator (he never was an absolute dictator, but voluntarily surrounded himself with legal controls that made him a sort of active regent in a lim-

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ited monarchy) it was an exception to the purely constitutional norm; and as such he was tolerated but supervised by a socially democratic though politically protective Army. The dictatorial paternalism of Vargas was not of the common Latin American republican *caudillo* type but represented an effort to make an administrative adjustment within the Brazilian monarchical and paternalistic tradition.

The better organization of the civil service was one of the great accomplishments of Vargas, the other being his effort to better the lot of the common people, especially the urban workman. Most of the Army leaders who supported Vargas regarded his initiative as a necessary adjustment in Brazilian life, one that the law-making elements had been unable to accomplish in almost half a century of congressional activity in a presidential republic of the United States type.

"It is harder for democracy to organize administration than for monarchy," Woodrow Wilson wrote in the essay already cited. The Brazilian case seems to favor his opinion. It is definitively a democracy, with social and ethnic manifestations that make it one of the most advanced communities of the continent and indeed of the modern world; yet in its political development it has been a special case in the American community in that it began its independent political life as a monarchy. Paradoxically, the monarchy was a liberal, democratic and national corrective to the aristocratic or autocratic regional and local excesses which were stimulated in the vast area of Portuguese America by the dominant plantation and slave-owning economic system and social organization. This is why ever since she became a republic, Brazil, instead of acting in crises as a typically Latin American republic—through revolution, caudillism and military dictatorship—has acted differently, in her own peculiar way. One has to seek the reasons for this unique behavior in her unique political-social development—a society where aristocratic excesses of private groups were moderated not by radical republicanism but by democratic monarchism, and where important initiatives in favor of the so-called underprivileged groups have been taken not so much by a congress or parliament as by creative individuals. These have acted within a monarchical tradition of executive initiative, preserved as a presidential, civilian, legalistic republic, with the Army usually playing a rôle similar to that of the Crown in the period of the monarchy.

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A FRESH LOOK AT THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMUNITY

By Edward G. Miller, Jr.

THERE has recently been a marked increase in the attention devoted to Latin America in the United States. In part it stems from unfavorable developments, such as the difficulties in Central America. But more basically this growing interest results from an increasing awareness of the tremendous potential in Latin America and a growing realization that, despite the sensational developments which are reported in the press from time to time, there is a continuity of life and growth in Latin America and in our relations with that area.

It is natural that ten years after the end of the last war our interest in Latin America should begin to revive. With our newly awakened sense of world responsibility after the war, we tended to become deeply committed, emotionally, with respect to those parts of the world where we had assumed new obligations. In the debates about "Europe first" and "Asia first," etc., Latin America became more or less "old hat." It was inevitable that there should occur an adjustment in the balance of our national concern. Once again we see our Latin American relations in more nearly proper perspective.

A reappraisal of the relations of the United States with its southern neighbors is complicated by the variety of differing criteria in this country for judging Latin American affairs.

American military men, for example, quite correctly look upon Latin America in terms of strategy. The defense of our continent necessarily involves the defense of the Panama Canal, the Caribbean and the South American land mass. The primary objective of military leaders is military coöperation; political and economic considerations are necessarily secondary. That simplifies other problems. Thus, a *New York Times* dispatch of August 4, 1953, from Guatemala, analyzing the political situation there with emphasis on Communist penetration, had this to say:

> On a recent visit to Guatemala this correspondent was struck by the difference in relations between the Guatemalan Government and the political and economic sections of the United States Embassy and between the Guatemalan Army and the United States service attachés.
>
> Guatemalan Government leaders and Embassy officers have the most cool

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and distant relations and these only on official business. Leading Guatemalan Army officers and the American service attachés are friends, maintaining social as well as business contacts.

The Government does not seek economic aid from the United States, nor has Washington offered any in many years. But the military leaders welcome the United States Army and Air Force training missions.

Of course, as the article explained, the Guatemalan Army had not been subverted by Communism to the extent that other Guatemalan institutions had been; yet the point is illustrative. This does not mean that our military men are not believers in democracy. It merely means that they have a particular job to do and that they put it first.

Similarly with the business view of Latin America. The American business community is a powerful factor there, and the area is extremely important to the United States economically. More than one-third of our entire export and import trade is with Latin America. Over 7 billion American dollars are invested there, more than the total for all the rest of the world except Canada. Many American businessmen are experts on the area. The intimacy brought about by this state of affairs gives rise to thousands of problems which come into the sphere of diplomatic negotiation, either formal or informal. It frequently means great pressure on our government to take a particular attitude toward a specific Latin American situation or toward the area as a whole.

This is further complicated by the fact that the American business community does not always speak with one voice. In some respects it is monolithic in its viewpoint whereas in others it represents a series of different positions. In general its idea of "good relations" with Latin America is that the climate be favorable for business and that the opportunity for a reasonable profit not be jeopardized through unfriendly or unwise governmental measures there. By and large, our business opinion opposes the extension of economic assistance to countries where advantageous conditions are not found, either because such aid would be futile under the circumstances or in the hope that the withholding of the aid will check rash political impulses.

But from that point on, the refinements set in. The investor abroad is interested primarily in his chance for a fair profit, and he wants to take part of the profit out in dollars. He feels that his investment should be secure against seizure; and he seeks a generally propitious local atmosphere, including labor laws that are not too extreme. But a mining or petroleum company may have

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a very different set of problems from a manufacturer; the point of view of a company which produces electrical equipment may be different from one which sells soft drinks. And the problem of a public utility company is something else again. The exporter, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the existence of a market for his goods and with his ability to obtain prompt payment for them in dollars. In so far as governmental regulations are concerned, his worries center around systems of import licensing and exchange controls. Importers of Latin American commodities are concerned with having a secure source of supply, and a favorable atmosphere here at home towards the producing country and its products.

And there are a great many other criteria. What constitutes "good relations" has a different connotation in different sections of our press; labor leaders have their particular yardstick, so have intellectuals, so have those who think about Latin America chiefly in terms of human rights and democratic institutions. Many people in this latter category feel that the principal and perhaps even the sole objective of our country's foreign policy should be to bring about "democratic" conditions in the other country through one means or another. If such conditions do not exist, then our "relations" with the country concerned are not "good" and presumably we should not coöperate with it. The variety of opinions is healthful and welcome, but a note of caution is also appropriate.

Many of the criteria used in appraising inter-American relations do not deal with relations *between* countries, but with the state of affairs *in* other countries. And such matters as press censorship, freedom of labor to organize, and restrictions on business (particularly when they are applied both to domestic and foreign business in another country) do not properly come within the purview of diplomatic relations. It is often difficult to draw a precise line between "relations with" and "conditions in" other countries, but it is important to remember that we draw such a line very strictly in our own domestic affairs, and that the people of other countries ask the same privilege. Diplomatic efforts which disregard it are unlikely to be successful.

II

In appraising inter-American relations, we must always have in mind the point in history at which we stand. Both we in

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the United States and our friends in Latin America sometimes forget that there have been great changes in the world since the heyday of the Good Neighbor Policy in the period between 1933 and 1941. The affairs of the inter-American community could not be frozen as of that moment. Where there is life and growth there is always a new stage and new adjustments.

The first phase in inter-American relations was the period of the birth of freedom—the time during which we and most of the Latin American countries achieved independence from European monarchies and became sovereign nations. It came to an end, for the United States, with the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, and, for the Spanish American Republics, with the holding of the Congress of Panama in 1826. The second phase covered the next succeeding 60 years, up to the time Secretary of State Blaine convened the first inter-American conference in Washington in 1889. This was an era when both Latin America and the United States were preoccupied with their domestic problems and their struggles to consolidate themselves as nations. We had our Civil War. Mexico had a war with the United States, was later subjugated by France, but finally achieved full independence in 1867. Brazil became an independent empire and subsequently a republic in 1889. Argentina became one nation as we know it now only in 1862 when the City of Buenos Aires and the inland provinces finally came under one government. During all this time the countries of the hemisphere had little intercourse with each other.

Another stage began when the reconstruction period after the Civil War drew to a close in the United States and we became actively interested in commercial opportunity abroad. It was an adventurous era and our international relations were marked by a series of incidents in which we do not pride ourselves today, such as our military interventions in Mexico and the Caribbean area. The years following 1889 were marked by a continued growth in the development of the Pan American idea through periodical inter-American conferences and the creation of specialized inter-American organizations. However, as recently as 1928, at the Pan American Conference in Havana, the United States delegation flatly refused to discuss the issue that was uppermost in the minds of the Latin Americans, namely, the right of one nation to intervene in the internal affairs of another.

But a new era opened soon thereafter. It might be called a

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period of courtship of Latin America by its northern neighbor. The first advances were made by President Hoover, Secretary Stimson and Ambassador Morrow at the end of the 1920's, and they were continued and dramatized by President Roosevelt with his announcement of the Good Neighbor Policy in 1933. During the first two terms of the Roosevelt Administration the courtship was especially ardent. Like a good suitor, we gave up the errors of the past and abjured our bad habits. The Export-Import Bank, plans for the Inter-American Highway, and the cultural exchange program were pledges of good will; and most important of all, in the minds of Latin Americans, was the elaboration of the doctrine of equality of states. We had few or no commitments elsewhere in the world during the 1930's; except for the trade agreements, foreign policy was negative, marked by abstention from the World Court and the enactment of the Neutrality Act. Our Latin American relations were the exception—a focus of interest in Washington. The war brought other interests to the fore, but our efforts to woo the Latin Americans were nonetheless intensified. The period culminated in the signing of the Rio de Janeiro Pact in 1947, when all of the American countries formally agreed that an attack on one nation constituted an attack on all.

Another phase then began. The framework of the inter-American community had been established, and the 21 Republics were faced with the problem of living together in a permanent alliance with given rules of conduct. In many ways it is a less dramatic and less glamourous era, and there are many frustrations. The United States entered this latest phase of inter-American relations at the time it shouldered urgent and complex burdens in other continents. We had quite logically worked out our regional relations with our southern neighbors in this hemisphere before we undertook other regional responsibilities. But when we turned our attention to other parts of the world, the bride of Rio de Janeiro felt that she had been abandoned almost upon leaving the altar. The economic contribution which we have made to the development of Latin America during the ten years following the end of World War II has been far greater than our prewar aid, but many Latin Americans note only that they are far less than contributions which we have been making elsewhere. The rapidity with which inter-American relations have developed in the last 20 years thus brings us under cross fire. Some in Latin America who have not caught up with the changes that have taken place

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still give vent to the old clichés about imperialism that were fashionable 30 years ago. And at the same time, many of our friends there accuse us, not of intervention and imperialism, but of neglect and lack of interest.

In the process of making the inter-American alliance a working concern, the United States in fact has taken a far greater interest in Latin American economic problems than it did in the heyday of the Good Neighbor Policy. Before the war we had no formalized economic arrangements with the Latin American countries, except those which we had undertaken through trade agreements, through the sugar-quota arrangements, and the inter-American coffee convention. However, our initiative in establishing the Export-Import Bank, the International Bank and the technical assistance program, and our acquiescence in the formation of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council projected our economic relations into a new sphere. The administration of our wartime export controls in a way that made us responsible for continuing essential economic activity in Latin America, even at the cost of depriving our own citizens of scarce materials, made Latin Americans believe that their countries would be our permanent source of supply of critical materials. And the imposition of wartime price controls on materials which we imported from Latin America made them believe that we had accepted a responsibility to compensate for their loss in dollars during the war by maintaining price levels when periods of shortage had ended.

Thus, although our new commitments throughout the world diluted the great diplomatic interest that had centered around Latin America in the 1930's, much more was expected of us from the Latin Americans after the war. Also, just as the weakening of other centers of power had caused us so vigorously to expand our commitments into new areas, that very weakness of other Great Powers made us more important than ever in Latin America. Before World War II, Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan and France performed important economic functions there as suppliers and consumers of goods and as suppliers of capital. During the war, the last four of the above countries were entirely cut off from Latin America, and Britain ceased to be an important factor in trade and investment. After the war, all five were in such a weakened condition that they could not immediately resume their former activities.

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The result was a tremendous increase in the influence and responsibility of the United States in Latin American economy. During the war we became the sole source of supply for most of the Latin American imports previously drawn from Europe or Japan, and we also became the sole market for many of the goods which the Latin Americans had previously sold elsewhere. The competitive advantages which this gave United States traders in the Latin American market were obviously great. But it also magnified our national responsibility in the area. And although the commercial patterns of the immediate postwar period are now changing markedly, as the Europeans and the Japanese increasingly trade and invest in Latin America, consequences of the wartime experience will be with us for years to come. In times of emergency we shall always be looked upon as the principal source of trade with Latin America, and at all times we shall be looked upon as the principal source of investment. The Latin Americans will always feel free to deal with other nations; they feel that we have assumed a permanent economic responsibility there.

III

The possibilities of friction in this situation are numerous. They are multiplied by the almost obsessive desire on the part of the Latin Americans to develop their economies and raise their standard of living; by the growth of nationalism which is a concomitant of that desire; by the intense scrutiny to which every major act of our government and every significant trend in our national life is subjected; and, of course, by the activities of the Communists who miss no opportunity to use all of these sources of friction for their own purposes.

All of this is underlined by the disparity in strength between the United States and the Latin American countries. The population of the United States is roughly equal to that of all of the Latin American countries, but the United States has an aggregate national income per year about ten times as large as all 20 Latin American nations combined. Our per capita standard of living is about ten times higher than the average of the Latin American countries and about 40 times higher than that of the smaller countries. The population of New York City alone is greater than that of all but four of our southern neighbors, and, moreover, the number of people who contribute effectively to the economic life of Latin America in terms of production and

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consumption of goods is well under half of the total population. Of all the countries in the Pan American community, only the United States possesses the accoutrements of world power. Only we can raise, equip and transport a force capable of fighting a war anywhere on the globe. Only we have the atomic bomb.

In the political field, the Latin Americans look with apprehension upon the growing number of our commitments in other areas in which they are therefore involved through their commitments to us. At the same time, the lopsided balance of military power in our favor tends to create irresponsibility in Latin America with respect to problems of world security, and this mood is intensified when we participate in common defense arrangements with countries which are much stronger than they are, but which nevertheless receive great military assistance from us. In some countries of Latin America—or, at least, in important sectors of public opinion—these factors (often, of course, combined with others) produce neutralism very much akin to the neutralism of some of the Asiatic countries. It was pronounced during the Korean war.

Religious and cultural differences also tend to separate the United States from the other republics of the hemisphere. The Latin American countries are without exception strongly Roman Catholic, and even where, as in Mexico, strong anti-clerical movements have occurred, the Church is still powerful. Latin Americans are suspicious of the influence of Protestantism and Judaism in the United States, and many of them look upon this as an almost unbridgeable gap between them and us, not realizing that there are more than 30,000,000 Roman Catholics in this country. They are also extremely proud of their cultural background and their way of life, and have tended—or pretended—to believe that the United States is materialistic and uncultured: only Europe can offer spiritual and intellectual guidance, they sometimes tend to feel. All this is changing, but it is still an important factor in shaping their attitude toward us.

All of the foregoing factors create an inclination on the part of the Latin Americans to band together in dealing with the United States because of the identity of interest as between themselves. This trend would be much more detrimental to the position of the United States in the hemisphere if we were dealing with countries that were in every respect similar. But such most decidedly is not the case, and one of the reasons why the Organization of

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American States, and the theory of sovereign equality upon which it is based, have great validity today despite the uniqueness of the position of the United States is that the other countries differ very greatly one from the other in so many respects—as to size, as to language, as to racial composition, as to wealth and as to the nature of their political institutions. This disparity between the Latin Americans themselves is frequently overlooked in our tendency to think about them collectively, but it is basic to any consideration of our hemispheric relations.

In size, the countries range from Brazil, larger than continental United States plus Alaska, to El Salvador, which is about the size of the State of Maryland. Haiti and El Salvador are among the most over-populated countries in the world, yet adjacent to El Salvador is Honduras, large sections of which are almost empty. The same is true of Haiti's neighbor, the Dominican Republic. In 1951 the per capita income of Argentina was only 8.3 percent of that of the United States, yet it was almost four times higher than that of neighboring Paraguay. Argentina, Uruguay and Chile are almost entirely European in their racial composition, whereas in large segments of Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia the original indigenous dialects are still spoken.

Furthermore, it is a truism that most of the countries, until recently at least, have had closer economic relations with the United States than with each other, since most of them have depended for their livelihood on the export of food and raw materials and the importation of manufactured goods. The foreign policies of the various countries of Latin America have developed according to their own peculiar requirements and pressures, so that there is no uniformity among them. A collateral result is that many of the bread-and-butter issues that come up in relations between the United States and Latin America are dealt with on a bilateral basis outside of the framework of inter-American treaties and conferences. Thus, although the Latin Americans do tend to band together at Pan American meetings on the broader general issues of economic assistance and raw-material prices, and though many harsh words can be spoken on these subjects at these meetings, bilateral relations between the United States and specific countries are carried out more harmoniously. The sum total of the bilateral relations must be measured by a very different yardstick from the relations as they might be measured at a particular inter-American conference.

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For example, our relations with Brazil have always been of a very special nature. The two countries are by far the largest in the inter-American community and both are linguistically isolated from the 18 Spanish-speaking countries. Brazil's independence was achieved in a peaceful way, and there has always been continuity in Brazil's foreign policy, as a Portuguese colony, as an empire, and as a republic. Brazil has generally been international-minded and has aspired to close relations with the United States; the complementary nature of the economies of the two countries has made this a practical ambition. And Brazil has always favored a strong inter-American organization, in keeping with the international orientation of her foreign policy.

Yet the very fact that Brazil has aspired to special relations with the United States on a bilateral basis carries with it an expectation on the part of Brazil of special treatment from the United States. Despite their genuine interest in a strong inter-American organization, the Brazilians resist any tendency on the part of the United States to treat them on the same basis as other Latin American countries. This fact in itself has the curious psychological result that although relations between Brazil and the United States are generally fruitful and constructive (Brazil was the only country to send troops to the European theater during World War II), they can be tempestuous—as at times in recent years over issues of foreign aid and coffee prices. It also means that Brazil can be as proud and nationalistic as any other country, as witness the failure of American private and governmental efforts in recent years to exercise any influence over Brazil's nationalistic petroleum and mineral policies. But regardless of these difficulties, Brazil's over-all foreign policy remains strongly oriented toward the United States, and is a constructive and stabilizing factor in the community.

In our tendency to think of the Latin American countries collectively, we lump together Mexico and Argentina, for example. These are unquestionably the two most important Spanish-speaking countries of the hemisphere in terms of population and resources. Both have at times tended to be neutralist in the cold war, and both have been leaders in the Latin American protest against United States policies on raw materials. But there the similarities end. Argentina's population is almost entirely European in origin. In Mexico the rôle of the indigenous population is at least equal in importance to that of the conquering whites.

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In fact, it might be said that Mexico has produced both a new racial type and a new culture.

And even though their positions toward the United States are similar in certain particulars, the Mexicans and Argentines have reached them through different processes of thought and for different reasons. If both nations are strongly nationalistic toward the United States, it might be said that the Mexicans feel that way because of excessive exposure to this country, one result of which was the loss of large parts of their national territory; whereas in a sense the Argentine attitude towards us has often been based in part on the frustration of being literally almost poles apart from us. In other words, the Argentine attitude has in the past tended to be theoretical and abstract, whereas Mexico's has been very specific and, for better or worse, highly realistic. This has made it possible for the Mexicans to adjust themselves gradually to living alongside of their powerful neighbor and of deriving profit from their relations with us, even while pursuing their own nationalistic policies. Argentine thinking about foreign relations was for many years conditioned by a feeling of superiority over the other Latin American countries, based upon pride in a European population, a comparatively high standard of living, and the beauty and size of the capital city of Buenos Aires, which contains a total population in its metropolitan area of about 5,000,000 people. These factors have at times caused a country of 17,000,000 people to entertain disproportionate notions as to its influence in world affairs.

Argentina has therefore tended to aspire to leadership in Latin America, and to resent what has been thought to be the intrusion by the United States in Latin American affairs. Mexico, on the other hand, has worked vigorously for an effective inter-American organization, if only for the sake of insuring her own protection.

The other countries of Latin America also have their own individualities and problems. The United States was responsible for bringing Cuba and Panama to nationhood, and this has given us a special relationship to them. The tremendous American investments in the highly strategic petroleum industry in Venezuela and the copper industry in Chile present special problems. Uruguay, a prosperous and highly-democratic nation situated between two great neighbors, has tended to look to the United States as a champion. Where specific problems are concerned,

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every Latin American country offers a special case. In recent years, the military and economic assistance programs have required the negotiation of many bilateral treaties adjusted to the specific nature of the relations between the United States and the individual nations. None of this is inconsistent with the spirit of the over-all inter-American organization; it has, on the contrary, strengthened its underlying purposes.

IV

Relations in the community will never be frozen. Latin America is changing with sensational rapidity. São Paulo, Brazil, is one of the fastest growing cities in the world. The national income of Venezuela in 1952 was more than 2 billion dollars, as compared with $434,000,000 in 1937. The value of Colombia's export trade increased from $86,000,000 in 1937 to $473,300,000 in 1952. The national income of Colombia has increased comparably in the same period; a formidable development program is under way there and the next 20 years will probably see an even more rapid growth.

Few in the United States are aware of the process of awakening that began in Latin America as recently as 25 years ago. It must be borne in mind that the origins of Latin America are very different from those of the United States. When Spain and Portugal ruled over their American possessions, neither had experienced the kind of economic and political revolution or the religious reformation that had occurred in England by the seventeenth century, nor was the achievement of political independence by the Latin American countries generally accompanied by significant economic or social change. Thus these countries were left to themselves, remote from the world's centers of thought and progress, with static social and economic structures whose origins extended back into feudal times. To the extent that any important development occurred in fields requiring heavy capital investment, such as railroads and electric power, most of the capital and technique was supplied by Europe, and eventually by the United States.

It was inevitable that one day all this should change. As the Latin American countries have felt the impact of the twentieth century and materialistic doctrine, great pressures have been felt for internal change. Some of this has, of course, been underlined by the impact of Communism, but the principal catalyst—

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as well as one of the principal targets in some respects—has been the United States. As one country after another has become aware of the great progress and great wealth that the United States enjoys, the people have come to demand for themselves, and for their countries as a whole, a greater share of the good things of life and a better place under the sun. This process of becoming aware has gone on gradually as the result of our motion pictures, magazines, and in general through the increasingly great intimacy of contact that modern life affords. It has hit countries at different times and with different effects, but it has culminated today in an almost frantic desire for change which is truly revolutionary in the light of Latin American history.

The wave hit first in Mexico. It did not have to await the coming of the movies or the *Reader's Digest,* because all that a Mexican had to do to see a different civilization was to look across the border. Of course Mexico had always had a revolutionary undercurrent from the days of Hidalgo and, later, of Juarez, but the impact of the United States and the common border have been tremendous. The 1910 revolution had a variety of aims, seeking simultaneously to bring down the political tyranny of Porfirio Diaz, the wealthy oligarchy, the Church, and vested economic interests both domestic and foreign. The revolution has been going on ever since, sometimes violently, sometimes more quietly, with interludes of reaction. One climax was the expropriation of the foreign-owned oil properties in 1937. The revolution has not substantially improved the lot of the great mass of Mexicans, but it has wrought notable changes in Mexico's national life. Some of its emotional fervor has died down, as evidenced in the easing of the restrictions on the Church and in the growing friendliness towards the United States, but the urge for national improvement is still strong and will bring further change to Mexico in our lifetimes.

The desire for change takes different forms in different countries. Uruguay, for example, has already reached a state of socialization that resembles that of Scandinavia, whereas in other countries the social structure has still not been profoundly affected by exposure to the facts of life in the twentieth century. But that the countries of Latin America are going through a profound and cataclysmic process of change, of revolution, of renovation and even of rebirth is undeniable. This process, as it is undergone, will bring gains and losses; it will also bring intensified nationalis-

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tic feelings which will be aimed primarily at the United States. This will mean occasional difficulties in our relations, possibly lasting for years at a time with some countries. It will bring great impatience in the United States. But nothing that we can do can change this course and these are the facts of life in Latin America. The ultimate result of this process, even if it takes a hundred years, will be to bring into the national life of the countries concerned millions of people who have never participated in national life as we know it—in the culture of a nation, in the production and consumption of goods, and in the shaping of its political life and institutions.

The process of change inevitably extends beyond the borders of each country. The Latin American nations existed side by side but cut off from each other during the first century of their independence. Bolivar's idea of a Pan American confederation failed above all because geographical propinquity gave way to the absence of communications and ended in political fragmentation. Today, with the airplane and increasing overland communication, travel between the countries is commonplace and trade between them is constantly increasing. More important is the interchange in thought and ideas between the Latin American countries themselves. The Organization of American States is not only a forum and meeting place, and a unifying factor, but its very existence and the rôle which it plays today arise from the needs of the new intimacy that this growing together has brought about.

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REARMAMENT AND THE GERMAN ECONOMY

By H. J. Dernburg

SINCE 1947, the United States has sought to strengthen the economy of West Germany, and gave the initial impetus to recovery by granting aid on a large scale. But Germany herself had to do the rest. The German people had experienced the worst defeat in their country's history, but they brought their industriousness, their talent for organization and their scientific skill to bear to dig themselves out of the ruins and regain what they had lost in wealth and in international good will. The result was what has often been called the "German miracle." Germany's recovery, in turn, has had a beneficial effect on the economic development of her trading partners. By opening her doors to imports from the countries in the Organization for European Economic Coöperation, by making foreign exchange available for German travel abroad, and by resuming the service on her large foreign debt, Germany has indirectly made a substantial contribution to the recovery of other European nations. Health, it appears, is as contagious as disease.

An economically strong Germany is now called upon to participate in the political and military rebuilding of Western Europe. After the Paris agreements of October 1954 had been ratified by all nations concerned, the occupation régime was terminated. Germany joined the new Western European Union and NATO as a sovereign Power, with the responsibility of participating in the common defense. She will have to create an army of 500,000 men and build small air and naval units.

Building an army will have an impact on the maintenance of internal and external balance and on the rate and pattern of German economic growth. To date the Federal Republic of Germany has been able to concentrate on producing consumption and capital goods for the domestic market and for export. Now it will have to shoulder the burdens of armament, as have other nations since the Korean war. These burdens are to be assumed at a time when Germany's industrial plant and labor force are nearly fully employed. It is important for Germany's new partners to estimate as accurately as possible the effect that this will have on the German economy.

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II

After the currency reform of 1948, the German economy went through two phases. The first, ending in 1951, was one of rapid if uneven expansion, characterized by the progressive utilization of existing industrial capacity. New investment was considerable even then, and was channeled primarily into the restoration of ruined capital equipment. In the second phase, after 1951, industrial capacity was expanded beyond prewar levels. The supply of labor was not a limiting factor in either phase.

A third now appears to be under way. The increases in gross national product (G.N.P.)—7 percent in 1953 and 8 percent in 1954—were achieved not only by an increase in investment at an annual rate of 10 to 15 percent, but also and most importantly by adding 1,800,000 workers to the labor force in 1953 and 1954. The growth in recent years is to be attributed to an increase in employment (and longer working hours), rather than to higher productivity from increased investment. In 1954, however, Germany's labor force was virtually fully employed, except for seasonal unemployment during the winter months. By the end of the year, capacity in numerous industries, such as construction, iron and steel, and coal mining, had approached, or even reached, full utilization. Taking these factors into account, we must assume that the rate of growth of the gross national product—*i.e.* the rate at which consumption and investment expand—would slow down, even disregarding the impact of rearmament.

Virtually full employment of the German economy, consequently, is the basic problem with which Germany will have to cope in the future. The burdens of rearmament will intensify it. They are twofold. First, the men drafted into the army will be withdrawn from production, thus further slowing down the rate of growth. Secondly, resources of labor and capital that otherwise would have been allocated to production for nonmilitary consumption and investment must be used for the establishment and maintenance of the army—barracks must be built or restored, uniforms and light weapons produced, the young men fed, and so forth. While this change in the pattern of production will not involve a decrease in the gross national product, it will obviously cut down the amount of goods and services available for nonmilitary consumption and investment. The Germans, to use a familiar phrase, will have guns, but less butter than otherwise.

But these general trends do not give a picture of the quantita-

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tive impact that rearmament may actually have on the German economy in the period ending in 1960, when the army build-up will have been completed. As a first step toward a forecast, we may attempt to estimate how the economy would develop under conditions of full employment, disregarding the effect of rearmament. A rough recomputation of the gross national product in 1954, eliminating the part that may be attributed to the increase in the labor force, suggests that, under conditions of constant employment, it would have risen only by about 5 percent over 1953, rather than by 8 percent. On the basis of this 5 percent rate, gross national product, which in 1954 amounted to 145 billion Deutsche marks, would, other things being equal, rise to 194.3 billion in 1960. The annual increment over 1954 during the six-year period (1955 to 1960) would average 8.2 billion or 5.7 per cent.[1]

The slowing down in the rate of growth due to virtually full employment can be seen more clearly if it is contrasted with the 1954 rate, which was associated with the absorption into the economy of unemployed manpower. At the 1954 rate of growth of 8 percent over 1953, the product would have risen to 230 billion D-marks in 1960. During this period the annual increment over 1954 would have averaged 14.2 billion D-marks or 9.8 percent, as compared with the estimate of 8.2 billion or 5.7 percent.

The losses in production due to the drafting of men into the army will not be felt at once. No one can guess what postponements might result from a Four-Power Conference, but in any case there will be a delay while laws governing rearmament are passed[2] and the framework of commissioned and noncommissioned officers is set up. Men will probably not be drafted before 1957. Assuming a three-year period of army build-up, the full strength of 500,000 would be reached by the end of 1959. The production losses caused by withholding these men from industry may be estimated at 725,000,000 D-marks in 1957, 2.2 billion in 1958, 3.6 billion in 1959, and 4.3 billion in 1960 and thereafter.[3]

[1] These and all other subsequent estimates of G.N.P. are at constant 1954 prices.

[2] The most important of these are a law for setting up cadre units; a defense law as a basis for compulsory military service; a pension law for the future regulars of the new army; a new military penal code; a legal basis for the Supreme Command; a law on the authorization of arms production under Article 26 of the Basic Law (the constitution); a law concerning refusal to serve in the army; a law concerning the supply of goods and services to the armed forces; and a law on the procurement of land for military purposes.

[3] These figures have been calculated on the basis of estimates on the army build-up (83,000 in 1957, 250,000 in 1958, 417,000 in 1959, and 500,000 in 1960 and thereafter) and of computations of the average output per worker (G.N.P. divided by average working force) in the years 1953 and 1954; average annual output per worker in these years was 8,685 D-marks.

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Our projections for G.N.P. under conditions of virtually full employment will have to be revised downward by these amounts. Taking production losses into account, it would be 190 billion D-marks in 1960 rather than 194.3 billion; the annual increment, as compared with 1954, would average 7.5 billion D-marks rather than 8.2 billion; and the average percentage increase would be 5.2 rather than 5.7.

To assess the impact on nonmilitary consumption and investment of a shift of resources of labor and capital to the production of military goods, account must be taken of the fact that the German economy has already had to support the armies of the Allied occupying Powers. These armies have been maintained, to a large extent, by German payments which were spent by the Allies on German goods and services; these expenditures have reduced the amount of goods available for nonmilitary consumption and investment. After sovereignty has been restored to Germany, these payments of occupation costs will gradually cease, and the Allies will have to support their armies stationed in Germany. German nonmilitary consumption and investment will consequently suffer cutbacks only to the extent that the forthcoming outlays for equipping and maintaining a German army exceed the former occupation costs for maintaining Allied armies.

Germany has had the contractual obligation to pay occupation costs at an annual rate of 7.2 billion D-marks, but in reality only in the neighborhood of 6 billion appears to have been spent in recent years. High German officials, on the other hand, have placed German annual rearmament expenditures at 9 billion D-marks, and this is the amount provided for by the Ministry of Finance in the budget for 1955–56. This figure is considerably below the more than 12 billion that Germany was to contribute to the now defunct E.D.C., but the 9 billion is the "maximum amount" that, in the view of the Ministry of Finance, Germany is able to afford. It is expected that United States aid will make a rather substantial contribution, and, equally important, that Germany will accumulate appropriated but unspent funds until the army build-up gains momentum in 1958–59. Subtracting the occupation costs actually spent from the prospective German rearmament expenditure, the net rearmament outlay would be of the order of some 3 billion D-marks annually.

Unlike the production losses due to the draft, this outlay of 3 billion D-marks will not actually decrease the gross national

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product, but it will certainly decrease the amount available for nonmilitary consumption and investment. Putting it another way, the net rearmament outlay decreases by 3 billion the annual increments that could otherwise be used for this purpose; the increment would be 4.5 billion yearly rather than 7.5 billion. If these 4.5 billion were to go entirely into private (rather than public) consumption and into investment, they could still in the aggregate expand under conditions of rearmament. In 1954, private consumption (consumer expenditures on goods and services) plus investment (gross fixed asset formation) rose by 9.2 billion D-marks over 1953. Consequently, under rearmament, the increase in the amount available for nonmilitary consumption and investment would be on the average about one-half as high as that in 1954. This, however, is a highly important conclusion, since it implies that, while rearming, Germany may be able to have not only guns but also a moderate, if significant, increase in butter as well.

III

These estimates will certainly require revision in the light of developments. "Other things" assumed to be equal can change greatly in times that are as uncertain politically as ours. In the foregoing projections, certain broad assumptions have been made and only certain variables introduced; other factors (such as prices, and the rates of investment and of labor productivity) have been assumed constant. It should be noted in particular that the conclusions could be quite different if the rate of growth, due to recent and future investment, were to be significantly higher than the basic assumed rate of 5 percent. Changes in the size and speed of Germany's rearmament effort would also make a difference. If the national product were to grow at a faster rate (for example, by 6 to 7 percent, as projected by the Minister of Economic Affairs, Ludwig Erhard, for 1955), there would be of course more butter; on the other hand, if the army were to be built up in, say, two years, and even more importantly, if the annual defense contribution were considerably larger than assumed here (say, more than 12 billion, as forecast for E.D.C.), there would be less.

Finally, German economic policy during the rearmament period may considerably alter the indicated trends. Germany expects, of course, to compensate for some of the adverse influences that virtually full employment, intensified by the rearmament effort,

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would have on economic growth and on the margin available for an expansion of nonmilitary consumption and investment. She hopes, for example, to tap additional labor supplies and to compensate for manpower losses by raising output per man through increased "intensive" fixed investment. To the extent that she succeeds in these respects, especially in solving the labor problem, the economic growth would of course be accelerated.

IV

The most serious problem expected to arise from rearmament is a shortage of manpower. However, as we have noted, it will not spring up overnight. Assuming a gradual build-up of military manpower between 1957 and 1959, the average drain might be 83,000 in 1957, 250,000 in 1958, 417,000 in 1959, and 500,000 in 1960 and thereafter.

Little is to be gained from the reservoir of unemployed. This may seem a surprising assertion, since average unemployment in 1954 (1,220,000 or about 7.5 percent of the average employed population) was relatively high. But average figures are deceptive because they are greatly affected by the seasonal lay-offs during the winter months in the building industry; construction is playing an important part in Germany's postwar economy and there is still much rebuilding to be done. Owing to these lay-offs, general unemployment in December 1954 was as high as 1,288,000 (an increase of 466,000 over September). But in view of the fact that men out of work in the building trade during the winter months cannot be shifted to other trades (or cannot be simply drafted into an army, for that matter), the rate of unemployment before the winter months is more significant for our considerations. The unemployed in September numbered some 820,000, equivalent to 4.6 percent of the employed labor force; a rate of 5 percent or less is considered by international standards as representing virtual full employment.

The German Minister of Labor has estimated that of these 820,000, some 400,000 represent unemployable men and women (owing to age, immobility of labor, and so forth) and 200,000 are out of work owing to shifts between jobs and other temporary influences; this would leave a reserve of only some 220,000 for an expansion of the active labor force. Moreover, partly because of somewhat improved economic conditions in the Soviet Zone, the net inflow of "immigrants" from East Germany (not all of whom

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are employable) subsided in 1954. On the basis of present evidence, East Germany no longer represents an important source of labor for West German industry, but this might possibly be altered if, for example, the West German wage level were to rise markedly. Finally and presumably most important, the number of young persons entering employment for the first time (which increased each year between 1951 and 1954) will begin to decline in the current year. It will decrease significantly in 1956, and will continue to decline until 1960. This year, 920,000 young people of both sexes will graduate from school, but by 1960 the number will have decreased to 580,000. Against these figures should, of course, be set the totals of men and women dropping out of the labor force, but the statistics are not readily available.

While it is difficult to gauge the impact on German industry of the progressive withdrawal (or withholding) of labor from production, there is general agreement that by 1958–59 labor shortages, especially of skilled labor, will become acute. Shortages of skilled labor have made themselves felt in the past, especially in the building industry, and it is on this industry that rearmament will initially make the greatest demands. One of the effects of the tighter labor market is, of course, the growing bargaining power of the workers. There was a wave of wage increases in the summer of 1954; and pressure is currently being brought to bear by the labor unions for further increases. Raises have already been granted in the building industry (6 to 8 percent) and in coal mining (9.5 percent). The outcome of wage negotiations may well determine Germany's future cost and price structure.

To counter inflationary pressures that may develop as a result of labor shortages, Germany expects to stretch her labor reserves to the limit by resettling East German refugees from predominantly agricultural areas, where they cannot be productively employed, to the industrial centers, and, more importantly, by drawing more women into the labor force. Female labor has played an increasingly important rôle in West German industry, and it is hoped that, possibly by offering stronger incentives, more women (not now registered as unemployed) may be drawn from the homes to gainful employment. The number of working women has increased by almost 6,000,000 from 1939 (when the female population was about 20,000,000) to 1953 (when it was almost 26,000,000). While male employment went up 23 percent during this period, female employment grew by 41 percent, the uneven

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growth being due in part to the changed sex composition of the population (a result of war losses) and the greater responsibilities that women had to shoulder in order to support families. The draft may create new responsibilities of this nature, and women may be willing to respond, as they have in other countries; marriages may also be postponed, thus keeping women in the labor force longer.

A further source of manpower for industry may be the importing of Italian labor. The proposal, originally made in a speech by the German Minister of Economic Affairs, was discussed by him and Signor Vanoni, Italian Minister of Finance, during conferences held in Bonn in December last. At that time it was agreed that a mixed Italo-German committee should meet in mid-January to examine the possibilities for the employment of Italian workers in Germany. It was reported later that no full agreement had been reached on the matter in the German Cabinet, and that the meeting of the committee had been postponed. The idea is of course resisted by the German labor unions, while the German Minister of Labor has cautioned that the country should resort to importing labor only after all available resources of German labor have been tapped. Some German economists have commented that bringing in Italian labor would not alone solve the problem, since these workers would increase consumer demand in other sectors of the economy, such as housing. But so did the influx of workers from East Germany, while the over-all effect of their migration has been extremely beneficial; they added more to production than they consumed. From a supranational point of view, the importation of Italian labor may benefit both the German and the Italian economies. If part of the Italian unemployed, who numbered about 1,800,000 in 1954, could be put to work in West Germany, Italian expenditures on relief would decrease, and as a result of workers' remittances Italy's balance of payments might be considerably improved.

However, neither increased female labor nor imported Italian labor would meet the need for skilled laborers, who are of extreme importance for Germany's highly specialized industries. In order to overcome this obstacle, there seems to be a need to increase labor productivity by better planning, improved production methods and increased investment. "Intensive" investment, aimed at raising productivity of manpower already employed, should, it is held, replace "extensive" investment, aimed at pro-

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viding productive employment for additional manpower. Under the pressure of labor shortages and possibly wage increases, German industry is likely to take this course. Coal mining and the iron and steel industry appear to deserve special attention; there seems to have been no substantial increase in productivity over the prewar period in the latter industry, while in coal mining there has been a sharp drop in productivity. But in view of the expected lower rate of growth in the national product, even the expected "intensive" investment may be possible only at the cost of inroads on consumption or nonindustrial investment. Such a policy might require a good deal of persuasion, since maintenance of the present high level in publicly-financed investment, especially in home construction, is close to the German heart.

V

The rather rapid comeback of the German Federal Republic in world markets has been partially attributed, especially since the Korean war, to the absence of the burden of armaments. The advantage that this gave to German foreign trade has often been deplored, especially by British traders. Reasoning in the same way, German industrialists have shown little enthusiasm about a rearmament prosperity which may prove to be fleeting. They have regained footholds in foreign markets and appear reluctant to convert plant to arms production, possibly at the expense of their capacity to export.

It has therefore been suggested by German governmental economists that the Federal Republic should attempt to leave its export potential intact by importing arms, to the largest possible extent, from countries that have already converted their industries to arms production. Such nations would seem to have considerable cost advantages in arms production as compared with Germany, which would still have to go through the process of conversion. Germany, on the other hand—as is suggested by her strong competitive position in world markets—appears to have cost advantages in many lines of export goods. Generally speaking, it would therefore seem advantageous for Germany to convert her export industries to war production to the least possible extent, to maintain thereby a high level of production for export, and to import war matériel instead. If such a policy of importing rather than producing arms were to be followed, Germany would trade imports of arms for current exports at favorable terms, or

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possibly she would trade such imports for accumulated exchange reserves representing the fruits of earlier production. The latter alternative might be quite feasible in view of Germany's very substantial reserves of gold and foreign exchange.

While buying arms abroad would add to Germany's current import requirements, the increase might be less than would be the decrease in exports under a program of converting industries to armament production. The net result would be to minimize the possible adverse impact of rearmament on the German balance of payments, as expressed in a decline in current-account surpluses. On the other hand, a decline in those surpluses might be considered a desirable development. In recent years they have been the largest single factor tending to increase the German supply of money; and they have drained other nations of gold and dollars. Much thought has been given both by Germany and the O.E.E.C. to the problem of modifying the extreme degree to which Germany has become a creditor.

Germany would of course herself produce those army goods in the manufacture of which she excels, such as optical instruments, and she may wish to make uniforms, for example, which would stimulate the textile industry. She may also resume producing such goods as ball bearings, at which she has excelled in the past but which she was not allowed to produce under the Allied arms curb.[4] The promise of United States offshore orders might be an incentive for making certain things that an army needs. Such orders have been a substantial source of dollars for other nations, but Germany to date has received only a relatively small amount of them—15,000,000 to 20,000,000 within recent years. United States-aid dollars could be spent, in part, for orders placed with German manufacturers for equipping German forces or those of other NATO members. Consequently, Germany may wish to follow a selective policy, resuming, for example, the production of ball bearings for export under offshore procurement programs (as well as for domestic consumption and general export), while importing, say, jet planes from Britain.

[4] Allied production curbs will be removed when Germany becomes a sovereign nation. Hence, certain branches of the machinery, electrical and chemical industries, as well as the plants specializing in the production of ball bearings, will no longer be subject to restrictions; moreover, commercial air lines will be able to resume operations. However, by a declaration which is part of the Paris agreements, Germany undertook to manufacture neither atomic, biological nor chemical weapons (the so-called A-B-C weapons), nor long-distance and guided missiles, warships (with the exception of smaller ships for defense purposes), and bomber aircraft for strategic purposes.

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American equipment for the initial outfitting of Germany's forthcoming army has reportedly been stored on both sides of the Atlantic, ready to be delivered immediately when German rearmament gets under way. However, while it has been paid for by Congressional appropriations, no decision appears to have been reached in this country as to whether such equipment, as well as further aid, will be made available on a basis of straight grants or under some sort of lend-lease arrangement, with a settlement to follow at a later date. Since the United States contribution to the German army will presumably be large, the choice of methods may have a considerable effect not only on Germany's budgetary outlays but also on her balance of payments in future years. To date, as already stated, German officials (in making a budgetary provision of 9 billion D-marks) appear to be operating under the assumption that Germany will not have to pay precious dollars for the United States contribution.

A substantial source of dollar receipts has been the so-called "troop dollar," *i.e.* money that United States soldiers stationed in Germany spend out of their own pay. It will probably not decline. The U.S. soldiers' pay is not financed by occupation costs, and according to official statements, the number of United States troops stationed in Germany will not be reduced when the occupation régime ends. These spendings amounted in 1953 to the large sum of $235,000,000 (equivalent to about one-fourth of German exports of goods and services to the dollar area in that year) and appear to have been running at the same rate in 1954.

Termination of the occupation régime may, however, entail substantial dollar outlays by United States military establishments. Allied authorities, as already stated, have been spending out of occupation costs some 6 billion D-marks annually, but it would be sanguine to assume that the dollar equivalent of this amount (1.4 billion dollars) will be available henceforth to bolster Germany's balance of payments. In the first place, of the 9 billion D-marks to be appropriated for rearmament in 1955–56, 3.2 billion ($760,000,000) will go to the Allies as "stationing costs" in monthly diminishing ratios (from 500,000,000 D-marks to 200,000,000); and certain provisions for stationing costs may also be made in future years. The Paris treaties stipulate that Germany must share the expense of maintaining troops of the partner states in her area for 12 months after the treaties go into effect. In the treaties, Germany recognizes,

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however, the need of common defense against aggression and therefore expresses her fundamental willingness to negotiate arrangements for the maintenance of other troops in her area after that first year. In the second place and presumably most importantly, Allied expenditures on German goods and services have probably passed their peak, because the chief investments for maintaining Allied forces have already been made. Dollar receipts by Germany resulting from the ending of the occupation régime may nonetheless prove to be rather substantial.

Summing up, Germany, by following a well-considered selective policy of reconversion, could minimize the possible adverse impact that rearmament may have on her present current-account surpluses. She may even be aided by the receipt of offshore orders, and by manufacturing goods for export that she has not been able to produce under the Allied curbs. She will certainly continue to receive troop dollars. In addition, she may earn substantial amounts of dollars subsequent to the gradual decline of her payments for "stationing." Since other NATO members received armament aid on a grant basis for their arms build-up after Korea, it may not be unrealistic to expect that Germany will be treated likewise. Consequently, it is quite possible that Germany's overall balance of payments will not deteriorate, especially considering the benefits to be reaped from the removal of Allied controls and the achieving of national sovereignty.

VI

There remains the question of inflation. Increased pressure as a result of rearmament must be expected on Germany's already strained resources, and the problem should therefore not be taken lightly. However, as we have seen, much can be done by Germany to lessen the new strain. If the Federal Republic succeeds in replenishing its labor force or increasing productivity by intensive investment, the influences retarding economic growth may be minimized, upward pressures on wages owing to labor shortages reduced, and the threat of an inflationary spiral avoided. Moreover, the pressure of rearmament on Germany's resources of capital and labor can be further lessened by a well-considered policy of importing rather than reconverting—*i.e.* shifting available resources of capital and labor to arms production. Finally, Germany, despite the requirements of rearmament, wishes to maintain free competition as much as possible among armament

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manufacturers, and to keep away from the now detested "dirigist" policies of the controlled Nazi economy. No "war economy within the economy" is to emerge. Aversion to this is also one of the reasons why Germany opposed the French-sponsored plan for a European armament pool. The plan has now apparently been abandoned.

Inflation will nonetheless remain a possibility in Germany, as in any country engaged in rearmament. Arms production creates income and demand, but does not increase proportionately the supply of purchasable goods. Germans are highly conscious of the dangers; within a generation they have lived through two disruptive inflations induced by rearmament and war. To avoid inflationary pressures, the redundant purchasing power must be either taxed away or absorbed by long-term loans. Rather than financing the rearmament effort by borrowing from the banking system, the German Government therefore expects to finance it by taxation and long-term borrowings based on genuine savings. There is danger, however, that Germany may attempt too many things at the same time. She wishes not only to finance the rearmament effort without inflation, but also to maintain a high level of investment in such projects as housing, to reduce interest rates, and to lower taxes further. All this may not be simultaneously possible, and a compromise may have to be struck.

In the fiscal year ended last March, the German Government was able, by an unusual combination of circumstances, to finance both its ordinary budget and its capital budget through tax revenues. Having assumed that the E.D.C. would come into being in fiscal 1954–55, it had provided in its ordinary budget 9 billion D-marks for occupation costs and rearmament. But when only 7.2 billion for occupation costs were required, it became possible to apply the remainder of 1.8 billion to the capital budget. This will not be possible in the current fiscal year 1955–56, when the full amount of 9 billion D-marks provided for this year will be fully utilized, or earmarked for rearmament and stationing costs. The government expects to finance the 1955–56 capital budget by a long-term loan of 1.5 billion D-marks. This loan, however, is not to be floated earlier than in February 1956, so as to give preference to industry in tapping available funds, and also to test the tone of the capital market.

Notwithstanding, competition will develop in the capital market in the longer run as between government, industry and

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other borrowers; and the government may find it difficult, when rearmament gains momentum, to pursue successfully its policy of lowering the interest level. As regards the distribution among borrowers of the funds available in the market, the government appears to have considerable powers; most new capital issues require government approval.

The German Government has been criticized by foreign observers on the grounds that, on the verge of rearmament, taxes have been lowered by the so-called "great tax reform," which became effective in January 1955. According to an official estimate, the reform will save individual and corporate taxpayers 3.2 billion D-marks annually. The measure was adopted partly on the ground that it would increase the net disposable income of individuals in the medium and high-income-tax brackets—whose propensity to save is believed to be high—and that this, in turn, would contribute to a revival of the market for industrial shares and obligations. If this should prove to be true, a lowering of taxes and the undertaking of a rearmament effort (which will not gain momentum until 1958–59) may not necessarily prove incompatible with a balanced economy. As pointed out earlier, considerable "intensive investment" will be required in order to increase productivity and thus lessen the effects of the prospective labor shortage, which appears to be the most pressing problem of the rearmament effort. However, tax policy may have to be revised when the rearmament effort gains momentum.

VII

For the second time within a generation the German economy will be called upon to engage in a major rearmament effort. Twenty years ago, in March 1935, Hitler abrogated the clauses of the Versailles Treaty that had limited German armament. Within four and a half years, Hitler's Reich built up a war machine capable of waging aggressive war. All German economic resources were devoted to the effort. To cope with strong inflationary pressures, the Nazi state resorted to direct controls, notably the freezing of prices (the so-called "price stop") and of wages. Governmental decrees, vigorously enforced, replaced the laws of economics, with the result that both prices and wages were kept remarkably stable.

However, one basic economic condition greatly assisted Germany in these respects, at least in the early stages of rearmament:

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at the outset there were considerable idle resources of capital and labor to be drawn upon. Before starting rearmament, there were still some 2,000,000 unemployed (2,400,000 in August 1934 and 1,700,000 one year later); this was in addition to an undetermined number of men and women who had been put to work at quasi-productive activities just to take them off the streets. Consequently, the rearmament effort, in its early stages, led to an over-all, if uneven, economic growth.

The economic environment of the forthcoming rearmament effort will therefore be quite different from that in the thirties, and will pose different economic problems. But in view of the fact that the rearmament effort is likely to be moderate and to extend over a period of years, the economic problems can be taken in stride. They will have to be solved, not by a mass of controls and legalized violence as in the Nazi state, but by well-considered economic and fiscal policies and happy compromises between conflicting policy objectives.

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OTTAWA AND WASHINGTON LOOK AT THE U.N.

By Kenneth McNaught

IN recent months Americans have viewed with some bewilderment the course of Canadian foreign policy, which they consider to be inexplicably erratic. How, they ask, is it possible for Canada to permit and even encourage the complete interlocking of North American defenses, and then to jump like a startled hare at the prospect of an anti-Communist war in the Far East? Are not these things inseparably linked? And yet Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, on March 24, told the House of Commons, "We have accepted no commitment to share in the defense of either Formosa or the coastal islands, or to intervene in any struggle between the two Chinese governments for possession of these offshore islands. . . ."

Canadians, of course, are equally puzzled by the seeming ferocity of Mr. Dulles whenever he deals with any problem arising on the vast containment perimeter. Should not these separate cases, ask the Canadians, be dealt with in terms of existing power possibilities and nationalist sentiment in the particular areas?

It may seem odd that two neighboring nations, who appear to European visitors to be as similar as two peas in a pod, should so little understand the basic conditions which really make them quite different. Within the United Nations, Canada and the United States appear superficially to have followed virtually identical policies. Yet, occasionally, as with Mr. Pearson's recent statement, basically different assumptions appear. How is this to be explained?

The question may best be answered by first conceding that the United Nations should not be judged (any more than an individual nation) solely by its own definitions. United Nations members have created a mythology about the purposes of their organization. Now a mythology may be (as is shown in the history of nations) useful in establishing and retaining loyalties. It can also obscure realities. The frequent use of the term "peace-loving" to describe this or that group of nations is a clue to the nature of the United Nations' mythology. The term is applied indiscriminately in speeches and resolutions, by both Communists and non-Communists, to designate those members associated with the

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representative making the speech or proposing the resolution. It is a favorite phrase because it identifies the nations to whom it is applied with the stated aims of the United Nations Declaration and Charter. Almost the entire debate surrounding the San Francisco Conference was an elaboration of the theme of peace and prevention of war. Yet an examination of United Nations history, and even of the Charter provisions themselves, indicates that peace is only one of the organization's aims.

Of course no two nations view the world organization in precisely the same light. Yet each member of the United Nations (even India) must at bottom agree that the program envisaged by the U.N. assumes that certain things are valued more highly than peace itself. Indeed, one could make an imposing list of the values which the Charter seeks to protect even at the expense of peace. The entire machinery of collective security is based upon the assumption that force must be used (*i.e.* the peace must be broken) against any state committing aggression upon those values which are held higher than peace.

It is the peoples of the world who believe the peace mythology of the United Nations, and this may or may not be a good thing. In any case it is a mythology which is perpetrated in true Machiavellian style by their governments who do not for a moment believe it themselves. Each of the government-members of the United Nations views the organization as a means whereby it may further the ends of its own foreign policy—and, of course, these ends are determined by the historic conditions which have molded national foreign policies, as well as by the amount of power which each member has at its command.

Assuming all this to be true, what are the aims and determinants of Canadian and American foreign policy which will condition the participation of the two nations within the world organization?

Canada's entire experience, both colonial and national, has been compared to that of a little man sitting in at a big poker game—if he wins he wins a great deal; if he loses he loses everything. And no matter who else may sit in at the game, there have always been two big players about whom Canada has been almost exclusively concerned. The bluffs, the wins and the losses between Great Britain and the United States have, ever since 1783, involved not only the prosperity but the security and even the existence of Canada. Frequently, when friction has developed

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between these two Great Powers, the solution has been found at the expense of Canada—and this used to happen with disturbing regularity: in 1783, 1842, 1846 and 1903, to list only the outstanding occasions. Also, on more than one occasion, one or another of the two Great Powers has tentatively suggested that a permanent solution might be found by eliminating the third man altogether—either in a burst of laissez-faire geniality (as in 1783) or in an excess of Manifest Destiny (as in 1812 or 1871).

Out of this experience Canada has concluded that her continued independence and territorial integrity depend primarily upon the state of feeling existing between Great Britain and the United States. That is, she early developed a functional approach to the question of power—seeing all too clearly that it was necessary to assume that the conditions of security were at the disposal of those who control real power. Canadians considered it desirable to try to influence the direction in which the Great Powers might use their strength, but there was no use in believing that the achievement of mere rights automatically conveyed real security. Thus Canada emerged as a cynical nation—although the cynicism has euphemistically been termed "moderation" and a "liberal desire for compromise."

This is not an exaggeration. Within the British Empire as it was before the First World War, Canada accepted the security which was implied by her membership, but refused point blank to make permanent commitments to the Empire's overseas defense —arguing that the major Power in the Empire must accept that function. At Versailles, Sir Robert Borden fought tenaciously against Article X of the League Covenant; and later, in the League, Canada was instrumental in having Article X (which was at the heart of the League's collective security structure) interpreted in a sense which left League members free to determine their actions pretty much as they saw fit. Again, one of the critical turning points in the life of the League came with the 1925 failure to adopt the Geneva Protocol. The MacDonald government in the United Kingdom had hoped to achieve a common imperial assent to the Protocol which would have provided a non-regional scheme of sanctions and compulsory arbitration. Mr. Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister, appeared to give his assent to the plan when he said that it was "highly desirable that a similar attitude should be adopted towards the Protocol by countries of the British Empire who are members of the

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League of Nations." But the real meaning of this became clear in the Canadian statement to the League's Secretary-General: "We do not consider it in the interests of Canada, of the British Empire or of the League itself, to recommend to Parliament adherence to the Protocol and particularly to its rigid provisions for application of economic and military sanctions in practically every future war. Among the grounds for this conclusion is the consideration of the effect of the nonparticipation of the United States upon attempts to enforce sanctions, and particularly so in the case of a contiguous country like Canada."

That is, Canada accepted the mythology of the League but helped noticeably in the destruction of its reality. It is significant, too, that the only revolution in British foreign policy which Canada has ever been able to engineer was the scrapping of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty and the acceptance by the British Empire of President Harding's invitation to the 1921 Washington Conference. This was one of the really indispensable stones in the edifice of "Anglo-American friendship"—and was cemented in place by the Canadian Prime Minister, Arthur Meighen, in the teeth of fierce opposition from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India and a considerable section of British public opinion. It is beyond doubt that in 1921 Canada accepted a common Empire policy only if it were geared exclusively to the triangular unity of Britain, the United States and Canada.

In the United Nations, Canada has also insisted upon a functional approach to power, which is clearly a continuance of her earlier attitudes. One further comment might be made about this background of Canadian foreign policy: as with all other nations, Canadian policy has been modified by domestic necessity. The historic rejection by the French-Canadians of overseas military commitments, and the sharply differing social values held by the two major races inside Canada, have contributed to the growth of a compromise-complex in all aspects of Canadian policy. As a nation Canada has never had any conclusive debate about the fundamental assumptions of her national polity. She has no rallying cries like *liberté, egalité, fraternité,* life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, or even the dictatorship of the proletariat. Canada lacks such slogans largely because they imply philosophic assumptions about which agreement might be impossible within and between the Canadian sections. And therefore Canada has no missionary zeal for the propagation abroad of a domestic ideology.

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Put in another way, she has never developed an idea of her manifest destiny. Thus, in the United Nations, Canada tends to be profoundly suspicious of any attempt to use that organization for the defense or advance of any particular set of ideas. If at any point she appears to support an ideological stand it is likely to be because of the other real element in her policy—recognition of the necessity of unity within the North Atlantic Triangle (of Britain, the United States and Canada).

At nearly every point in the American foreign policy background the characteristics are directly the opposite of those discernible in the Canadian case. To begin with, Americans have never really felt themselves to be dependent for their security upon any nation or group of nations (even the Franco-American Alliance of 1778 was quickly forgotten, and Jefferson's love for the British fleet was but the briefest of flirtations). From the time of Washington's statements on neutrality down to the day of the go-it-alone school, this has been of primary significance. Furthermore, Americans do not always seem to have been "functional" or realistic in their approach to the problem of power. In 1812 they undertook a war in which their own potential was clearly much less than that of their imperial opponent—and emerged without loss of territory. Another interesting example might be the Venezuela boundary crisis in 1895, when Secretary of State Olney fired what Lord Salisbury called a "twenty-inch gun" at the British. In a 10,000-word lecture the American told Britain that the United States was supreme in the Americas—at a time when this doctrine could not very easily have been supported by American power.

Now, one significant thing about this apparent lack of realism (this idealism, or moralistic approach to foreign policy, which Mr. George Kennan finds so distressing) is that every time it has been employed it has been successful. The other main point is that it stems from the nature of the American nation—a nature very different from that of Canada. The Americans, unlike the Canadians, have been accustomed ever since the 1760's to debating the fundamentals of their policies. From time to time they have made pretty clear statements about these—as in the Declaration of Independence, the Monroe Doctrine or the Charter of the United Nations. It may be argued that these statements are all susceptible of differing interpretations, but in the defense or extension of all of them Americans have borne arms. Again, once

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the conclusion of any of the "great debates" has been reached, it has been made binding by revolution, civil war, or by the kinds of social-political pressure described by Alexis de Tocqueville. The United States has emerged, therefore, not as a timid and cautious nation, devoted to compromise and insistent upon the exact correspondence of power and policy commitments, but rather as one which has made up its mind on basic matters, is convinced that there is a right and a wrong policy in any situation, and that it has a duty to extend the principle of right.

If Canada, then, is the chief cynic of the United Nations—not nearly so concerned with right and wrong as with what seems to be possible—the United States is the chief moralist. And so far as this may be true, both nations appear to be acting out their historic rôles within the new international framework.

II

This thesis might be sustained by reference to some of the major developments in recent international affairs which have concerned both countries. In the origins of the United Nations, Canada's policy was a reflection of her conclusion that her security depended upon the good relations of Britain and the United States. Thus her decision to enter the U.N. followed automatically upon two other decisions: the revolutionary acceptance by the United States of the idea of such an international organization, which came in the Moscow Four Power Declaration of 1943; and the closely following decision of the conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers also to accept this new international endeavor. In the Canadian House of Commons there was only the traditional end-of-the-session debate on the subject—which is to say there was practically no debate. From the outset, Prime Minister Mackenzie King stressed what he called "the functional idea of international organization." That is, he was not bold in challenging the concept of Big Power leadership; but rather asserted "that power and responsibility should as far as possible be made to correspond." Although Mr. King, at the San Francisco Conference, tried to obtain recognition of a second tier of Powers—the so-called Middle Powers—his efforts in this direction were distinctly halting. He recognized that Canadian influence upon the decisions of the Great Powers would be exercised in the traditional Canadian manner—behind the scenes. This timorous approach was described and accepted by Mr. M. J. Coldwell, the

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Canadian Socialist representative at San Francisco, as seeking "the highest common denominator attainable at the conference." The apparent Canadian docility was noted by Professor A. R. M. Lower when he wrote in 1946: "At the moment Australia has more conviction and political courage to contribute than has Canada." It is significant that the toughest fight put up by Canada at San Francisco was for recognition of the principle that any Security Council decision which would require members to contribute armed forces should be preceded by consultation with the members concerned. Conversely, Canada at the outset was one of only six nations (in a total U.N. membership of 55) to join each of the eight specialized agencies—where ideological rivalry was thought less likely to occur, and where military strength was not necessarily a determinant of function.

In the beginning, the United States was at one with the other Great Powers with respect to the voting procedure of the Security Council (*i.e.* the maintenance of the veto power of the permanent members of the Council), and thus Canada did not go out on a limb on this question. As soon as the depth of the divisions in the Security Council was clearly revealed, and when General Marshall had started the ball rolling toward the establishment of the Interim Committee, or Little Assembly, Canada had little doubt as to her course. She would be automatically with the United States and Britain in this attempt to circumvent the Soviet use of the veto; but at the same time her limited faith in the United Nations diminished perceptibly. Was this not because she viewed the establishment of the Little Assembly as an attempt to employ the United Nations as a vehicle for the extension of ideological policies at the expense of seeking in a designedly universal organization only "the highest common denominator"? It is worth emphasizing that it was during his speech supporting the 1947 American resolution to establish the Interim Committee that Mr. St. Laurent gave the first definite indication that Canada had never really departed from her dependence upon the structural strength of the North Atlantic Triangle. He said then:

> Nations, in their search for peace and coöperation, will not and cannot accept indefinitely and unaltered a Council which was set up to ensure their security, and which, so many feel, has become frozen in futility, and divided by dissension. If forced, they may seek greater safety in an association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for greater national security. . . . It is to be hoped

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that such a development will not be necessary. If it is unnecessary, it will be undesirable. If, however, it is made necessary it will take place. . . . This, you may say, is defeatism of the worst kind. It is not. It is merely sober realism.

That was, beyond question, the authentic voice of Canada; and it is not accidental that Mr. St. Laurent has been credited with being the primary author of the second great regional alliance—in a system of alliances which, in truth, strikes at the very heart of the U.N. Charter.

But it is also very notable that the North Atlantic Treaty is the only one of the regional alliances to which Canada has adhered. She refrained from applying for admission to the ANZUS discussions and resulting treaty; she has continued aloof from the Organization of American States; and she has specifically excluded herself from any commitment to the Manila, or SEATO, Pact—despite the obvious fact that she is both a Pacific and an American state. All this clearly reflects the traditional principles of her policy: commitments must bear a precise relation to power, and the conviction that the sole source of her security is the unity of the Atlantic Triangle. It is only to NATO that Canada has a specific, permanent commitment, and this is the only international organization that has at its immediate command a solid international striking power. In other words, it is only on the basis of Anglo-American solidarity that Canada commits herself to collective automatic force, let alone to a share in European security arrangements.

It is probable, despite the Treaty preamble which refers to "the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples," that NATO has been dictated from the beginning by necessity rather than by ideology. In so far as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been extended to include Greece and Turkey (and by implication Spain and Jugoslavia), and has thus become, in Professor Freedman's words, "one of the major moves in the Western counteroffensive against Russian postwar expansion"—in these things Canada has acquiesced primarily because they are ardently desired by the United States. If Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty fulfils Canada's idea of security, possibly Article Four might be taken as suggesting the more extended ideological interpretation of the United States. Article Five secures all the signatories against an armed attack from abroad; Article Four envisages the penetration of a country by an organized ideology (*i.e.* by Communist subversive activity) and calls for consultation be-

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tween the signatories in such an event—much like the old Quadruple Alliance of 1815, which was designed to suppress liberal-nationalist subversion of the European autocracies.

Article Two of the North Atlantic Treaty, on the other hand, brings directly into question the triple membership of Canada in the United Nations, NATO and the Commonwealth of Nations. It is generally agreed that Article Two was placed in the Treaty at Canada's instigation. The Article calls upon members of NATO to "eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and to encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them." This, perhaps, recalls Canada's historic attempts to achieve reciprocal free trade with the United States—but it is of greater interest still in another respect. The proposal to build up a comprehensive political-economic community runs directly into two great and apparently permanent factors: the refusal of Britain thus to weaken her ties with the rest of the Commonwealth, and the post-Civil War high tariff determination of the United States. Thus Canada's Article Two has remained a pious hope—but a hope whose expression gave witness to Canada's primary loyalty.

This point might be restated in another context. The proposing of Article Two indicates that Canada is far less concerned about Commonwealth solidarity than she is about reinforcing the solidity of the North Atlantic Triangle. This is shown in several ways both within and beyond the United Nations framework. Canada has been noticeably reluctant to support the Indian position when Asian matters are discussed at the United Nations—although India is quite obviously the greatest pillar of the Commonwealth in Asia. Again, Canada has remained aloof from SEATO, while three other Commonwealth members signed the Pact. Some people have argued that Canada kept clear of the Manila Pact out of deference to Indian opinion about that alliance. Any examination of Canada's Far Eastern policy, however, clearly reveals that it consists in having no policy at all, and therefore no commitments in either the Pacific or Asia. Indeed, this irks a small group of politicians in the booming Pacific province of British Columbia. Mr. Howard C. Green, the chief spokesman in Parliament for this group, rebuked Mr. Pearson on April 1 in these words: "Some of us have been trying to emphasize [that Canada is a Pacific Power] for several years, and yet it must have come as a surprise to many hon. members that the United States Secretary of State would make a statement of that kind. Of course it

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is very true; Canada is and has been for some years, one of the leading Pacific Powers. Today the greatest threat to civilization is in the Pacific. . . . I believe that Formosa is in fact in the first line of defense for Canada. . . ." This shade of opinion is considered by the majority in the Canadian Commons to be not much more than a pale reflection of the American China Lobby, and some see Mr. Green almost as a latter-day Whitelaw Reid. Fearful of overreaching their material and human resources, and ever intent upon shoring up the main pillars of the Anglo-American entente, Canadians have resorted to the Colombo Plan in place of an Asiatic policy. Perhaps this is considered by some people in the Parliament as being a real policy; but the Socialist criticisms of the meager annual vote of about $26,000,000 for the plan have been very telling.

Actually, few Canadians accept the view of a monolithic Communist imperialism in Asia. Most members of Parliament seemed to agree with Mr. Pearson when he argued, on March 24, that, "The Communist movement in Asia is not simply a conspiracy of evil and alien forces seeking power and domination; unfortunately it is more than that. It has secured too many followers who see in it, at least until they have acquired some experience of its workings in government, a means of improving the welfare and happiness of their own people and ensuring their freedom from Western pressure and control. Therefore I feel we shall not make much appeal to the peoples of Asia unless we make it clear to them that while we denounce Communistic doctrines and methods we wholeheartedly support the ideals of these people for liberation from hunger, misery and outside domination." It remains true, however, that Canada has not developed any really vital or large-scale policy by which to act upon this concept of the Asian problem.

Further evidence that Canada is willing to let the United States direct Asiatic policy, even at the expense of Commonwealth unity, was provided during the visit of the Canadian Prime Minister to India last year. Mr. St. Laurent made a special point of telling a restive Indian Congress that the United States was correct in seeking to arm Pakistan as a key member of a "Middle East" Pact. Mr. St. Laurent has apparently never seen fit to request a Commonwealth conference on his own initiative; and press reports indicate that at the Commonwealth meeting in London early this year the Canadian Prime Minister was intent on "sell-

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ing Eisenhower" to the other delegates. Indeed, neither Mr. King nor Mr. St. Laurent, both of whom have spoken with the conviction that they express Canadian national opinion, has been what the Toronto *Globe and Mail* would like to see—namely, "strong Commonwealth men."

III

All of this points to the great difference between Canada and the United States in their approach to international organization. While the United States continues to act upon the principle that we are witnessing a global struggle between conflicting ideologies, and desires to employ the United Nations and all the subsidiary alliance structures to defend and extend what she defines as the democratic way of life, Canada's primary loyalty is to functionalism rather than idealism and thus she hews close to the single line of North Atlantic security. Thus it is that Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs may appear from time to time mildly to rebuke the United States for insisting on the perfidy of all Communists, or for drawing too tight the bamboo curtain—still when the chips are down his delegation votes with the Americans. Put in another way, Canadian diplomats appear at the U.N. in rather a satellite rôle, while less publicly they are not always convinced that the ideological issue is the main one. Because the United States has a sense of mission, and because this pervades its entire foreign policy, Canada, who regards solidarity with the United States as essential to her own limited view of security, tends to get carried along willy-nilly.

Perhaps the case of the U.N. action in Korea can further support this thesis. When war broke out between the northern and southern portions of the Korean peninsula, Canada had just about decided to recognize the Mao Tse-tung Government in China—as Britain had already done. This surely indicated an underplaying of the ideological issue by the Canadian Government. Thus the question of a Canadian contribution to the American-led intervention of the United Nations should logically have been based on the problem of whether the cause of collective security would be advanced by such Canadian action. It was, indeed, on the ground of an affirmative answer to that question that the Canadian participation was advocated and, when undertaken, defended. It is probable, however, that most Canadians saw the real issue in Korea as being not that of collective security in the

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abstract or general sense, but rather that of containing and, it seemed for a while, of rolling back Communism. But this is to say that the cause was primarily ideological; and Canada certainly never committed herself to the defense or the repulse of any ideology. It may be concluded, therefore, that the Korean participation of Canada rested less upon the collective security merits of the case than upon the recognized necessity of not running counter to American policy in any critical area.

It should be observed, in this connection, that Canada defined very closely her commitments in Korea, and that she pulled her troops out faster than the United States thought was strictly proper. Furthermore, direct Canadian pressure upon the American State Department was greater and more open with respect to the Korean venture than in any other postwar instance. This was particularly true in relation to the advance toward the Yalu River, the possibility of an assault upon the China coast, and the defense of Formosa. In the case of the latter two problems, indeed, Canada specifically "contracted out." And now that the fighting is over in Korea, one hears again the non-ideological (or cynical, if you like) Canadian voices gently suggesting in Senate, House, Cabinet and press that the time to consider Chinese recognition and admission to the U.N. is near. One such voice—that of the Prime Minister last year on his return from the Far East—broke into full-bodied tones when he said, "We must be realists. Sooner or later we will be obliged to recognize the government which the people desire." The more cautious Mr. Pearson was busy for weeks afterward modifying this unguarded remark.

The fact is that there are many areas of international affairs in which Canadians and Americans have differing points of view—stemming from their respective historical experiences. But it is equally true that Canadians have been most reluctant to allow these differences to emerge into full view. As two final examples one might take the development whereby the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was extended well beyond the Atlantic area and, second, the problem of the nature of an international civil service.

With respect to the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO, Canada consciously refrained from creating an issue—yet she agreed with British opinion that the defense of the Middle East should be organized separately from that of the Atlantic. Indeed, by not sending a full ministerial mission to the preliminary con-

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ference on Middle Eastern questions, Canada clearly indicated that she did not consider herself to be directly concerned with the problem at all. In pursuance of the Truman Doctrine, however, the United States felt obliged to insist upon the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO, and, in this instance, overcame British resistance. Canada simply accepted the outcome. In other words she refused to rock the North Atlantic boat by shifting her weight heavily to the British side; and as a result she found herself committed to the defense of a very distant part of the globe—on ideological grounds which she had never really accepted.

On the question of the importance and the nature of an international civil service Canada has declared herself on several occasions. As a matter of fact, this is the kind of practical administrative problem in which Canadians take great delight. In this case her interest was at least partly the result of her hope that the international civil service (like the work of the specialized agencies and of assistance to underdeveloped countries) might be relatively free of the ideological struggle.

The concept of a new international loyalty, as stated in Article 100 of the Charter—that is, that members of the Secretariat must in no sense be national agents—has rightly been called " the most severe test to which a civilized person of the twentieth century can be subjected." At San Francisco, Canada was active in support of this idea. Her resolutions and arguments are reflected to a considerable extent in Article 101, dealing with standards of selection for the Secretariat, and in Article 105, dealing with the privileges and immunities of officials of the United Nations or of representatives of members accredited to it. In the working out of the concept, however—in the course of the actual functioning of the various branches of the new international service—exactly the same ideological complications cropped up as those which appeared in the other U.N. areas. Here, again, although Canada continued to argue that no nation should seek to qualify the international loyalty of any of its citizens who became U.N. servants, she recognized the practical difficulty involved.

The critical stage of development was reached with the 1952–53 loyalty cases in New York, when a Federal Grand Jury declared that "an overwhelmingly large group of disloyal United States citizens" had infiltrated into the United Nations; and when in March of 1953 Secretary-General Lie declared that "not a single United States staff member of the United Nations Secretariat has

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ever . . . been charged in any court of the United States—much less convicted—of espionage or any act of subversion." This was a head-on collision between one of the few really central principles which Canada had enunciated and the American assertion of the subversive nature of world-wide Communism.

The question was further complicated by the actions of the Secretary-General, who was genuinely distressed by the problem of international loyalty within a host country. The three-man commission of jurists whom he appointed to advise him recommended that he should dismiss all employees who had been found guilty of subversive activities against the host country (which was quite unexceptionable). But the commission went further and advised Mr. Lie also to dismiss all employees who pleaded the Fifth Amendment, as well as all those who he had reasonable ground to believe had been or were likely to be engaged in subversive activities against the host country.

The Secretary-General had, even before receiving the commission's report, dismissed all those who had pleaded the Fifth Amendment and who were on temporary contract; after he received the report he dismissed all those on permanent contract who, after a second opportunity to defend themselves, still invoked their constitutional right to remain silent. This action of Mr. Lie's quite clearly accepted the right of a U.N. member to exercise a very considerable degree of control over the convictions of its citizens who became servants of the United Nations—and it was this very thing which Canadian influence at San Francisco had sought to avoid. Yet, when the Secretary-General took another step recommended by the commission and established a panel to help him decide in cases of suspected future subversion (the most tenuous of all the grounds of dismissal) the Canadian Government endorsed the appointment of a well-known Canadian as chairman of the panel—Mr. L. W. Brockington. Although this panel has remained relatively inactive, one could argue convincingly that Canada here refrained from forceful advocacy of a proposition to which she had previously committed herself—and that, again, she did so through concern for the solidarity of the North Atlantic Triangle. In effect, Canada contented herself with mildly restating the general principle of the international nature of the U.N. service, and then with accepting the essence of the American point of view. As Mr. Paul Martin of the Canadian delegation said: "It is not just or reasonable that an em-

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ployee should be dismissed on the sole ground of having refused to answer questions, the answer to which might serve to incriminate him. . . . Such refusal should cause the Secretary-General to view the employee with suspicion and should lead the Secretary-General to institute inquiries."

IV

It has been suggested, then, that the approach both of Americans and of Canadians to international organization has been and is bound to be conditioned by their total historical experience and their present national characteristics; that this has led the United States to lay heavy emphasis upon the ideological division of the world, and to conceive of the cold war (even in its warmest phases) as being, at every point, symptomatic of the ideological cleavage—and that this interpretation has led it to view the United Nations and other international organizations as being part of a pattern for the defense and extension of Western ideas and interests as it defines those values. Canada, again in conformity to her history and nature, views these same international instruments in a cautious or even cynical fashion, always centering her policy upon the rather limited but to her essential foundation of the permanent good and close relations of the North Atlantic Triangle.

The mixture of pessimism and sober optimism which characterizes the Canadian approach to world problems is well illustrated by a speech in which the Secretary of State for External Affairs commented upon the Canadian Prime Minister's world tour of last year:

> . . . our sense of understanding must even extend to the very people who we think threaten our peace. We cannot be soft-headed about this matter, for power in the hands of irresponsible rulers could be dangerous to our peace. But while we need not be soft-headed we should certainly be clear-headed. I agree that we must be careful and alert, but also that we must not let fear freeze our diplomacy into immobility or fire it into panic action. The purpose of our Canadian policy—and I do not think there is any division in the country about this—is not merely to build up military collective strength, important as that is. The purpose is to work together with our friends in solving our own problems and also, if possible, to negotiate with those whom we fear, in solving those other problems which divide the world. Canada is anxious to play its part also in this form of collective security, anxious to play its part in seeking by negotiation international solutions to differences, to seek them by negotiation from the strength which we are now collecting, and with strength, but also with wisdom, with full realization of the calamitous result

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of failure, and in the hope that one day security will rest upon a stronger basis than the certainty of massive retaliation, atomic retaliation if you like, against anyone who would break the peace; retaliation which would certainly annihilate the enemy but might also destroy ourselves.

At the moment, Canadians and Americans understand each other least when they speak on the subject of Asia. Out of the whole complex of their past experience and present unequal strength they arrive at conclusions which gravely perplex each other. Apparently Canada recognizes the import of Sino-Russian power when she integrates her whole northern defense policy with that of the United States—and spends a good deal of money on it. On the other hand, Americans learn with surprise that Canadians would like to have the number of American soldiers and airmen stationed in Canada considerably reduced, and the gap filled by personnel of other NATO countries. Again, Americans are startled by Canadian insistence, as shown in a recent Parliamentary statement, that, "although the basic issues between the free world and the Communist world are clear enough, we have [in Formosa and the offshore islands] a dispute in which that clarity is not, to say the least, obvious."

American missionary self-confidence, now based upon a near hegemony of power among the "Western" nations, will continue to make her policy decisions markedly different from those of Canada, which are based upon realization of limited (if real) power, a balanced North Atlantic Triangle, and a casuistic approach to international relations.

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HOW UNIFIED IS THE COMMONWEALTH?

By G. F. Hudson

THE devolution of the British Empire into an association of sovereign states has left the periodic Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference as the most important organ of co-ordination among the members of the association. These conferences are meetings for consultation and exchange of views; they are not summoned to meet particular emergencies and they have no formal agenda. They are not meant to produce binding agreements or to commit the participating governments to a definitely formulated joint policy in any field of world affairs. They nevertheless do involve a degree of mutual influence and adjustment in policy-making which goes far beyond the normal interactions of states in friendly diplomatic relations, or even relations of alliance, with one another. A cynical observer may say that the Commonwealth conferences are an ingenious device by which Britain continues to impose her own policies on ex-British territories in spite of their nominal independence. But although British views, supported by the prestige of long experience and *savoir faire* in world politics, undoubtedly continue to carry great weight at the conferences, their more striking feature in comparison to the past is the influence which the other members now exert upon Britain. A Castlereagh, a Palmerston or a Salisbury in formulating British foreign policy did not have to take account of the opinions of British overseas colonies and dependencies, but a Bevin or an Eden must continually be seeking the approval, or at least the understanding, of Ottawa, Canberra and Delhi for any important step in Britain's international relations.

Eight separate nations distributed over five continents cannot be expected to have a single uniform policy in relation to the rest of the world or to see eye to eye with one another on all current issues of world affairs. The differences of geographical location would alone be sufficient to produce profound differences of outlook, even without the great diversity of ethnic origins and history. Nevertheless, the fact that all the countries concerned have in the past formed part of the British Empire and have emerged as independent states through peaceful constitutional processes has left them all with a certain common heritage of political and legal ideas which is of the highest significance in the face of a

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world infested with totalitarian tendencies. British settlers carried the institutions of their homeland to Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, just as they did to those North American colonies which subsequently became the United States; except in South Africa, where the British element is outnumbered by the Dutch, these institutions have remained the foundation of national life.

In India, Pakistan and Ceylon, historic traditions are, of course, entirely alien to the British way of life, and nationalism in recent years has tended to reassert indigenous values against all kinds of Western influence; yet the pre-independence apprenticeship of the educated classes in British law and politics has deeply affected their entire approach to the problems of the modern world. When power was handed over to leaders of Asian peoples formerly under British rule, there were many who took it for granted that Commonwealth ties with them could not be more than nominal and would probably be terminated as soon as the new states gained full confidence in themselves. But up to now the Asian members of the Commonwealth have shown no inclination to break away from it, and it is a striking fact that none of the issues which involve serious conflict within the Commonwealth ranges the British-origin and Asian members in groups on opposite sides. The Kashmir question nearly led to war between two members and is still a most difficult and dangerous dispute, but it divides the Asians among themselves, not as a bloc from the rest of the Commonwealth. The policies of racial discrimination pursued by South Africa against Asian immigrants as well as the indigenous Africans inevitably arouse deep resentment in India, Pakistan and Ceylon; but the sharpest conflict is raised by the South African challenge to British colonial policy in Africa, and particularly the demand to take over the British-administered Protectorates within South Africa, so that here again the antagonism, serious though it is, does not split the Commonwealth along racial lines.

The reference to South Africa affords a convenient starting-point for a survey of the foreign policies of the members of the Commonwealth because South Africa comes nearest to having no foreign policy at all. It is also today the most aloof from the Commonwealth family circle. Alone among the members it was not represented at the recent conference in London in February by its Prime Minister, but only by its Minister of Justice who

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left for Capetown before the conference was over. Absorbed in its local and internal affairs, remote from any area of serious international disturbance, and conscious of the disapproval with which the world at large regards its racial policies, the ruling party in South Africa tends more and more to withdraw into a defiant isolationism, claiming that South Africa will mind its own business and that other nations should mind theirs. As the only one of the members of the Commonwealth whose interests are not involved in some strategic area fronting the Communist power bloc, South Africa is curiously detached even from the "cold war," though by *apartheid* it is busily creating wonderful opportunities for the penetration of Communism into the African continent. The only consoling feature from the point of view of the Free World in an otherwise deplorable situation is that "Malanism" at least appears to ensure that in any world conflict South Africa cannot be ranged on the side of Moscow, and this is potentially of the greatest strategic importance because, with the possible destruction of the Suez Canal in an atomic war, Capetown would become the pivot of maritime communications between Britain and the United States on the one hand and the countries of the Indian Ocean on the other.

Apart from South Africa, all the Commonwealth countries are concerned in the affairs of regions which are more or less directly threatened by the advance of Communist power. Britain, as an island off the coast of Europe to which 20 miles of sea no longer afford protection against devastating attack from the Continent, is vitally concerned in the defense of Western Europe, including the German Federal Republic, against the Soviet Union and its European satellites, and is further committed by its long-established Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian interests to participation in the defense of those regions. On the other side of the Atlantic, Canada has not only a stake, shared with the United States, in the preservation of Britain and Western Europe from Soviet domination, but has also during the last few years become conscious of her own exposed position as the most northerly country of the Americas in an age when war could be waged across the Bering Strait or over the North Pole. At the other end of the Commonwealth, Australia and New Zealand have been aware, ever since the entry of a Japanese fleet into the Coral Sea in 1942, of the potential danger to their security from a domination of the Far East by a single aggressive Power, and are linked in regional

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defense agreements both with Britain and with the United States. Finally, of the Asian Commonwealth countries, India has a long land frontier with Communist China, while Pakistan touches China at one point, and is also exposed to possible approaches of Communist expansion through Afghanistan on one side and Burma on the other; Ceylon, though remote from either Russian or Chinese frontiers, cannot fail to recollect the time, only a few years ago, when Kandy was the headquarters of the "Southeast Asia Command."

Of all the members of the Commonwealth, Canada, as a partner in NATO, is the most closely associated with Britain's own defense. As one of the three countries which led the way in the development of atomic power, Canada also has special links with both Britain and the United States which constitute an international grouping of the greatest importance in the present period of world history. In some respects, nevertheless, Canada tends to draw apart from the rest of the Commonwealth. She is outside the sterling area and thus has no share in the financial coöperation which is one of the most effective bonds between other Commonwealth countries. Her closest economic ties are inevitably with the United States, and strategically the two North American nations are bound to become more and more tightly integrated. During the two great wars against Germany in which both Canada and the United States took part, the idea of an invasion of North America by way of the Arctic was inconceivable. Today, however, Alaska, Ellesmere Land and Baffin Land belong to a vulnerable strategic zone for which a joint American-Canadian defense is essential. Canada's strategic commitments under the NATO and North American defense agreements thus extend from the Mediterranean to the North Pole and round to the Aleutians.

Westward across the Pacific, however, Canadian interests and commitments stop short of the American. Canada has never shared in the American transpacific expansion which led to possession of Hawaii and the Philippines or in the traditional American concern for the fate of China. The Canadian instinct is to avoid involvement in the affairs of Asia. Neither the American obligations to Japan, South Korea and Formosa nor the Southeast Asia defense pact are underwritten by Canada. One result of this has been that the Canadian attitude towards Communist China is much nearer to the British than to the American. This is not to be attributed merely to a habit of taking advice from Lon-

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don or to the personal opinions of a Foreign Minister, but is to be explained largely by Canadian isolationism in relation to the Far East. The Canadian resolution not to become involved works in the same direction as the British desire to disengage.

The Manila Treaty, on the other hand, does bring together four members of the Commonwealth, as well as the United States, in a league to keep Southeast Asia from possible conquest or domination by Communist China. In addition, Australia and New Zealand are linked with the United States by the Anzus Pact, to which Britain is not a party.

The attitude of Australia and New Zealand to world affairs is conditioned to an increasing extent by awareness of the huge mass of Asia to the northwest, the nearest Asian neighbor being the new political creation of Indonesia with its alarming internal instability and Communist infestation. Until 1942 the two Australasian Dominions relied on British sea power for their security and willingly dispatched troops to the Middle East in both Britain's wars against Germany. In the war of 1914–18, with the Anglo-Japanese alliance ensuring security in the Pacific, this could be done without danger, but with a hostile Japan it proved extremely dangerous, and the crisis which followed the fall of Singapore put a severe strain on British-Australian relations, as revealed in the correspondence published in Volume IV of Sir Winston Churchill's war memoirs. Australia suddenly found itself threatened with Japanese invasion; the British Government agreed to the recall of part of the Australian forces serving in the Middle East for defense of their homeland, but subsequently tried to get part of them diverted for the campaign in Burma—a request with which the Australian Government bluntly refused to comply. The peril, though it was not of long duration, made a profound and ineradicable impression on the Australian mind, and when relief came, it was from the American victories in the Coral Sea and at Midway rather than from anything Britain was able to do at that time to help the two Dominions.

In the postwar period, with Britain hardly able to dispose of any surplus of strength over and above her European and Middle Eastern commitments, Australia and New Zealand have had to continue placing reliance for their security mainly on a defensive alliance with the United States. Politically, however, they have been less inclined to an American alignment. Long after Washington had decided to rebuild and rearm Japan as a barrier

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against Russo-Chinese Communist expansion, Australians could see no danger in the Pacific but from Japan. The fact that neither the Soviet Union nor Communist China possessed sea power such as Japan had had seemed to render them harmless for trans-oceanic expeditions, whatever they might do on the mainland of Asia.

Recently, however, Canberra has been taking a much more serious view of Asian Communist policies, and the main reason for this has been the development of the situation in Indonesia. The mainland of Asia may be far away, but Java, Timor and New Guinea are not. It was from this island chain that the Japanese threatened Australia a dozen years ago, and it is now realized that internal subversion could make it once more a frontier of menace even without a direct military conquest by a stronger Asian power. The earlier Australian sympathy for Indonesian nationalism has largely evaporated; the spectacle of a government leaning heavily on Communist support to maintain its domestic ascendancy, indulging in rabid anti-Western propaganda to divert attention from its economic failures, and stridently demanding possession of Western New Guinea when it is unable to maintain order in its own scattered territory, fills Australian observers with misgivings for the future. One of the great advantages of the Manila Treaty from an Australian point of view is that the combination of states for the collective defense of Southeast Asia may be expected to have a steadying effect on Indonesia, even though the latter remains outside the alliance.

Australian foreign policy may vary to some extent in accordance with developments in domestic politics, but it is unlikely that the return of the Labor Party to power would radically alter the current official preoccupation with the long-term threat to Australia from the course of events in the Far East. The tendency of Australian Far Eastern policy is to follow a path intermediate between the British and the American. Australia does not share in the American commitments to Japan, South Korea or Formosa and does not yet show any great enthusiasm for the revival of Japan; on the other hand, it cannot afford to take the risks Britain may be inclined to take in speculating on a benevolent heart behind the grim visage of Communist China. This is not a matter of ideology, but of geography. Sir Winston Churchill in his memoirs, speaking of the crisis of 1942, has to admit that "whereas the advance of Japan could make no difference to the

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safety of the British Isles, it confronted Australia with a mortal danger." The same principle applies to the new menace from Peking. Ultimately British policy must be determined by European priorities and Australian by Pacific priorities; in the last resort Britain can regard Southeast Asia as expendable, but Australia cannot.

At the last Commonwealth Conference the four members who are signatories of the Manila Treaty, that is to say Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan, consulted together on Southeast Asian affairs preparatory to the SEATO conference to be held in Bangkok, but only the first three took part in a discussion on the defense of Malaya. Pakistan does not wish even to appear to be supporting what is still essentially a colonial régime; her own stake in SEATO is the security of the territory of East Pakistan, which would be threatened by Communist ascendancy in Burma —which in turn would be the almost certain consequence of a Communist conquest of Siam, quite apart from the possibility of direct pressure and infiltration from China. Malaya has no common frontier with China and could not be attacked overland unless Siam had been first overcome; it presents, however, a political problem of the greatest difficulty. As long as it remains under British sovereignty, it is an anomaly in a continent where all the major colonial régimes have now been liquidated and a most vulnerable target for Communist-guided anti-colonial propaganda; on the other hand, if British control is brought to an end, there is a real danger of Communist subversion through the Chinese element in Malaya. Singapore, the strategic pivot of the whole Southeast Asia region, is virtually a Chinese city. The problem of the future of Malaya has now indeed become one of the widest interest, and is no longer one simply of adjustment between the British Government and a colonial people advancing to independence. The two Pacific Dominions will henceforth insist on being consulted in any British decisions about Malaya, and the issue cannot be entirely separated from that of the British attitude towards the Chinese People's Republic.

While Pakistan is the only one of the Asian members of the Commonwealth to be a partner in SEATO, all three belong to the grouping known as the "Colombo Powers," which also includes Burma and Indonesia. This was originally designed in Delhi as the core of the neutral bloc which it has been the aim of Mr. Nehru's foreign policy to create, and Pakistan, by first accepting

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American military aid and then joining SEATO, has seriously disrupted the Nehruite solidarity. The policy of India herself, however, remains in sharp contrast to the purposes—or at least the estimates of international forces—which have led four members of the Commonwealth to take part in the scheme for collective security in Southeast Asia. Indian policy is the product of three main factors which have so far been operative without any lesson of experience sufficient to counteract their effects. The first is the determination since the achievement of national independence to have a completely independent foreign policy—a mood which implies separation from, though not antagonism towards, Britain. The second factor is the pacifism of the Gandhi tradition, which is a genuine element of great influence in Indian politics, however little it may seem to a cynical observer to determine Indian actions where Kashmir is concerned; India's political leader as the heir of Gandhi is not expected to renounce the use of force where India's own vital interests are concerned, but on the world stage he must be the peacemaker *par excellence,* the disinterested mediator between warring camps. Finally, there is the continuing anti-imperialist sentiment which sees all Western intervention in Asia, even to sustain the independence of weak states, as a revival of colonialism, and takes it for granted that any Asian country in conflict with a Western Power must be in the right. For such an outlook Communist China appears as a nation striving to rid herself finally of semi-colonial status and Peking's aggression in Korea as basically a defensive measure against foreign interference on the Asian mainland. The conviction that Communist China is not a disturber of the peace, but the innocent victim of American warmongering, remains deeply rooted in the Indian mind.

Nehruite neutralism, which is continually leaning over sideways to give the benefit of the doubt to the Marxist-Leninists of the new China, is almost more exasperating to Americans than the straightforward hostility of states which have been gathered into the Communist bloc. The British attitude, however, is much more tolerant. Britain does not, indeed, hesitate on occasion to disregard Mr. Nehru's admonitions and rebukes, as when she joined in the creation of SEATO in spite of Delhi's view that it would be a provocation of the Chinese People's Republic. The British well understand India's dislike of any policy which looks like following in the wake of the Western Powers, and know that

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any kind of pressure on India would only defeat its own purpose. They are more than satisfied with the happy condition of Indo-British relations since independence and are unwilling to do anything that might put an excessive strain on them. They are convinced that the Congress régime in India will in the long run be resistant to Communism and that it will learn from experience if, contrary to Indian expectations and assurances from Peking, Communist China does make further forward moves in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile it is expedient to listen to the Indian Prime Minister's sermons without showing irritation and to make the most of the channels of contact and information which are made available by India's friendship with the People's Republic.

There have recently, in fact, been signs that India is becoming uneasy at the activity of international Communism in Asia, including its militant advance within India herself. The Communist bid for power in the Andhra elections has driven the Congress Party for the first time to drop the pretense that Indian Communism is a purely internal affair and to denounce it as an instrument of foreign Powers, even though this means the introduction of a jarring note into the professed harmony of Indian relations with the Communist world. A suspicion that the new China may not be quite as innocuous as she is made out to be keeps on finding expression in India in spite of the prevalence of the orthodox view that Americans are always in the wrong. Such a suspicion would indeed be alarming in view of India's relative weakness, aggravated by the unresolved conflict with Pakistan, for taking any counter-action to protect the lands which lie east of India and south of China. Fortunately, however, the Western imperialists have not hesitated to provoke the Chinese People's Republic by setting up roadblocks in Southeast Asia, and India is thus in the happy position of having her eastern approaches protected without being required to make any contribution to the common defense.

As a result of the Manila Treaty, Mr. Nehru is now able to denounce the disturbance to the peace of Asia caused by the defensive measures of the SEATO Powers—than which nothing can be more popular with Indian audiences—without having to worry lest Thailand be one day snatched into the Communist orbit without anyone lifting a finger to prevent it. The advantage to India in a security system which is officially condemned may go far to explain Mr. Nehru's good humor and cheerful confidence

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on his visit to London. Far from being an element of discord and recrimination in a gathering where most of the other participants were involved in those arrangements for checking Communist aggression which India professes to regard as superfluous, if not actively harmful, Mr. Nehru appeared entirely at his ease and entered fully into the discussion of the international situation.

The public statement issued after the conference in London inevitably contained much of the noncommittal verbiage to be expected in such documents, but in view of the diversity of policies represented the extent of agreement revealed was impressive. On the general situation vis-à-vis the Communist bloc, the communiqué was able to announce that the representatives of Commonwealth countries concerned in regional defense plans

> agreed that the overwhelming superiority of the Western Powers in nuclear weapons offers at the present time the most effective and practical assurance that world peace will not be disturbed by any deliberate act of aggression. They agreed that their defense policies should be founded on the principle that world war can be prevented if the free democracies are resolved to maintain in readiness forces sufficiently strong to deter any potential aggressor.

The statement went on to relate that defense policies in Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia were reviewed by the countries concerned. This means Britain and Canada, as NATO members, so far as Europe is concerned; the four signatories of the Manila Treaty so far as Southeast Asia is concerned; and members of both groups for the Middle East, as the region through which pass the main air and sea communications between them. The Commonwealth, indeed, is coming more and more to be divided into an Atlantic group of countries comprising Britain herself, Canada and, marginally, South Africa, and an Indo-Pacific group including Australia, New Zealand and the three Asian Commonwealth members. The two groups are linked together primarily by Britain's continuing presence as a Power in the Indian Ocean. British naval and air strength could provide invaluable help in case of need to any of the five Commonwealth partners in the Indo-Pacific region. But power depends on bases, and as the process of decolonization leaves Britain without suitable territories under her own full sovereignty, the interlocking of the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific defense systems becomes conditional on agreements for the maintenance of bases similar to those which assure American reinforcement for the defense of Western Europe.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

TWO MINUTES TILL MIDNIGHT. By ELMER DAVIS. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955, 207 p. $2.75.

In a distinctly grim but steadfast mood Mr. Davis faces, without flinching, the threat of a thermonuclear dénouement to the present international crisis. This, for all its horrors, must be preferred to abdication or surrender.

COMMON SENSE AND WORLD AFFAIRS. By DOROTHY FOSDICK. New York: Harcourt, 1955, 207 p. $3.50.

The author, formerly a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, interprets briefly the primary principles of an American foreign policy to avert the disasters of war and Communist predominance.

AMERICAN STRATEGY IN THE ATOMIC AGE. By COLONEL GEORGE C. REINHARDT. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955, 236 p. $3.75.

In this thoughtful essay and prescription Colonel Reinhardt wrestles with the problem of how to "devise a strategic policy that can both support a progressive political concept and be at the same time militarily sound."

POLITICAL WARFARE: A GUIDE TO COMPETITIVE COEXISTENCE. By JOHN SCOTT. New York: Day, 1955, 256 p. $3.75.

While the principal concerns of this book are the policies and actions which should be developed for keeping the United States on the narrow path of "competitive coexistence" it is also a useful handbook of political warfare techniques. The author rejects preventive war and isolationism as well as purely passive defense.

DESTIN DU XX^{e} SIÈCLE. By JULIAN GORKIN. Paris: Les Iles d'Or, 1954, 301 p. Fr. 600.

A Spanish ex-Communist writes on the problem of coexistence vs. permanent war and urges that the nature of the Soviet régime makes coexistence a delusion.

ADMIRAL AMBASSADOR TO RUSSIA. By ADMIRAL WILLIAM H. STANDLEY AND REAR ADMIRAL ARTHUR A. AGETON. Chicago: Regnery, 1955, 533 p. $6.00.

The greater part of Admiral Standley's memoirs is devoted to his years as American Ambassador in Moscow, from April 1942 to October 1943. While most of the story is familiar by now the book provides some useful additional insights into our wartime relations with the Soviet Union and especially into the Ambassador's efforts to have American aid to the Soviet Union appropriately recognized.

ALERTE! By JULES MOCH. Paris: Laffont, 1954, 298 p. Fr. 690.

An extensive exposition and critique of the E.D.C., based on a report prepared for the Foreign Affairs Commission of the French National Assembly.

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RÉARMEMENT ALLEMAND ET DÉFENSE OCCIDENTALE. By General X. Paris: Quillet, 1954, 309 p. Fr. 550.

A French criticism, largely in military terms, of the E.D.C. concept and of a truncated Germany's participation therein.

LA NOUVELLE ARMÉE ALLEMANDE EST LÀ. By Alexis Dormont. Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1954, 220 p. Fr. 570.

A survey of the various armed forces already in existence in the Soviet Zone of Germany.

MARXISM: PAST AND PRESENT. By R. N. Carew Hunt. New York: Macmillan, 1954, 180 p. $2.75.

A useful introduction and appraisal by the author of "The Theory and Practice of Communism."

THE COMMUNIST THEORY OF LAW. By Hans Kelsen. New York: Praeger, 1955, 203 p. $5.00.

A critical analysis, by a leading jurist, of the Communist theory of law, especially its anti-normative approach to legal and social relations.

WAR OF WITS: THE ANATOMY OF ESPIONAGE AND INTELLIGENCE. By Ladislas Farago. New York: Funk, 1954, 379 p. $5.00.

SPIES AT WORK. By Ronald Seth. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954, 234 p. $4.75.

Two popular works on the gentle art of espionage. The first deals usefully and seriously with contemporary intelligence activities; the second with some notable spies in history.

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES. By H. C. Allen. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955, 1024 p. $10.00.

A very substantial and extensive review of Anglo-American relations. After attempting to characterize the relationship, the author, who occupies the chair of American History at the University of London, provides a historical survey from the time of the American Revolution. The last 300 pages are concerned with the years since the First World War.

UN: THE FIRST TEN YEARS. By Clark M. Eichelberger. New York: Harper, 1955, 108 p. $1.75.

A brief survey and assessment by one of the contributors to the first American draft of the U.N. Charter.

DIE ZWANGSARBEIT IM FRIEDENSVÖLKERRECHT. By Hartwig Bülck. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1953, 227 p. DM. 19.80.

A juridical study of the efforts to make freedom from slavery or forced labor an internationally recognized human right.

FEDERALISM MATURE AND EMERGENT. Edited by Arthur W. MacMahon. Garden City: Doubleday, 1955, 557 p. $7.50.

This volume, the product of one of the Columbia University Bicentennial Conferences, develops the theme of federalism in its theory and application. One section is devoted to supranational union in Western Europe.

REVOLUTION OF THE LONELY. By P. J. Bouman. London: McGraw-Hill, 1954, 437 p. 17/6.

A cinematic and symbolically inclined reconstruction of world history since the death of Queen Victoria. Apparently very well received in the original Dutch version.

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POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1955, 230 p. $3.75.

The new edition of a standard reference book, brought up to date as of January 1, 1955; gives the composition of governments of all countries, summarizes party programs and lists newspapers with their political affiliations and editors.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

THE REVOLUTION IN WORLD TRADE. By Samuel Lubell. New York: Harper, 1955, 143 p. $2.50.

Mr. Lubell, an able journalist and author of "The Future of American Politics," here examines, or rather reëxamines, American trade relations with the rest of the world. Among other points he strongly expresses his doubt that tariff reduction and the elimination of trade restrictions are the nostrums they are usually said to be.

POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS. Edited by Kenneth K. Kurihara. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1954, 442 p. $8.50.

A number of authors contribute articles, the general purpose of which is to extend Keynes' "General Theory" in the fields of monetary theory, economic fluctuation and growth, and aggregative economics.

MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION AND THEIR REGULATION. Edited by Edward H. Chamberlin. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954, 548 p. $7.50.

A stimulating international symposium of papers, prepared under the auspices of the International Economic Association, and dealing with the theoretical and practical problems of monopoly in the various Western countries.

INTERNATIONALE EISEN- UND STAHLKARTELLE. By Günther Kiersch. Essen: Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, 1954, 224 p. DM. 11.

An analysis, with numerous statistics, of the international iron and steel cartels during the inter-war years.

LES RÉPARATIONS ALLEMANDES: DEUX EXPÉRIENCES, 1919–1932, 1945–1952. By Richard Castillon. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1953, 197 p. Fr. 850.

A doctoral dissertation comparing the principles, practices and results of the German reparations question after the First and the Second World Wars.

LES ASPECTS FINANCIERS, FISCAUX ET BUDGÉTAIRES DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DES PAYS SOUS-DÉVELOPPÉS. The Hague: Van Stockum, 1953, 274 p. Florins 12.50.

Reports at the seventh session of the International Institute of Public Finance.

HISTOIRE DU MOUVEMENT OUVRIER. VOLUME III: DE 1921 À NOS JOURS. By Édouard Dolléans. Paris: Colin, 1953, 424 p. Fr. 1100.

The third volume of this important history of the labor movement, primarily in Western Europe and the United States, covers the period from 1921 to the early postwar years.

ÉTUDES EUROPÉENNES DE POPULATION. Paris: Éditions de l'Institut National d'Études Démographiques, 1954, 438 p. Fr. 1000.

A symposium of essays on manpower, employment and migrations.

POPULATION PROBLEMS. By Warren S. Thompson. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953, 488 p. $6.50.

An able general text, first appearing in 1942 but largely rewritten.

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NATIONAL MINORITIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM. By Inis L. Claude, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955, 248 p. $4.50.

A study of national minorities as a problem in international relations before, during and after the Second World War. As the author remarks, this subject has been relatively little discussed in recent years but it remains of troublesome importance.

STUDIES IN THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF "THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY." Edited by Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1954, 279 p. $4.50.

Six essays, in part an extension, in part a critique, of the methodology and findings of "The Authoritarian Personality," which appeared in 1950.

The Second World War

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. SPECIAL STUDIES: THE WOMEN'S ARMY CORPS. By Mattie E. Treadwell. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1954, 841 p. $6.25.

An extensive history of the WAC, a volume in the official series, dealing at considerable and useful length with the misunderstandings that arose in the course of introducing a women's corps into the Army.

THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II. VOLUME SIX: MEN AND PLANES. Edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955, 807 p. $8.50.

This volume in the official history deals with the "Zone of the Interior"—the development of the air organization, the creation and distribution of weapons and the recruitment and training of airmen.

ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY. By Husband E. Kimmel. Chicago: Regnery, 1955, 206 p. $3.75.

Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet at the time of Pearl Harbor, presents his side of the story in the long-standing debate over the responsibility for the U. S. failure to be prepared for the Japanese attack.

GREECE, CRETE AND SYRIA. By Gavin Long. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1953, 587 p. 25/. (London: Angus and Robertson.)

An official history of the Australian participation in the Greek, Cretan and Syrian campaigns of 1941.

LA CAMPAGNE D'ITALIE, 1943–1945. By Robert Jars. Paris: Payot, 1954, 244 p. Fr. 950.

A brief survey of the Italian campaign from the invasion of Sicily.

The United States

THE ROOSEVELT LEADERSHIP, 1933–1945. By Edgar Eugene Robinson. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1955, 491 p. $6.00.

A cool, conscientious but on the whole unfavorable and unsympathetic appraisal of Roosevelt's administration: good intentions but undiscriminating means which led to dangerous consequences at home and abroad. The author is professor of history at Stanford University.

A FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. By Clarence B. Randall. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954, 83 p. $1.95.

A concise, personal statement on the requirements for a liberal United States

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policy, by the Chairman of the Board of the Inland Steel Company and Special Consultant to the President on Foreign Economic Policy.

GOVERNMENT AND SCIENCE: THEIR DYNAMIC RELATION IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. By Don K. Price. New York: New York University Press, 1954, 203 p. $3.75.

In these lectures, Mr. Price, formerly Deputy Chairman of the Research and Development Board of the Department of Defense, discusses with much insight the increasingly complex relationship between independent scientific research, governmental support and American national security requirements.

COMMUNISM, CONFORMITY, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: A CROSS-SECTION OF THE NATION SPEAKS ITS MIND. By Samuel A. Stouffer. Garden City: Doubleday, 1955, 278 p. $4.00.

The results of an extensive and illuminating attitude survey, taken in the summer of 1954 and dealing with people's feelings toward Communists and civil liberties. The grimness of the national mood toward Communism is unmistakable.

AMERICA'S RISE TO WORLD POWER, 1898–1954. By Foster Rhea Dulles. New York: Harper, 1955, 314 p. $5.00.

In this volume in The New American Nations Series, Mr. Dulles, Chairman of the History Department at Ohio State University, follows the important if changing debate in U. S. foreign policy between "isolationism" and "internationalism" in the first half of the twentieth century. A useful, balanced, general survey.

A HISTORY OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY. By Julius W. Pratt. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1955, 808 p. $6.95.

An extensive general survey of United States diplomatic history since the American Revolution, including an introductory section on the tools and processes of foreign policy.

DECISION FOR WAR, 1917: THE LACONIA SINKING AND THE ZIMMERMANN TELEGRAM AS KEY FACTORS IN THE PUBLIC REACTION AGAINST GERMANY. By Samuel R. Spencer, Jr. Rindge (N. H.): R. R. Smith, 1953, 109 p. $2.50.

A brief monograph on two episodes leading to the American entry into World War I.

THE AMERICAN STORY. By Garet Garrett. Chicago: Regnery, 1955, 401 p. $5.00.

A quite personal summary of American history, in which the dominant trends of recent decades are viewed with marked disapproval.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. Edited by Alfred H. Kelly. Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1954, 126 p. $3.50.

Five lectures on various aspects of American foreign policy, by Quincy Wright, Col. G. A. Lincoln, William J. Bossenbrook, Dexter Perkins and Alfred H. Kelly.

CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA. By Clinton Rossiter. New York: Knopf, 1955, 326 p. $4.00.

An intelligent and composed examination, by a professor of government at Cornell, of the American brand of conservatism—its historical roots and the quite wide range of its contemporary manifestations.

ROAD TO THE RIGHT. By Gordon Harrison. New York: Morrow, 1954, 342 p. $4.50.

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The particular theme and emphasis of this contribution to the rapidly growing library on American conservatism is indicated in the author's opening sentence: "To write about conservative politics in America is to chronicle the political performance of American business."

THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA. By Louis Hartz. New York: Harcourt, 1955, 329 p. $4.75.

The leading concept of this thoughtful study is that the American political tradition differs markedly from that of Europe in not having an "ancien régime" to contend with. In consequence we have had neither a truly aristocratic political tradition, nor a real Socialist tradition. As a nation we have been Lockians from the outset.

LES QUARANTE-HUIT AMÉRIQUES. By Raymond Cartier. Paris: Plon, 1953, 456 p. Fr. 990.

An interesting state-by-state description by a French observer. Occasionally awry in his facts—Jimmy Walker and Johnny Walker are confused—the author has nonetheless brought together a great deal of information to illustrate the variety of American life.

DIE ENTDECKUNG AMERIKAS ANNO 1953, ODER DAS GEORDNETE CHAOS. By L. L. Matthias. Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1953, 355 p. DM. 11.80.

A thoroughly unfavorable, unpleasant and distorted view of American life, culture and politics.

BEHIND THE PRESIDENT: A STUDY OF EXECUTIVE OFFICE AGENCIES. By Edward H. Hobbs. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1954, 248 p. $4.50.

A useful study of the background and functions of such agencies as the Bureau of the Budget, National Resources Planning Board, National Security Council and Council of Economic Advisers.

THE GREAT CRASH, 1929. By John Kenneth Galbraith. Boston: Houghton, 1955, 212 p. $3.00.

A professor of economics at Harvard writes wittily—and he has many sitting targets—of the events leading up to and immediately following the stock market crash of the autumn of 1929. Seeking to keep fresh the "immunizing memory" of that experience, he goes after a number of legends which have sprung up to soften the recollection of the blow.

THE ECONOMICS OF RECESSION AND REVIVAL. By Kenneth D. Roose. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954, 280 p. $4.00.

A detailed examination, using the tools of national income analysis, of the recession and revival of 1937–1938: its causes and the effectiveness of the instruments employed to control it.

THE WESTERN PUBLIC, 1952 AND BEYOND. By Alfred De Grazia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954, 226 p. $3.00.

A study, based on the 1952 elections, of the particular, and in some respects peculiar, political attitudes and voting behavior of the 11 Western states.

SPANISH-SPEAKING GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES. By John H. Burma. Durham (N. C.): Duke University Press, 1954, 214 p. $4.00.

A study of the very disparate groups in the United States having Spanish as their mother tongue—the long-settled Hispanos of New Mexico and southern Colorado, the Mexican immigrants, the Filipino Americans and the Puerto Ricans.

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WITHIN THESE BORDERS. By John R. Scotford. New York: Friendship Press, 1953, 151 p. $2.00.

A rather sketchy survey of the Spanish-speaking peoples in the United States.

Western Europe

L'INTÉGRATION ÉCONOMIQUE, SOLUTION DE LA CRISE DE L'EUROPE? By Dušan Lukač. Geneva: Droz, 1953, 175 p. Swiss Fr. 10.

After examining Europe's outstanding economic problems the author concludes that the efforts at "economic integration" show little prospect of providing any real solution.

THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY. By D. G. Valentine. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1955, 273 p. Guilders 12.50.

Primarily a legal analysis of the 24 articles of the Treaty that grant jurisdiction to the Court.

DIE EUROPÄISCHE NATION. By Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1953, 163 p. DM. 9.60.

On the background and prospects of the Paneuropa movement, by a long-standing proponent.

LA GUERRE DES PAPILLONS: QUATRE ANS DE POLITIQUE COMMUNISTE (1940–1944). By A. Rossi. Paris: Les Iles d'Or, 1954, 332 p. Fr. 990.

The author, who has already contributed to our knowledge of the French Communist Party in the early war years, here examines their policy over the four years from the Armistice to Liberation. Based very largely on the clandestine press, posters, slogans, orders of the day, etc.

LE CONFLIT ENTRE LA DROITE ET LA GAUCHE DANS LE CATHOLICISME FRANÇAIS, 1830–1953. By Michel Darbon. Toulouse: Privat, 1953, 296 p. Fr. 590.

A discussion of the political rift which has split French Catholicism for over a century.

MÉMOIRES. VOLUME I: IDÉAL VÉCU. By General Weygand. Paris: Flammarion, 1953, 650 p. Fr. 975.

This first volume of General Weygand's memoirs covers his career through the end of the First World War.

LES DERNIERS PROPOS DE PIERRE LAVAL. By Yves-Frédéric Jaffré. Paris: Bonne, 1953, 318 p. Fr. 650.

One of Laval's attorneys reports on conversations with his client during the latter's last months in prison.

CHARLES GIDE. By A. Lavondès. Uzès (Gard): Capitelle, 1953, 265 p. Fr. 550.

A biography in homage to the late French economist.

SALAIRES ET REVENDICATIONS SOCIALES EN FRANCE, 1944–1952. By J.-L. Guglielmi and M. Perrot. Paris: Colin, 1953, 248 p. Fr. 1000.

A study of wages, wage demands and accompanying trade-union activities in France since the Liberation.

ZUR GESCHICHTE DES FRANZÖSISCHEN SYNDIKALISMUS. By Eugen Naef. Zurich: Europa Verlag, 1953, 250 p. Swiss Fr. 10.50.

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An analysis of the intellectual and political forces informing French trade unionism in the present century.

L'INFLATION FRANÇAISE D'APRÈS GUERRE, 1945–1949. By Jacques Le Bourva. Paris: Colin, 1953, 381 p. Fr. 1500.

A theoretical and technical analysis.

LE PLAN MONNET EST-IL UNE RÉUSSITE? By Gabriel Taïx. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1953, 160 p. Fr. 480.

A critical and unfavorable appraisal of the Monnet Plan.

PREMIERS ÉLÉMENTS D'UNE COMPTABILITÉ NATIONALE DE LA BELGIQUE: 1948–1951. Brussels: Institut de Sociologie Solvay, 1953, 209 p. Fr. 250.

A study, using methods of macroeconomic analysis, of the Belgian G.N.P., national income, public and private consumption, capital formation and savings for the years 1948–51.

GEGEN DEN STROM: MEMOIREN EINES EUROPÄISCHEN SOZIALISTEN. By Hendrik de Man. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1953, 291 p. DM. 12.50.

Posthumously published memoirs of the Belgian Socialist, politician and scholar, who died in June 1953.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF SWITZERLAND. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954, 223 p. $4.00.

A translation and commentary by Christopher Hughes; includes a translation of the law of 1902 on the relations between the legislative councils and the executive.

MODERN GERMANY: ITS HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION. By Koppel S. Pinson. New York: Macmillan, 1954, 637 p. $10.00.

A useful and competent general history, from the late eighteenth century to the present.

LE VOISIN ALLEMAND. By H.-J. Duteil. Paris: Bonne, 1953, 322 p. Fr. 660.

A perceptive survey of life in contemporary West Germany by an able French journalist.

GERMANY'S COMEBACK IN THE WORLD MARKET. By Ludwig Erhard. New York: Macmillan, 1954, 276 p. $4.50.

A translation of "Deutschlands Rückkehr zum Weltmarkt," noted here July 1954.

PANZER AM POTSDAMER PLATZ. By Arno Scholz and Others. Berlin: Arani, 1954, 221 p. DM. 11.80.

A reconstruction, with numerous illustrations, of the workers' uprising in the Soviet Zone on June 17, 1953.

BERLIN IM WÜRGEGRIFF. By Arno Scholz. Berlin: Arani, 1953, 559 p. DM. 22.

Lead articles by the editor of the Berlin *Telegraf* over the years 1950–52.

THE THIRD REICH. Edited by Maurice Baumont, John H. E. Fried and Edmond Vermeil. New York: Praeger, 1955, 910 p. $9.00.

A massive international symposium by many prominent scholars on the philosophical antecedents, political and historical background, morphology and dynamics of National Socialism. A valuable, if inevitably uneven, contribution to the subject. The work was published under the auspices of the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies and with the assistance of UNESCO.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TYCOONS AND TYRANT: GERMAN INDUSTRY FROM HITLER TO ADENAUER. By Louis P. Lochner. Chicago: Regnery, 1954, 304 p. $5.00.

Mr. Lochner finds the German industrialists guilty perhaps of sins of omission, but not, with very few exceptions, active partners in Hitler's rise to power or in his plans for war.

STRESEMANN AND THE REARMAMENT OF GERMANY. By Hans W. Gatzke. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1954, 132 p. $3.00.

The author of "Germany's Drive to the West" here analyzes with skill and authority the significant problem of Stresemann's relation to the clandestine rearmament of Germany in the 1920's. A very useful contribution.

UM DES TEUFELS HANDSCHRIFT. By Paul Rohrbach. Hamburg: Dulk, 1953, 518 p. DM. 15.80.

Memoirs extending over the years since the beginning of the Wilhelmian era, with a good deal of emphasis on Germany's overseas and colonial interests.

HINDENBURG: EIN LEBENSBILD. By Walter Görlitz. Bonn: Athenaeum, 1953, 438 p. DM. 16.80.

An extensive, interesting but not outstanding biography.

THEODOR HEUSS: EIN LEBENSBILD. By Hans-Heinrich Welchert. Bonn: Athenaeum, 1953, 231 p. DM. 7.80.

A brief biography of the *Bundespräsident*.

DIE ENTSTEHUNG DER CDU UND DIE WIEDERGRÜNDUNG DES ZENTRUMS IN JAHRE 1945. By Hans Georg Wieck. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1953, 247 p. DM. 12.80.

This second book in a German series treating the history of parliamentarianism and political parties deals with the formation of the Christlich-Demokratische Union and the Deutsche Zentrumspartei after the Second World War. Well documented.

GESCHICHTE DER CHRISTLICHEN PARTEIEN IN DEUTSCHLAND. By Karl Buchheim. Munich: Kösel, 1953, 466 p. DM. 14.50.

A history of Christian parties and movements—Catholic, Protestant and Christian Social—in German politics since the *Vormärz*.

DIE HÖHEREN DIENSTSTELLEN DER DEUTSCHEN WEHRMACHT 1933–1945. Edited by Fritz Frhr. von Siegler. Munich: Institut für Zeitgeschichte, 1953, 155 p. DM. 7.80.

A useful reference book on the organization and personnel of the higher commands of the Wehrmacht during the Nazi régime and in the Second World War.

ÖSTERREICHS SENDUNG IM DONAURAUM. By Eduard Ludwig. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1954, 356 p. Schillings 60.

A brief history of Austrian domestic and foreign policy from the founding of the republic after the First World War to the Raab Ministry in 1953.

CARTEGGIO. V: DOPOGUERRA E FASCISMO (1919–22). By Filippo Turati and Anna Kuliscioff. Turin: Einaudi, 1953, 621 p. L. 3500.

This is the fifth volume, but the first to be published, of a proposed six-volume edition of the correspondence of the Italian Socialists Turati and Anna Kuliscioff in the period 1898–1925.

CONVERSANDO CON TOGLIATTI. By Marcella and Maurizio Ferrara. Rome: Edizioni di Cultura Sociale, 1954, 391 p. L. 800.

An informal but approved biography of the Italian Communist leader, based in large part on conversations with him.

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LO STATO INDUSTRIALE. By Ernesto Rossi. Bari: Laterza, 1953, 150 p. L. 700.

A monograph on the problem of Italian industrialization, with special reference to the Istituto di Ricostruzione Industriale.

DAS STAATSANGEHÖRIGKEITSRECHT VON SPANIEN, PORTUGAL UND IRLAND. By Karl-Alexander Hampe. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1954, 123 p. DM. 9.20.

On the law of nationality in Spain, Portugal and Ireland—one of a series of volumes on this subject.

Eastern Europe

AMERICAN IN RUSSIA. By Harrison E. Salisbury. New York: Harper, 1955, 328 p. $4.00.

Mr. Salisbury, who was *New York Times* correspondent in Moscow from 1949 to 1954, here reports on his experiences and observations in those years. While his interpretations of certain political events and developments have been questioned by other Soviet specialists, the book has an abundance of interesting information, much of it first hand.

FACE OF A VICTIM. By Elizabeth Lermolo. New York: Harper, 1955, 311 p. $3.75.

The memories of one of Stalin's countless innocent victims of the 1930's who lived to tell the story of her prison life. The narrative is interspersed with bits of information about other inmates whom the author met or heard about.

LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN SOVIET AND AMERICAN INDUSTRY. By Walter Galenson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955, 273 p. $5.50.

The study, based largely on extensive research in Soviet sources, estimates prewar trends of labor productivity in a number of Soviet industries; compares their levels with corresponding industries in the United States; and makes some interesting conjectures regarding underlying factors and future trends. The book is well documented, and is a handy reference for data previously unavailable to readers who do not command Russian.

THE FORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION: COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM, 1917–1923. By Richard Pipes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954, 355 p. $6.50.

An analysis, one of the studies under the auspices of the Russian Research Center at Harvard, of the rôle played by the national question in the Russian Revolution, especially in the Ukraine and Belorussia, the Moslem borderlands and the Caucasus, in the years between 1917 and 1923.

TWO STUDIES IN SOVIET CONTROLS. By Herbert S. Dinerstein and Leon Gouré. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1955, 254 p. $4.50.

In these two case studies of the Soviet control apparatus in action, the first ("Communism and the Russian Peasant," by Mr. Dinerstein) discusses Communist controls over the Russian peasantry, the second ("Moscow in Crisis," by Mr. Gouré and Mr. Dinerstein), the problem of maintaining control in Moscow during the German approach to the city in the fall of 1941.

L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE. By Wolfgang Leonhard. Paris: Éditions du Fuseau, 1953, 229 p. Fr. 480.

A blast at the Soviet régime by a wartime broadcaster for the German National Committee, who broke with Moscow in 1949.

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TABLEAU DE LA RUSSIE JUSQU'À LA MORT DE STALINE. By Gabriel Louis Jaray. Paris: Plon, 1954, 450 p. Fr. 1500.

A general survey of Soviet Russia in the Stalin era—economic development, domestic and foreign policy, regional and national problems.

ZWISCHENEUROPA: VON DER OSTSEE BIS ZUR ADRIA. TEIL I: POLEN, TSCHECHOSLOWAKEI, UNGARN. By Otto Forst de Battaglia. Frankfurt/Main: Frankfurter Hefte, 1954, 438 p. DM. 19.80.

Aside from the author's nostalgia for the Habsburg Monarchy whose downfall started it all, this is a dispassionate review of the history of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, especially since 1945. Much information, most of it familiar, some of it inaccurate, is amassed and presented in a somewhat disorganized fashion.

SATELLITE GENERALS. By Ithiel de Sola Pool. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955, 165 p. $1.75.

This volume in the Elites Series of the Hoover Institute Studies is a rather uneven survey of the development of military elites under Communist rule in Eastern Europe and China.

HISTORY OF MODERN SLOVAKIA. By Jozef Lettrich. New York: Praeger, 1955, 329 p. $5.00.

A readable and on the whole objective account of Slovak politics since World War I, by the former chairman of the Slovak Democratic Party who is now in exile.

SATELLITE AGRICULTURE IN CRISIS. New York: Praeger, 1954, 130 p. $2.50.

A useful if unevenly evaluated collection of data on the progress and the vicissitudes of Communist land policy in the East European satellites.

DER TRIEST-KONFLIKT UND DIE ITALIENISCH-JUGOSLAWISCHE FRAGE. By Walter Hildebrandt. Göttingen: Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Osteuropaforschung, 1953, 127 p. DM. 12.

A brief monograph on the Trieste conflict, primarily in the decade 1943–1953.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

BRITISH POLITICAL PARTIES. By R. T. McKenzie. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955, 623 p. $7.50.

In this important book, Mr. McKenzie investigates the British party system, and more particularly the distribution of power within the Conservative and Labor Parties and the functioning of the party machines. An exceptionally valuable piece of exposition and analysis.

GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT. By Herbert Morrison. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954, 363 p. $3.40.

A valuable and really inside view of the workings of British parliamentary government. While the table of contents would suggest a formidable treatise, Mr. Morrison's ebullient presence is felt throughout the book.

A CONCISE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF BRITAIN: FROM 1750 TO RECENT TIMES. By W. H. B. Court. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954, 368 p. $4.00.

An able reëxamination of the course of the industrial revolution in Britain in the light of recent historical research and new tools of economic analysis. The volume was prepared as a sequel to the late Sir John Clapham's economic history, which went only to 1750.

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POWER IN TRADE UNIONS. By V. L. Allen. New York: Longmans, 1954, 323 p. $5.00.

A conscientious analysis of British trade union organization, constitutions and practices.

WAGES AND SALARIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1920–1938. By Agatha L. Chapman assisted by Rose Knight. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1953, 253 p. $9.50.

A volume in the series of studies in the national income and expenditure of the United Kingdom, being undertaken at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research in London and the Department of Applied Economics at Cambridge.

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE IN BRITAIN, 1939–45. By R. J. Hammond. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954, 246 p. $5.00.

This publication of the Food Research Institute at Stanford University analyzes the wartime management and control of food and agriculture in Britain.

A DIARY WITH LETTERS, 1931–1950. By Thomas Jones. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954, 582 p. $4.80.

Although Dr. Jones had officially retired from the Civil Service in 1930 he remained, as the book's jacket says, "friend and colleague of many famous people." These diaries and letters, largely for the 1930's, are quite revealing of a number of features of that disastrous decade.

THE FRENCH CANADIANS, 1760–1945. By Mason Wade. New York: Macmillan, 1955, 1136 p. $6.50.

A massive and comprehensive study, by an American historian of Scots and English antecedents and of Roman Catholic faith. In tracing the implications of "le fait français en Amérique" the author devotes the last 500 pages to the years since the outbreak of the First World War.

COMMUNISM AND DEMOCRACY IN AUSTRALIA. By Leicester Webb. New York: Praeger, 1955, 214 p. $5.00.

A survey of the 1951 referendum campaign which concerned the suppression of the Australian Communist Party and the removal of Communists from trade-union offices.

SAFETY LAST. By Lt.-Col. W. F. Stirling. London: Hollis, 1953, 251 p. 18/. (New York: British Book Centre, $4.00.)

Memories of an exceedingly active life, chiefly in the Near East and Balkans. Col. Stirling was, among other things, Lawrence's Chief-of-Staff in Arabia.

The Middle East

ATLAS OF ISLAMIC HISTORY. Compiled by Harry W. Hazard. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954, 49 p. $6.00.

A useful reference with brief accompanying text.

WITHIN THE TAURUS: A JOURNEY IN ASIATIC TURKEY. By Lord Kinross. New York: Morrow, 1955, 191 p. $4.00.

The report of a journey in 1950 as far as the Soviet frontiers of Asiatic Turkey.

FOR ZION'S SAKE. By Norman Bentwich. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1954, 329 p. $4.00.

A biography of the Jewish leader, Judah L. Magnes, first president of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

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South and Southeast Asia

SOUTH-EAST ASIA BETWEEN TWO WORLDS. By Tibor Mende. London: Turnstile Press, 1955, 338 p. 21/.

Mr. Mende, who has made a specialty of underdeveloped areas, here discusses the life and problems of Indonesia, Burma and Pakistan. Informative and containing some excellent first-hand reporting, the book concludes with the author's propositions and prescriptions. In the economic field he feels that the only alternatives open are planning by persuasion or planning by force; he hopes for the former.

AN AMERICAN IN INDIA. By Saunders Redding. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1954, 277 p. $3.50.

An account, by an American Negro, Professor of English at Hampton Institute, of a recent three-month lecture tour in India. Of interest for the light it sheds on the sources of anti-American feeling in that land.

LOCATION OF INDUSTRIES IN INDIA. By Tulsi Ram Sharma. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1954, 371 p. (New York: Heinman, $4.00.)

This revised edition of a work first appearing in 1946 takes account of post-partition changes and India's first Five Year Plan.

MAHATMA GANDHI. By Vincent Sheean. New York: Knopf, 1955, 204 p. $2.50.

A brief, simple and lucid account of Gandhi's life.

JINNAH: CREATOR OF PAKISTAN. By Hector Bolitho. New York: Macmillan, 1955, 244 p. $3.75.

Mr. Bolitho, whose forte is biographies of monarchs and heads of state, here tells the story of the lonely but commanding Moslem leader who was largely responsible for the creation of an independent Pakistan.

THE COMMUNIST STRUGGLE IN MALAYA. By Gene Z. Hanrahan. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954, 146 p. $2.00.

A valuable study of the strategy and tactics of the Communist movement in Malaya.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

WANTED: AN ASIAN POLICY. By Edwin O. Reischauer. New York: Knopf, 1955, 276 p. $3.75.

As he indicates by his title, Mr. Reischauer is primarily concerned with presenting the problems that confront American policy-makers in the Far East. He appropriately stresses what is going on in Asia and in the Asian mind, and while some of the policy conclusions toward which his analysis inclines require further debate, the book performs a welcome service in setting the terms for profitable consideration of this most thorny area of United States responsibility.

THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST CHINA. By W. W. Rostow and Others. Cambridge: Technology Press, and New York: Wiley, 1954, 379 p. $5.00.

This publication of the Center for International Studies at M.I.T. is the most comprehensive survey of Communist China to date. It examines in detail "the three great strategic factors likely to determine the future evolution of Chinese Communism—the interplay between the régime and the people, the Sino-Soviet alliance, and the Chinese economy." The authors conclude that a number of internal problems which confront Chinese leadership could, if not properly managed, lead to serious crisis for the Communist régime.

CHINA AND THE COLD WAR. By Michael Lindsay (Lord Lindsay of

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BIRKER). Melbourne: Melbourne University Press; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1955, 286 p. $3.75.

The author, who served as interpreter on the recent Attlee mission to China, reflects on his complete disillusionment with Chinese Communism. Developing the thesis that the Communist reliance on subjective truth makes it impossible for the Chinese leaders to calculate rationally the consequences of their deeds, he finds their actions best explained as irrational rather than as being simply in bad faith.

L'EXPÉRIENCE COMMUNISTE EN CHINE. By ROBERT MAGNENOZ. Paris: Les Iles d'Or, 1954, 306 p. Fr. 900.

The author, who has had long experience in China, reviews the ideological and political background of Chinese Communism: its relations with Russia, the creation of the new régime, the economic program, the intervention in Korea, and China's principal international and foreign problems. Thoroughly opposed to the régime, he has hopes that the Chinese people's disillusionment with the Communists since 1949 may promote a change in the future.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK: AN UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY. By EMILY HAHN. Garden City: Doubleday, 1955, 382 p. $5.00.

An informal but friendly biography, in which the Generalissimo emerges as a stiff and stubborn figure but more frequently in the right than in the wrong, which is more than Miss Hahn says of United States actions in Chinese affairs.

DAUGHTER OF THE KHANS. By LIANG YEN. New York: Norton, 1955, 285 p. $3.50.

The autobiography of the daughter of a Mongol family in China whose observations of the tumultuous 1920's and 1930's are to some extent those of an outsider, but not a Westerner.

U.S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA, 1950–1953. VOLUME I: THE PUSAN PERIMETER. By LYNN MONTROSS AND CAPTAIN NICHOLAS A. CANZONA. Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, Historical Branch, 1954, 271 p. $2.00.

The first of four volumes chronicling the Marines' participation in the Korean conflict.

CRUSADE IN ASIA: PHILIPPINE VICTORY. By CARLOS P. ROMULO. New York: Day, 1955, 309 p. $4.00.

General Romulo here recounts the story of the emergence of an independent Philippine state, the successful struggle against the Communist forces after the war, and the rather complex course of recent domestic Philippine politics.

THE FORMATION OF FEDERAL INDONESIA, 1945–1949. By A. ARTHUR SCHILLER. The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1955, 472 p. Florins 15.

A scholarly analysis, by a professor of law at Columbia University, of the background and structure of the federal state in Indonesia. Based on a trip to Indonesia in 1949 and on a wealth of documentation, much of it difficult to come by.

GEOGRAPHY OF THE NORTHLANDS. Edited by GEORGE H. T. KIMBLE AND DOROTHY GOOD. New York: American Geographical Society, and Wiley, 1955, 534 p. $10.50.

A number of specialists contribute to the physical, social and economic geography of the arctic and sub-arctic regions. Includes regional studies on Alaska, Canada, Greenland and Iceland, Northern Scandinavia and the U.S.S.R.

Africa

CAIRO TO CAPE TOWN. By REGINALD REYNOLDS. Garden City: Doubleday, 1955, 370 p. $5.00.

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A British writer's account of a journey through Africa in 1953; quite out of the ordinary run for its perceptiveness and its ability to get down to bedrock.

MIRAGE OF AFRICA. By Alan Houghton Brodrick. London: Hutchinson, 1953, 212 p. 18/.

A very readable account of a trip from the Mediterranean across the Sahara to Lake Chad and back to Tunisia. Little of politics.

MAROC ET TUNISIE. Paris: La Nef (Julliard), 1953, 224 p. Fr. 480.

A symposium of articles, appearing in a special issue of *La Nef*, dealing with various current problems in Morocco and Tunisia.

NORDAFRIKA FINDET KEINEN FRIEDEN. By Kurt Neher. Ulm-Donau: Knorr, 1953, 295 p. DM. 12.80.

A report on a journey through the area once the scene of battles of the Afrika-korps.

THE HEART OF AFRICA. By Alexander Campbell. New York: Knopf, 1954, 487 p. $5.00.

A personal but serious and informative report on Africa south of the Sahara, which pays much attention to the deteriorating state of native-white relations.

LA FRANCE ET LES NOIRS. By Jean Guéhenno. Paris: Gallimard, 1954, 141 p. Fr. 290.

A French writer's account of a tour through Senegal and the Ivory Coast in 1953.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TRIBAL CHANGE: A STUDY OF IMMIGRANT LABOUR IN BUGANDA. Edited by Audrey I. Richards. Cambridge (Eng.): Heffer (for the East African Institute of Social Research), 1954, 301 p. 30/.

A study of the immigration of labor into Buganda, in southern Uganda, and its economic and social effects.

Latin America and the West Indies

HANDBOOK OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES: 1950. Edited by Francisco Aguilera. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1953, 332 p. $7.50.

HANDBOOK OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES: 1951. Edited by Francisco Aguilera. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1954, 305 p. $8.50.

The sixteenth and seventeenth volumes of this indispensable annotated bibliography on Latin America.

LA ECONOMÍA AGRARIA DE AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL TRABAJADOR CAMPESINO. By Moisés Poblete Troncoso. Santiago de Chile: Ediciones de la Universidad de Chile, 1953, 314 p.

A study, by a professor at the University of Chile, principally concerned with the economic, social and juridical position of the agricultural laborer in Latin America.

TRANSFORMATION: THE STORY OF MODERN PUERTO RICO. By Earl Parker Hanson. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955, 416 p. $5.00.

An optimistic account of recent social and economic changes in Puerto Rico expressing particular admiration for the work of Governor Luis Muñoz Marín. The author, a professor of geography, was formerly consultant with the Puerto Rican Reconstruction Administration.

JAMAICA: THE PORTRAIT OF AN ISLAND. By W. Adolphe Roberts. New York: Coward-McCann, 1955, 247 p. $4.00.

A popular survey and history by an author who specializes in the Caribbean area.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations, International Court of Justice, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2966 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington 6, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. London, 1955. 167 p. (Overseas Economic Surveys.) 5s.

L'Algérie contemporaine. Paris, Service d'Information, 1954. 235 p.

Commercial Policy and Trade

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Present rules and proposed revisions. Washington, 1955. 86 p.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Final Act. Geneva, GATT, 1955. v. p.

Trade agreements extension. Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 1, Jan. 17–Feb. 7, 1955. Washington, 1955. 2 pts.

——. Report, Feb. 14, 1955. Washington, 1955. 86 p. (H. Rept. 50.)

Tariff simplification study; interim report to the President . . . pursuant to Section 101(d) of the Customs Simplification Act of 1954. Washington, Tariff Commission, 1955. 70 p.

Trade agreements manual; a summary of selected data relating to trade agreements that the United States has negotiated since 1934. Washington, Tariff Commission, 1955. 49 p.

Injury determinations under the Anti-Dumping Act. Washington, Tariff Commission, 1955. 3 p.

Study of the financial aspects of international trade and of the Export-Import Bank and World Bank. Report of the Citizens Advisory Committee to the Committee on Banking and Currency, Senate, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pursuant to S. Res. 25 and S. Res. 183. Washington, 1954. 54 p. (Com. Print.)

Eastern Europe

Reports of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression (Communist takeover and occupation), House, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., under authority of H. Res. 346 and H. Res. 438, Dec. 30–31, 1954. Washington, 1954–55. 16 pts. (H. Rept. 2684.)

1. Latvia. 25 p. *2.* Albania. 22 p. *3.* Poland. 37 p. *4.* Poland (appendix). 176 p. *5.* Treatment of Jews under communism. 34 p. *6.* Estonia. 33 p. *7.* Ukraine. 36 p. *8.* Armenia. 16 p. *9.* Georgia. 31 p. *10.* Bulgaria. 18 p. *11.* Byelorussia. 29 p. *12.* Hungary. 27 p. *13.* Lithuania. 20 p. *14.* Czechoslovakia. 30 p. *15.* Rumania. 25 p. *16.* Summary report. 44 p.

Social achievements in people's Poland. Warsaw, n. pub., 1954. 114 p.

Ein Dokument antireligiöser propaganda aus der Sowjetunion. Bonn, Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1954. 36 p.

Economic Conditions

Growth and stagnation in the European economy, by Ingvar Svennilson. New York, 1954. 342 p. (1954. 11. E. 3.) $4.50.

Trends in economic growth; a comparison of the Western Powers and the Soviet Bloc. A study prepared for the Joint Committee on the Economic Report by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. Washington, 1955. 339 p. (Jt. Com. Print.)

Trends in economic sectors. Paris, OEEC, 1954.

1. The chemical industry in Europe. 153 p. $1.50. *2.* The coal industry in Europe, 81 p. $1.00. *3.* Maritime transport. 71 p. $1.25. *4.* The iron and steel industry in Europe. 26 p. *5.* Tourism in Europe in 1953. 65 p.

Statistical data. Vol. 1. Population and employment. Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1954.

European Federation

The First five years, 5 V. 1949–5 V. 1954. Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1954. 84 p.

NATO; the first five years, 1949–1954, by Lord Ismay. Paris, NATO, 1955. 280 p.

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Far East and Asia

Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., on Executive A, Feb. 8, 1955. Washington, 1955. 15 p. (Exec. Rept. 2.)

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 83d–84th Cong., on Executive K, Nov. 11, 1954, Jan. 19, 1955. Washington, 1955. 2 pts.

——. Report, Jan. 25, 1955. Washington, 1955. 19 p. (Exec. Rept. 1.)

Authorizing the President to employ the armed forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and related positions and territories of that area. Report from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany H. J. Res. 159, Jan. 24, 1955. Washington, 1955. 4 p. (H. Rept. 4.)

——. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. J. Res. 28, Jan. 26, 1955. Washington, 1955. 9 p. (S. Rept. 13.)

——. Act, approved Jan. 29, 1955. Washington, 1955. 1 p. (Public 4, 84th Cong.—H. J. Res. 159.)

The Korean war and related matters. Report of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act. . . . to the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 21, 1955. Washington, 1955. 25 p. (Com. Print.)

Industrial development in Indonesia, by J. E. Stepanek. N. Y., 1955. 161 p. (TAA/NS/INS 3.)

Without the chrysanthemum and the sword, by Jean Stoetzel. Paris, UNESCO, 1955. 334 p.

Financial Policy and Exchange

Directives for the application of the agreement for the establishment of a European Payments Union. Paris, OEEC, 1954. 30 p.

Private United States investment in Europe and the overseas territories. Paris, OEEC, 1954. 137 p. $1.25.

European Payments Union convertibility of currencies, 1951–1954. Paris, OEEC, 1955. 77 p. (OEEC bibliographies 1.) 75¢.

Investment insurance manual; insurance available for new American investments abroad under the Investment Guaranty Program. Washington, FOA, 1954. 29 p.

Germany

Education in the German Federal Republic, by G. W. Prange. Washington, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1954. 42 p.

Der Härtefonds im Lastenausgleich. Troisdorf, Ministerium für Arbeit, Soziales und Wiederaufbau des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1954. 73 p.

Der Unabsehbare Strom, by Harald von Koenigswald. Troisdorf, Ministerium für Arbeit, Soziales und Wiederaufbau des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1954. 79 p.

West-Ostdeutsche Forschungsaufgaben, by George Droege. Troisdorf, Ministerium für Arbeit, Soziales und Wiederaufbau des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1955. 79 p.

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Five Year Plan; Progress report for 1953–54. New Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1954. 333 p.

Latin America

Foreign capital in Latin America. N. Y., 1955. 164 p. (1954. II. G. 4.) $1.75.

The Development of Brazil; report of Joint Brazil-United States Economic Development Commission. Washington, 1954. 324 p. $2.75.

The Economic development program of British Honduras, prepared by D. L. Gordon. Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1954. 34 p.

Strengthening of internal security. Washington, Pan American Union, 1953. 432 p.

Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission 1954. London, 1954. 91 p. (Cmd. 9274.) 3s.

Constitution of the Republic of Nicaragua, 1950. Washington, Pan American Union, 1954. 64 p. 25¢.

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